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The central issue in this thesis is whether the world, as we fnd it in
perceptual experience, shares structure with thought. According to the
view that I label “monism”, it does; according to “dualism”, it does not.
It is my aim to defend monism: in a basic case, we think of something
that it is some way; we can also see that something is some way, so that
it is then manifest before our eyes that something is some way.
Thought, experience, and the world share predicative structure. In
chapter I, I argue for monism by arguing against dualism, which in
chapter III is discussed more specifcally as the view of Charles Travis.
But an at least equally important aim is to overcome a certain philo-
sophical framework within which monism cannot come into its own.
The core assumption of this framework is that a thinkable content is, in
itself, without assertoric force, and to hold it to be true one must add
such force. In chapter II, I argue that a thinkable content rather has the
character of a claim, even if this character can be muted in certain spe-
cial contexts, or when the content occurs in a more complex whole.
Only against this background can monism be understood as the truism
that it is. When it comes to this framework issue, “Fregean monism”
functions as a foil, which in chapter IV is discussed more specifcally as
the view of John McDowell in Mind and World.
2
Contents
I Everything is not enough
§1 Introduction 6
§2 Dualism 7
§3 How things are 13
§4 Out of mind's reach 16
§5 Fregean monism 24
§6 Monism 34
II The Thing that is Thought
§1 Introduction 54
§2 A sign for the angels 57
§3 Monism 75
III Reaching beyond the conceptual
§1 Introduction 96
§2 Travis's move 102
§3 Anti-psychologism 110
§4 Scheme-content dualism 120
§5 Naïve realism 132
§6 Out of reach 145
IV Saddled with content
§1 Introduction 153
§2 Two reminders 154
§3 Perceptible facts 160
§4 Antinomy 176
§5 An alternative 182
3
Acknowledgements
In many ways this thesis is a response to the ideas of Charles Travis. I
feel very happy to have had the opportunity to get to know Charles,
experience his friendship, and discuss my work with him. Without his
advice, criticism, and encouragement I would have written with less
inspiration about something entirely diferent.
I have also beneftted from the feedback of Bill Brewer. It's always a
pleasure to talk to him, and he helped me see what needs to be said -
only some of which I have managed to say - in defence of my view.
Two out of the past four years I spent as a visiting student at the Uni-
versity of Chicago, where I found something of an intellectual home. I
have both my friends among the graduate students and the professors
to thank for that. In particular I thank James Conant and David Finkel-
stein for giving me the opportunity and for commenting on my work.
Our conversations shaped my thinking more than I can acknowledge:
many of the central ideas in this thesis started with something they
said to me. I also had inspiring conversations with philosophers who
were visiting the department, especially Martin Gustafsson and Jean-
Philippe Narboux.
I was given the opportunity to present an early version of Chapter I for
a conference on idealism at Ca' Foscari, Venice, in September 2015; and
a version of Chapter IV in the Wittgenstein Workshop at the Univer-
sity of Chicago, in January 2016. On both occasions, I beneftted from
the responses of the participants, and I thank them and the organisers.
4
One group drags everything down to earth from the heavenly region of the
invisible, actually clutching rocks and trees with their hands. … The people
on the other side of the debate … insist violently that true being is certain
non-bodily forms that can be thought. … There’s a never-ending battle going
on constantly between them about this issue…
Plato, The Sophist
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I Everything is not enough
§1 Introduction
In this chapter I introduce two opposing philosophical views of percep-
tual experience and judgement. Schematically, the opposition can be
framed as follows. According to the one view, dualism, we cannot say
what we see: we can speak about what is given, but we cannot say it. The
world is everything that we can think about, the totality of things.
According to the other, monism, we can say what we see: we can see that
something is the case, and we can also say that something is the case.
The world is everything that is the case, the totality of facts. I argue for
monism. But an at least equally important aim is to bring into view a
philosophical framework, inspired by Descartes and Frege, within
which monism seems impossible. What becomes of monism within this
framework I call Fregean monism; it is defended by John McDowell in
Mind and World.
In §2 I introduce dualism, in §3 I argue that it is committed to a conten-
tious thesis, and in §4 I argue that this thesis is mistaken. In §5 I
introduce Fregean monism and argue that it is likewise mistaken. In §6
I discuss the rejection of Fregean monism and suggest that monism can




1 It is one of the most basic philosophical convictions that anything
that can be put into words must be at a remove from the sensible world.
What we mean by our words, the thought expressed, is abstract and
general, grasped by the mind instead of the senses. The sensible world
is not made up of abstract generalities, but of what is particular and
extended in space and time: such things as animals and plants, grains of
sand, footprints, shadows and clouds; or maybe such things as the fall-
ing of a shadow, the rising of a wave, an evening walk. In experience
something particular impresses itself on our senses and thus becomes
present to us; in response we make up our mind about what to think
and do. We then draw a relation between a thought and what is given;
for the thought to be true is for the relation to hold. So we cannot liter-
ally see that the wave is rising, or that the evening is setting, or that one
coin is larger than another; to see that something is the case is really to
tell that a thought is true on the basis of being given what is out there. I
call any view of this shape dualism.1
Let me elaborate on this by means of two theses. The frst thesis is that
1 The label is meant to evoke Davidson's “dualism of scheme and content”
(Davidson 1973) rather than, say, mind/body dualism. But I believe Davidson
had in mind something somewhat more specifc. His target is a version of
what I call dualism, but motivated by the sense that there are radically difer-
ent perspectives from which to describe how things are, none of which has a
claim to being the true perspective. I will mainly be concerned with dualism
as motivated by the idea that perception is a confrontation with our sur-
roundings (chapter I), and by a Cartesian conception of judgement (chapter
II). 
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perceptual awareness is an achievement of our senses, without help
from either the understanding or the capacity for judgement. To see
things is not already to apply concepts or to take any stances on how
things are. Perception is passive in a way that contrasts - not only with
action, but also - with the kind of rational agency exhibited in belief
and knowledge. It is not just that we cannot decide what to see or how
we see it to be. It is, of course, true that we cannot decide what to see,
aside from choosing where to stand and how to focus our attention. But
we cannot decide what to believe either, aside from deciding what to
investigate and where to look for information. Nonetheless, believing
is something we do, in a certain sense: it is an expression of rational
agency, an exercise of judgement and understanding. The dualist
thinks perception is not even active in that sense. 
One way in which the passivity of experience comes to expression is
grammatical. Although we normally speak of perception in the active
voice, with the perceiving subject in the grammatical subject position
(“I see… .”), the dualist talks of it in the passive voice: as being appeared
to, or being presented with something, or being given something. Only
in response do we apply concepts, partition the whole, carve it up,
interpret it, bring it under a generality, relate it to something else, or
whatever it is that the mind does. C.I. Lewis ofered the following clas-
sic statement (Lewis 1929: 38):
There are, in our cognitive experience, two elements; the immediate data,
such as those of sense, which are presented or given to the mind, and a form,
construction, or interpretation, which represents the activity of thought. Re-
cognition of this fact is one of the oldest and most universal of philosophic in-
sights.
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Expressed abstractly like that, the basic idea concerns the character of
givenness; it stays neutral on what is given. Sense data theorists share
this conception of givenness and furthermore believe that what is
immediately given is not yet an element of our shared environment. I
mention this only to leave it aside. According to the form of dualism
with which I will be concerned, the very things around us, the world in
which we live, our surroundings themselves are immediately present
in perceptual experience. Such a view is known as naïve or direct real-
ism. Charles Travis expresses its central thesis as follows (Travis 2013:
31):
[P]erception, as such, simply places our surroundings in view; afords us
awareness of them. There is no commitment to their being one way or anoth-
er. It confronts us with what is there, so that, by attending, noting, recogniz-
ing, and otherwise exercising what capacities we have, we may, in some
respect or other, make out what is there for what it is—or, again, fail to. 
Perception confronts us with what is there. In other, slightly archaic
words, our senses acquaint us with our surroundings. “Acquaintance” is
here used in a special sense. To be acquainted with someone, in the
everyday sense of the word, is more than merely to have crossed paths;
it is to have a certain familiarity with - and so to know certain things
about - this person. But the dualistic sense of acquaintance is only the
having met, without the knowledge thus acquired. This knowledge is
supposed to be acquired on the basis of acquaintance. That does not
mean that perceptual acquaintance must come temporally before
knowledge. Nor does it mean that being acquainted with things would
be psychologically distinguishable from telling that they are thus and
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so. It may well be that immediately upon seeing a wave I recognise that
it is a rising wave, and this recognition need not be an isolable element
in my stream of consciousness. Still, so the thought goes, in a logical
sense any knowledge I acquire about the wave is posterior to the wave's
being present to me. In so far as experience is receptive, a matter of
awareness of what is there, it is mere acquaintance with what is there.
That thesis on perceptual awareness is epistemological, in the broad
sense of concerning the order of taking something to be so: seeing is
prior to knowing and believing (telling). This thesis comes together
with what I call the second or ontological thesis of dualism, which is
ontological in the broad sense of concerning the order of being so: what
is given is a diferent sort of thing than the sort of thing that can be
expressed in words and known to be the case.
One way to draw the distinction is by means of a contrast between the
concrete particularity of the sensible world and the generality of
thought. For anything that we can think to be so, there are indefnitely
many ways for things to be so that they are accordingly. What is before
our eyes is the unique way things are here and now. In telling how
things are we bring this unique way under a generality. The generality
is not before our eyes; it is not part of the sensible world. Apart from
this basic idea there is a choice on how to draw the distinction. Some
dualists talk of particular cases, state of afairs, or situations, which in
judgement we relate to a thought, statement, or proposition. Others
talk of property instances, which in judgement we recognise as
instances of a type. But for present purposes we can abstract away from
the details. The general idea is that the way something is, in the sense in
which this can be given in experience, is something infnitely particu-
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lar, non-repeatable. When I'm looking at a wave, I see the way the
wave is as it is here and now. It makes no sense to say of anything else
that it is this way. There is no such thing as being the same way. It is a
property instance, not a property type; a particular case, not a way for
a particular case to be. When I tell that the wave is rising I group this
unique thing together with other possible cases of a rising wave. I
recognise this property instance as being of a certain type; I recognise
this particular case as being a case of a rising wave.2
Dualism is the combination of both theses. We can summarise the
combination as a conception of “seeing that something is the case.” A
diferently inclined philosopher might think that it is possible to see -
in the sense of visual awareness - that something is the case. In doing
so, one would fnd a conceptual form enmattered in the here and now.
There is the matter (the thing that one sees), and there is the form
(what and how one sees it to be) — these are diferent ways of describ-
ing one and the same object of experience. But that is not how the
dualist thinks of it. To a dualist, form and matter are two separate
items which stand in a relation to each other. “Seeing that something is
the case” is not a receptive achievement. To see that something is over
there, or that one thing is larger than another, or what something is, is
really to tell that something is the case on the basis of being given what
is out there. To the dualist, anything which can be put into words
remains at a remove from what is present in perceptual experience. We
can talk about what we see, bring it under a generality, but we cannot
2 Kalderon 2011 and Travis 2013 make this especially explicit. This kind of idea
may also be behind the issue of the “fne-grainedness” of experience, when
this is seen as a problem for the thesis that experience is conceptually struc-
tured.
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say what we see.
The ontological and the epistemological thesis confrm each other.
Either one can serve as an argument for the other. The dualist may
start with the idea that our surroundings are made up of particulars
not of generalities, and then argue on this basis that perceptual experi-
ence, in so far as it is receptive, can only be awareness of particulars,
not already awareness of them falling under generalities. That the
evening is setting is not an object in our surroundings; therefore, to see
that the evening is setting cannot be a receptive achievement. Con-
versely, the dualist may argue that because in experience we are caused
to see what we do and only make up our mind in response, what we see
can only be concrete and particular: facts and propositions are not spa-
tio-temporally located, they do not undergo or efect changes, and so
cannot impress itself on our senses or be present in experience; there-
fore, they are not part of the sensible world. We cannot be given that
things are a certain way; we must judge that things are a certain way on
the basis of what is given.3 Thus each conviction is sustained by the
other, but it is difcult to argue for them on independent grounds. The
dualist feels they are basic requirements of realism: to deny them
would be – to borrow a phrase from McDowell - to slight the independ-
ence of reality. The world must be given to us, lest it be dependent on
the activity of our mind. What is given must be devoid of generality,
lest it be abstract and formed so as to ft the shape of our thinking.
3 One could see an argument in either direction in Frege's remark, “That the sun
has risen is not an object which emits rays that reach my eyes, it is not a visible
thing like the sun itself. We judge that the sun has risen on the basis of sense
impressions.” (Frege 1918: 292; my translation) This remark is central to
Travis's defence of naïve realism in Travis 2013.
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§3 How things are
Although dualism is a familiar target of criticism, it tends to strike its
proponents as only common-sensical. Lewis had this to say about the
epistemological thesis (1929: 53):
[N]o-one but a philosopher could for a moment deny this immediate pres-
ence in consciousness of that which no activity of thought can create or alter.
And about the ontological thesis, J.L. Austin wrote the following (Aus-
tin 1950: 117):
When a statement is true, there is, of course, a state of afairs which makes it
true and which is toto mundo distinct from the true statement about it: but
equally of course, we can only describe that state of afairs in words (either the
same or, with luck, others).  
It is indeed undeniable that there is something truistic in those state-
ments. But a philosopher can afrm a truism and meanwhile smuggle
in a substantial thesis — which is, I believe, just what the dualist does.
So the frst thing I need to show is that dualism is not obvious, that it is
committed to something contentious: a reduction of how things are to
an object of reference and acquaintance.
That we only see particulars, and that only in response we bring them
under a generality, is not as common-sensical as it may sound. We do
not just see things, but in doing so we see how things are. Of course, we
can see something perfectly clearly and yet not see how it is in various
respects. But what would the presence of things be if it were not at least
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a matter of seeing how things are spatially arranged over time? During
a walk along the beach I may see, for example, that the dunes are over
here and the sea is over there, that a couple is walking towards a beach
house, dragging a buggy behind them, that the wind is rufling the
feathers of a sandpiper, that a wave is washing over a stranded jelly
fsh, unfastening it, retreating and leaving behind some debris. What I
mean to describe here is my seeing what I do — I describe that which I
see in the way that I see it. My description is given in response to see-
ing it, but what it means to capture, express, is my perceptual
experience itself. My surroundings' being present to me articulates
into these sayable aspects, among indefnitely many others. I can see,
and also say, that there is some seaweed lying over there. Nor is this
sort of thing limited to spatial location. To see how things are spa-
tio-temporally arranged is also to grasp a causal order, which things
are moving themselves and which are moving others, and how —
which means that it is also a matter of seeing what animals and people
are doing. Not to mention such things as hearing or seeing meaning in
spoken or written words, emotion in a voice, face or bodily posture.
But according to dualism, to see that something is the case is a response
to perceptual experience. It is to bring what is present under a general-
ity; to group it together with possibilities that are not present. The
dualist can acknowledge that seeing things is seeing how things are.
But he can only acknowledge this by distinguishing “seeing how things
are” in this sense from “knowing that something is the case.” Corres-
pondingly, he will distinguish what is seen in the frst from what is
known in the second: “how things are,” in the sense in which this can
be given in experience, is not what we say in saying how things are. It
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is rather a thing to speak or think about: a state of afairs, particular
case, property instance, or whatever the preferred idiom may be.
Wanting to accommodate the fact that the world consists not just of
things but of how things are, the dualist is moved to construe how
things are as a particular; concrete and unique, non-repeatable, a token
of a type. He will distinguish, for example, between the wind's rufling
the feathers of a sandpiper, awareness of which may be perceptual, and
that the wind is rufling the feathers of a sandpiper, awareness of
which is cognitive. In the sense in which we can see how things are we
cannot say how things are; and in the sense in which we can say how
things are we cannot see how things are.
You can recognise a dualist by this attempt to construe how things are
as something else than what we say in saying how things are, and as
itself a thing to refer to, something which we cannot know (savoir) but
only be acquainted with (connaître). To some, that may seem absurd
enough to conclude that dualism is a myth – the elusive “Myth of the
Given”. It would be a logical mistake to construe “how the sky is” as an
object, like the sky itself. The sense that nothing more needs to be said
may account for the felt lack of argument on the side of dualism's
opponents (a complaint voiced in Kalderon 2011 and Travis forthcom-
ing). Conversely, the dualist will accuse his opponent of equivocating
over two senses of how things are, the sense in which it can be said,
and the sense in which it determines the truth or falsity of what is
said.4 All I have meant to show so far is that the form which this dis-
4 “McDowell misconceives sensory presentation as conceptual representation,
in part, by confating property exemplifcation with the content of a possible
predication … .” (Kalderon 2011: 240)
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tinction takes in dualism is a contentious thesis: how things are, in the
sense in which this can be given in experience, is an object of reference
and acquaintance. The task remaining is to show that this thesis is mis-
taken.
§4 Out of mind's reach
The general objection against dualism is that it places the world out of
mind's reach. It is not difcult to get a sense for the basic idea. For our
words not to be idle or empty, out of touch with the world, we have to
be able to know, on occasion, not merely what it is true to say but why
it is true to say that. One can think of this as what it means to know
what it is true to say: knowing is knowing the reason why. For a basic
kind of belief, perceptual experience is the way to acquire such know-
ledge. When I believe that the sky is blue, and I believe this because the
sky itself is present to me in experience, its being present to me is my
reason for thinking that the sky is blue; and if I am right, what is
present is the reason why it is true to think that the sky is blue. But
according to dualism, this reason (either the presence or what is
present) is not the sort of thing that can be put into words. I can refer to
it, talk about it, but I cannot say it. And so it seems that the dualist has to
claim that I cannot say why it is true that the sky is blue, or why I am
justifed to believe this; and that I cannot know, but only be acquainted
with, my reason for thinking that the sky is blue. The criticism is that
this would mean that the reason stays obscure to the mind, so that it
cannot be my reason for thinking what I do. 
Let me frst briefy discuss the problem of acquaintance. The dualist
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tends to emphasise the fact that in perceptual experience things are
immediately present to us. The view that in experience we represent
things as being some way is thought to be in contradiction with this.
But I want to contrast dualism with a view according to which the
presence of things in experience is the subject's self-consciously know-
ing how things are. That seems to me the right view. From this
perspective, the dualistic separation of understanding and the pres-
ence of things in experience leaves too little for the latter to be a self-
conscious awareness of how things are. It could at best be the sort of
awareness that we undergo when we're being distracted by a buzzing
noise without noticing: the kind of case in which it makes sense to say
that our ears, but not we, are hearing something. But to sufer sense
impressions in that way is not yet to be in possession of a reason for
judgement, even though that is just what it is supposed to be according
to dualism.
For example, when I listen to a song I do not merely hear sounds; I hear
the way these sounds hang together to form rhythms, melodies,
chords, chord progressions, and so on. But this is just to hear that they
hang together in such and such ways, and that is something which I
can also say: I can say, for example, that I am hearing an A minor chord
or a perfect ffth. But to grasp what I can also say – that things are thus
and so – is something which, according to dualism, I do on the basis of
perceptual awareness. Abstracting away from it, what I am supposed to
be literally hearing is not already a chord or a melody as such.5 I hear
5 “As such” is somewhat redundant. A dualist would say that what I hear is in
fact a chord or a melody. But if I do not hear it as such, it is perfectly natural
to say that I do not hear the melody. The use of “hear” is the intentional use
Anscombe draws attention to in Anscombe 1965.
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mere notes without yet grasping the connections. But without grasping
the connections I do not hear notes as such; they are, so far, mere
sounds to me.6 But if dualism is right, even to judge that these sounds
are distinguished from the background noise is something that I must
do on the basis of literally hearing what is there. But now what kind of
“hearing” is this? In what sense am I still aware of what is there at all?
To receive auditory input, without grasping any structure, is merely
having one's ears open, not yet using them to listen. 
This is just one example of a general phenomenon, extensively
described by philosophers working in a Kantian tradition.7 If to be
aware of the particular case has to be mere acquaintance, this aware-
ness would lack the togetherness needed for it to be self-conscious
awareness, bearing rationally on what we are to think and do — and so
the supposed object of awareness would be out of mind's reach. C.I.
Lewis may be right that no activity of mind can create what is immedi-
ately present, but it can - and normally does - inform human sensibility,
so that our sensing can be our grasping how things hang together.
The above may be summarised in the catchphrase “perceptual experi-
ence is already conceptually shaped”. But given the ontological thesis
of dualism, this is apt to be misunderstood. It is apt to be misunder-
stood as saying that before the conscious subject comes onto the scene,
her perceptual experience is already conceptualised: subconsciously the
non-conceptual given is transformed into something conceptual. That is a
6 If I momentarily fail to hear a connection between notes, they will not by that
fact cease to be notes to me. But if I am deaf to such connections, I lack the ca -
pacity to hear notes.
7 See, for example, Strawson 1974 and Longuenesse 1998.
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common reading of Kant. More recently we fnd it in Travis's
responses to McDowell (see Travis 2004, 2007, and forthcoming).
Surely some philosophers have wanted to defend a view along those
lines. But it is not what McDowell meant, and it is not what I mean. To
say that experience is conceptually shaped, a matter of seeing that
something is the case, is to say that a fact can be immediately manifest
in perceptual experience: right there before one's eyes. There is no con-
ceptualising to do, because the world itself is already conceptually
shaped. This does not make sense against the background of the onto-
logical thesis of dualism, and so the dualist simply does not hear it in
this way. Even if a conception of perceptual givenness forms one of the
main motivations for the ontological thesis, it is not the only one, and
to argue against it does not thereby upset the ontological thesis. We
must tackle that thesis head-on. 
The ontological thesis means that what is given is something inefable,
something which cannot be made available for discursive deliberation
in the way that a thought can. But what is the problem with that? It
seems one may accuse a philosopher of trying the impossible when
something thought-like is supposed to be inefable – an inefable
insight, an inefable idea. But what could be the problem with unsay-
able things in the world? To say that the sky is blue is not to say the
sky, but to bring the sky under a generality. One may hear this kind of
response in Austin's remark, quoted above. But Austin does not speak
of ordinary objects of reference, he speaks of states of afairs, and this
play just the role that such terms do in dualism generally.8 The prob-
8 This is evident from his theory of truth: “A statement is said to be true when
the historic state of afairs to which it is correlated by the demonstrative con-
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lem is not with the claim that the sky cannot be said, but that one cannot
even say how the sky is. Dualism construes “how the sky is” as a partic-
ular which in thinking is brought under a generality. 
For the sake of convenience, let us refer to this particular as a property
instance, the blue of the sky (another option would be: the sky's being blue).
According to dualism, for me to see that the sky is blue is really for me
to tell (judge) that the blue of the sky instantiates a certain type: the
property of being blue. What is present to me is the reason why it is
true to say that the sky is blue. So why is it true to say that the sky is
blue? The blue of the sky. So far, this reference to the blue of the sky is
lacking a propositional context. Of course it makes sense to refer to
something in order to say why a judgement is true or justifed. But
referring to something is done in the context of, or as a preparation for,
saying how it is. I can say, “It is true to say that the sky is blue because
the sky is, in fact, blue,” — here I refer to the sky, within the context of
saying how it is. I can also say that it is true because of the sky, but that
calls for a further specifcation: surely it's true because of something
about the sky - the condition it is in, a certain way it is - and what else
than that it is blue? But dualism construes the condition it is in as
something which I can only refer to. So at the point where I would
want to say how the sky is, all I can do is refer to something. But I can
only refer to something in the context of saying what or how it is. The
dualist has deprived me of the context in which referring would make
sense. 
If that it is the problem with dualism, it would make sense of McDow-
ventions (the one to which it 'refers') is of a type with which the sentence used
in making it is correlated by the descriptive conventions.” (Austin 1950: 116)
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ell's criticism of the Myth of the Given in Mind and World. McDowell's
discussion focusses on the role of perceptual experience in providing
an ultimate justifcation for an empirical belief. To fall into the Myth of
the Given would be to think that this ultimate justifcation, what is
given in experience, cannot be conceptually structured. If I believe that
something is the case, and I believe this in a way that can be traced
back to an experience I've had, I would ultimately, in defending my
belief, have to point to what was given to me. The reason for my belief -
and if I am right, the reason it is true - would not be the sort of thing
that can be expressed in words (McDowell 1994: 6):
The idea is that when we have exhausted all the available moves within the
space of concepts, all the available moves from one conceptually organized
item to another, there is still one more step to take: namely, pointing to
something that is simply received in experience. 
But what is wrong with pointing to something? McDowell doesn't say.
But we can now see what the problem is. If “what is given” is construed
as an object of acquaintance, which replaces how things are, pointing
to this object takes the place of saying how things are, and so this
pointing would lack a propositional context. It would be empty, failing
even to refer to what is given – less like an assertion than like a noise
made when one is at a loss for words.
But this may be too quick. At this stage in the dialectic, it still seems
something else can be done besides trying to point to what is given. I
can say that what is given is the reason why it is true to say that the sky
is blue: the blue of the sky is a truth-maker for the proposition that the
sky is blue. Given a more determinate understanding of what that
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comes to, there is also something more determinate I can say. For
example, I can say that what is given is the type of thing it is: the blue
of the sky is an instance of blueness. Doesn't that mean that what is
given is within mind's reach after all?
It is true that dualists do not generally feel tempted to refer to what is
given outside the context of a proposition. Instead of pointing to what
is given, they relate it to something conceptual. They say something
like, “The blue of the sky instantiates the property of being blue.”9
Although in a certain sense this says the same as “The sky is blue,” it is
supposed to make something manifest which is not yet manifest in
that shorter formulation. The shorter formulation brings the sky under
a generality: the concept of being blue. But what makes this true is a
particular instance of falling under this generality: an instantiation of
being blue. So for philosophical purposes it is not enough to say that
the predication is true because the sky is blue. That would only be to
say that it is type blue. It is true to say this, to say that the sky is type
blue, because the sky is token blue. The blue of the sky is the reason that
it is true to say that the sky is blue. And the blue of the sky is a token of
a property.
But when the dualist says this, he is failing to apply his own standards
to his own view. “The sky is token blue” is again a predication. It brings
the sky under the concept of being token blue. But what makes this
true, the dualist should say, is a particular instance of falling under this
9 One can replace this by any theory of truth according to which for a thought
(thinkable content, proposition, etc.) to be true is for it to stand in some rela-
tion to some given thing (particular case, fact, property instance, etc.). See
Hornsby 1997 for an insightful discussion of such views.
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generality: an instantiation of being token blue. It is not enough to say
that the predication is true because the sky is token blue (that would be
to say that it is type token blue); rather, it is true because the sky is
token token blue. And so on forever. It may seem that the dualist can
stop after the frst step: the reason it is true to say, “The sky is blue,” is
that the sky is token blue, but that is where the chain stops: there is no
further reason why it is true to say that the sky is token blue. But to
stop there is to conceive the world as conceptually structured: we can
say that the sky is token blue, and that the sky is token blue can be
there in the world. The idea of dualism would be lost. Once an excep-
tion to the ontological thesis is admitted, there seems no reason to
hang on to it at all: if that the sky is token blue is there in the world,
why not also that it is blue?
The dualist feels a certain dissatisfaction with the perspective we take
up when in everyday life we say how things are using the words that
we do. When we say, “The sky is blue,” this fails to transparently reveal
how this thought stands to reality. For philosophical purposes it would
be insufcient to say that the judgement is true because the sky is blue.
To say merely that would be to go around in a circle within the concep-
tual sphere. The ultimate reason a judgement is true, which is given in
experience, is not the sort of thing that we can think; it is the sort of
thing that we can only think about. But this same dissatisfaction
should extend to the relational formulation. It should be obvious that if
saying, “The sky is blue,” is to remain confned within the conceptual
sphere, then there is no point in paraphrasing this as, “The blue of the
sky instantiates the property of being blue,” or any other formulation
like that. Say that the dualist would accept this point. If he would non-
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etheless retain the picture of the world as lying beyond the conceptual
sphere, he would now, having rejected talk of a relation between
thought and given, have no option left but to point to what is given.
What makes a thought true is really not the relation, but the worldly
relatum. In answer to the question “Why is it true that the sky is blue?”
the dualist has to say something equivalent to “things”; not to “how
things are,” even if it is his analysis of “how things are.” But this point-
ing is empty: having rejected the relation, it can now not anymore be
understood as a way of saying anything.
§5 Fregean Monism
1 If the problem with dualism is that it construes what is given as
something to refer to, something which we can only speak about, the
answer would seem to be that we can say what is given. It is true that
the world consists of such things as sand and waves, things we can only
speak about. But things are not divorced from how they are. When a
wave is before my eyes, then so is how it is: for instance how it is
shaped and coloured, and where it is over time. Such aspects of the lay-
out of reality can be manifest to me in experience, and I can also put
them into words. I then talk about the wave, but not about how it is — I
say how it is. With that I reach the world, that which determines
whether my judgement is true or false: it is true to say that the wave is
rising because it is, in fact, rising. The world is “Everything that is the
case,” as it is said in the opening lines of the Tractatus, “the totality of
facts, not of things.” (TLP 1-1.1) And that something is the case can also
be manifest in experience: to see things is to see that something is the
case. (TLP 5.5423) That answer is what I call monism.
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2 In Mind and World, John McDowell defends a form of monism. He
combines the Tractarian slogan with the idea that to speak truly is for
the thing that one says to be a fact (27):
[T]here is no ontological gap between the sort of thing one can mean, or gener-
ally the sort of thing one can think, and the sort of thing that can be the case.
When one thinks truly, what one thinks is what is the case. So since the world
is everything that is the case …, there is no gap between thought, as such, and
the world.
Correspondingly, he defends a conception of perceptual experience as
seeing that something is the case (9):
In experience one takes in, for instance sees, that things are thus and so. That is
the sort of thing one can also, for instance, judge. 
These remarks are not supposed to be substantial theses. What may
seem to be theses are really meant as reminders of something which
outside of our studies we do not forget. They are, once disengaged from
a more substantial understanding, undeniable: they are truisms (27):
But to say there is no gap between thought, as such, and the world is just to
dress up a truism in high-fown language. All the point comes to is that one
can think, for instance, that spring has begun, and that very same thing, that
spring has begun, can be the case. That is truistic, and it cannot embody some-
thing metaphysically contentious, like slighting the independence of reality.
The point of issuing these reminders is to dispel sceptical anxieties
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about the contentfulness of thought, and thereby also to dispel the
sense that a more substantial conception of the relation between mind
and world would be possible or needed, in particular the kinds of con-
ception which I have grouped together under dualism. But as I will now
argue briefy, and in more depth in chapter IV, we cannot understand
McDowell's reminders as truistic within the philosophical framework
in which he develops them.
3 McDowell thinks that philosophers cannot accept the truisms,
and instead fall into the Myth of the Given, because they are under a
restricted conception of causality. On the restricted conception, any
causal interaction is in essence understood the way things are under-
stood in natural science—according to some variant of the picture,
maybe more sophisticated, of a dent made in the clay tablet of the mind.
But we cannot make sense of reason in this way; in particular, of the way
judgements hang together according to relations of justifcation. So it
comes to seem that experience, if it consists of the impressions which
our surroundings make on our senses, cannot constitute a reason for
judgement. But then again, it must, lest our concepts be empty, and our
thinking be “a frictionless spinning in a void.” (11) A philosopher falls
into the Myth of the Given when she thinks of nature in this restricted
way and nonetheless feels - correctly - that experience must bear
rationally on what we are to think and do. She will then take what is
given to be non-conceptual; nonetheless she will insist - incoherently -
that this non-conceptual thing is a reason for judgement. McDowell
thinks that we can avoid the Myth of the Given when we remove the
restriction on our conception of nature. He reminds us that nature
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includes second nature, which in the human case includes the capacity
for speaking a language. By learning a language, we also develop a
second nature for drawing on our conceptual capacities in perceptual
experience. This allows for experience to be a transaction in nature
which is nonetheless conceptually shaped. “Impressions can be cases of
its perceptually appearing - its being apparent - to a subject that things
are thus and so.” (McDowell 1994: xx) This in turn allows us to accept
the truism that the world is everything that is the case, and that in
experience it can be manifest that something is the case (26-8).
But although McDowell allows for sensibility informed by the under-
standing, he still wants to separate understanding and the capacity for
judgement. He inherits this idea from Frege, though it has its source in
modern philosophy in the fourth Meditation of Descartes. There the nar-
rator writes, “All that the intellect does is enable me to perceive the
ideas which are subjects for possible judgement; and when regarded
strictly in this light, it turns out to contain no error in the proper sense
of the term.” (Descartes, 1641: 95) The understanding or intellect is here
thought of as a faculty of perception, and the very idea that understand-
ing is perceiving means that it cannot yet be judging. To perceive
something, Descartes thinks, is not yet a matter of taking a stance on
how things are. So if understanding is perceiving, then to understand
something, to grasp an idea, is likewise not yet a matter of taking a
stance. 
This also means that what the understanding perceives is, considered as
such, without the force of judgement. It is not what we claim in claim-
ing that the sky is blue, but the mere idea of the sky's being blue. And so
the separation of understanding and judgement goes together with
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what, since Frege, is known as the distinction of content and force.
What “perceiving the subject of judgement” is for Descartes, that men-
tioning a thinkable content is for Frege. The content of a judgement is
not the claim that the sky is blue but the thing which we claim: that the
sky is blue (try to hear the combination of copula and verb without
force). In judging we add assertoric force to the thinkable content: the
idea of a blue sky is on our mind, and moreover, we afrm that things
are this way. It is within this dualistic framework, which will be the
topic of the next chapter, that McDowell ofers an account of perceptual
experience as conceptually shaped.
This comes to expression in two ways. First, although sensibility is
informed by the understanding, it is not thereby a matter of takinga
stance on how things are. The understanding is the capacity for using
concepts; so to say that sensibility is informed by the understanding is
to say that conceptual capacities are used in some way. But since exper-
ience is passive, separate from the will, these conceptual capacities
cannot already be exercised; they are, as McDowell puts it, “drawn on”
or “passively actualised”. Just this is supposed to save McDowell's view
from being a subjectivist form of idealism. It would be idealistic to
think of experience as a form of judgement, a matter of exercising con-
ceptual capacities, but it is not idealistic to think of it as involving the
passive actualisation of conceptual capacities (10):
In experience one fnds oneself saddled with content. One's conceptual capa-
cities have already been brought into play, in the content's being available to
one, before one has any choice in the matter. The content is not something one
has put together oneself, as when one decides what to say about something. In
fact it is precisely because experience is passive, a matter of receptivity in op-
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eration, that the conception of experience I am recommending can satisfy the
craving for a limit to freedom that underlies the Myth of the Given.
Second, McDowell follows Frege in distinguishing between an act of
judgement and the content of such an act. The possible content of a
judgement is “given by a 'that' clause” (3); it is what is referred to by an
instance of the scheme “that things are thus and so”. This use of “that
things are thus and so” as a referring expression pervades Mind and
World. That is why McDowell's reminders take the form that they do:
the very same thing which can be said can also be seen and be the case.
The bearer of a truth value is, as such, something to refer to, even
though in thinking we do not refer to it but think it. It is a thing, but a
thinkable thing. Again this idea is supposed to save McDowell's view
from “slighting the independence of reality” (27). It would be idealistic
to think of the world as made up of acts of thinking. But it is not ideal-
istic to claim that the world is made up of the true contents of such acts
(28):
'Thought' can mean the act of thinking; but it can also mean the content of a
piece of thinking: what someone thinks. Now if we are to give due acknow-
ledgement to the independence of reality, what we need is a constraint from
outside thinking and judging, our exercises of spontaneity. The constraint does
not need to be from outside thinkable contents.
Now the central ideas of monism are understood in a surprising way.
The dualistic background assumptions make for what I call Fregean mon-
ism, which, despite the name, is like monism in the way that a fata
morgana is like an oasis. That the world is “everything that is the case”
is understood to mean that the world is every thinkable thing that is the
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case: the totality of true thinkable contents. Similarly, that “seeing
things is seeing that things are thus and so” is understood to mean that
in experience we are presented with a thinkable content. To be thus
represented to is not already to take a stance on how things are. It is
merely to be under an appearance to the efect that things are thus and
so; in response we can either take this appearance at face value, as
would be the default, or reject it as an illusion (26):
That things are thus and so is the content of an experience, and it can also be the
content of a judgement. It becomes the content of a judgement when one de-
cides to take the experience at face value. … So it is conceptual content. But
that things are thus and so is also, if one is not misled, an aspect of the layout of
the world: it is how things are.
McDowell presents these ideas as Kantian, in terms of a contrast
between the spontaneity of discursive activity and the receptivity of
perceptual experience. What is at issue, though, is not so much that
contrast as such, but its alignment with the contrast between activity
and passivity, which comes from Descartes and more immediately
from Frege (Kant himself speaks of experience in the frst person and
the active voice). Jennifer Hornsby, in a defence of McDowell's view on
truth, considers the objection that this view supposes that “by denying
any gap between thought and world, one commits oneself to a sort of
idealism.” (Hornsby 1997: 1) But that, she writes, would be a confusion
of people's thinking with the content of their thoughts. To say that the
world is made up of acts of thinking would be idealistic, but it is not
idealistic to say that the world is made up of true thinkable contents.
But one does not have to confuse people's thinking of things with the
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content of their thoughts in order to fnd this view idealistic in a prob-
lematic way, or maybe the problem is that it is not idealistic enough.
The problem is just this separation between understanding and judge-
ment which is supposed to save the view from idealism. 
One basic problem is that McDowell needs the determination of a
truth-evaluable content to be passive in a way that contrasts with the
activity of judgement. It is not something that merely happens to one in
the way that a blow to the head does; exactly not: that is the point of
saying that sensibility is informed by the understanding. But it is still
passive in a way that contrasts with taking a stance on how things are.
Without doing anything, in this sense, one can be under an appearance
to the efect that things are thus and so, an appearance which one can
then either accept at face value or reject as an illusion. But if in experi-
ence we lack the agency to take a stance on how things are, then how
can we have the agency to determine a truth evaluable content? Or the
other way around, if we have the agency to determine a truth evaluable
content, then how can we lack the agency to take a stance on how things
are? It is not as if we generally fnd apt words to describe a scene and
then decide to mean it, too. Finding apt words and meaning what we
say are not two separate acts, the frst a preparation for the second.
McDowell himself emphasises as much in this defence of essentially de
re sense (McDowell 1984, 2005). If thinkable content, to be genuinely
content, must refer to what it purports to, then to “have content avail-
able to one” cannot be separate from taking a stance on how things are.
To have content available to one is already to know that the referring
terms in it do refer. The good idea of essentially de re senses does not go
together with the separation of judgement and understanding, and so
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also not with the separation between judgement and sensibility
informed by the understanding.
Relatedly, it is not as if normally we can hold an experience at arm's
length and decide to take it at face value or reject it as an illusion.
McDowell would not deny this. The two-part structure is supposed to
be the logical structure of experience. It may be a shallow ad hominem to
object that constructive metaphysics is just this kind of postulation of a
logical structure hidden underneath what is manifest to the thinking,
perceiving subject. To do so cannot go together with McDowell's insist-
ence that he is merely issuing reminders. A more principled objection is
that the structure he postulates could never be the surface structure. It
could not be that I generally had to decide whether or not to take
appearances at face value. If I did, I would be so alienated from my sur-
roundings that I would not have anything to go on to make the decision.
The picture McDowell presents would ft someone who was in the posi-
tion which a radical sceptic fears he is in. It thus exactly fails to dispel
sceptical anxieties about how the world could possibly be within mind's
reach.
Those objections concern the epistemological structure of McDowell's
account of experience. Another line of objection concerns his ontolo-
gical “truism”: his conception of the world as the totality of true
thinkable contents. Even if it is truistic, as McDowell claims, that the
world is everything that is the case, this ceases to be truistic when it is
understood to mean that the world is the totality of true thinkable con-
tents. Referring to a thinkable, refecting on it, it seems the wrong sort
of thing to impress itself on our senses, be present in experience, or
constitute the sensible world. I look around, and I fnd leaves lying on
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the ground, barren branches against a pale blue sky, the sun cascading
on wet stones, but no matter how hard I look, nowhere do I fnd the
thinkable content that the leaves are on the ground. What can be present to
me in experience, what I fnd around me on my way through the world,
are things that undergo and efect changes, and have a spatio-temporal
location; not such things as “that things are thus and so”. It is true, on
the view which I will eventually defend, that one can see that the leaves
are on the ground, but this is to see the leaves, and, in doing so, to see
where they are; it is not to see a thinkable thing. Now it is not that
McDowell would deny that concrete particulars impress themselves on
our senses and are present to us. He would say that they do. But what
this means, according to him, is that we are presented with thinkable
content, which in response we take at face value. This referential per-
spective on a thinkable content encourages ontological questions which
McDowell would prefer to set aside. It makes it reasonable to respond
as the dualist does: a thinkable content is not the sort of thing which
undergoes or afects changes, and so not the sort of thing to impress
itself on our senses or be present in experience.
So the reason dualists cannot accept McDowell's reminders is not
necessarily that they are under a restricted conception of causality.
Rather,  within the framework McDowell shares with dualism these
supposed truisms are substantial philosophical theses which face vari-
ous problems. One could tinker with the view to answer some of these
problems, but that would only hide the fact that they have their source
in a central feature of Mind and World: the separation of understanding
and judgement which is supposed to allow McDowell to steer a middle
course between the Myth of the Given and a frictionless spinning in a
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void. McDowell underestimates the attractions of dualism. A restricted
conception of causality is only one route to dualism. The more general
idea is that awareness is not yet to take a stance on how things are. And
that idea McDowell endorses. One could say that his conception of the
Myth of the Given is only one special case, and although he avoids this
special case, he falls into the more general form of the Myth. 
§6 Monism
1 If the problem with dualism is that it construes what is given,
how things are, as something to refer to, then the answer is that we can
say how things are. But it is a mistake to hear this as: the thing which
we say is the very same thing as the thing which is how things are. By
taking up this perspective of referring to “what we say” and “how things
are” we would contradict the insight in the moment of stating it, as the
Fregean monist does. It may be inevitable that the correction to dualism
will at frst take such a form. We have to refer to “what we say” and
“how things are” in order to say that these are not really things to refer
to; that is, not really things. They are not really things which in judge-
ment we relate to each other, not even the relation of identity. But we
can get away from this referential perspective when instead we take up
the perspective of judgement.
When we say how things are we do not have “what we say” on our
mind. When I think that the wave is rising what is on my mind is not
the thinkable content that the wave is rising. That the wave is rising is
what I think, but what I think of is the wave: I think of the wave that it is
rising. The content is not on my mind but part of my mind: it consti-
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tutes my standpoint on reality.10 So if judgement were any sort of rela-
tion it would be a relation between the thing named and the way it is
said to be; in this case, between the wave and rising. But this cannot be a
relation at all, on pain of an infnite regress. (To think that the wave is
rising would be to think that the wave and rising stand in a relation R,
but that would be another case of judgement, and so we would have to
repeat the analysis: to think that would be to think that the wave, R,
and rising stand in a relation R', and so on.) It is rather the unity
thought in combining subject and predicate. By thinking together sub-
ject and predicate I think together what I think of and how I think it to
be; and if I think truly, then the very thing I think of is the very way I
think it is.
But this does not make sense against the background of the distinction
of force and content. The central idea behind that distinction is that to
combine subject and predicate is not yet to make a judgement. It is only
to form a thinkable content; to hold this content to be true is an addi-
tional act. But if judgement is not a matter of combining subject and
predicate, it must instead be a matter of doing something with the com-
bination of subject and predicate. It comes to seem that in a judgement
we have the thinkable content on our mind, which we then predicate
something of: to judge that the sky is blue is to judge that that the sky is
blue is the same as how things are (McDowell), or reaches to the particu-
10 I am borrowing a phrase, and an idea, from Peter Sullivan: “neither the sen-
tence nor the thought obtrudes itself as the object of consideration, or ob-
structs one's view of things. Quite the reverse. The sentence understood, the
thought, constitutes one's view of things. That is what was meant earlier when
I said that sentences of a language which expresses thoughts present a stand-
point of refection.” (Sullivan 2004: 733)
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lar case (Travis), or is a fact (early Frege), or is the True (later Frege). So
we are led away from the standpoint of judgement (in the sense of
above) to a standpoint of judging about the thinkable content. It comes
to seem that this is the standpoint of judgement.
Such a conception must anyway be rejected. The problem is that on this
view a thinkable content is not the sort of thing one can think; one can
only think that the thinkable content is true (or something synonym-
ous with that). Of course the Fregean will insist that when one thinks
that the sky is blue, what one thinks is that the sky is blue. But what this
means, according to his theory, is that one thinks that that the sky is blue
is true (or something synonymous). Judgement is construed as predic-
ating something of a thinkable content. But if predication is generally
without force, not yet a matter of judgement, the same would hold for
predicating truth of the thinkable content. Frege acknowledges this,
and at some point in the dialectic, any Fregean must. But in so far as he
is Fregean, he still cannot think of judgement as a matter of combining
subject and predicate. And so he will still feel that there is a diference
between the claim that the sky is blue, which is in itself without force,
and the claim that it is true that the sky is blue, even though this now
cannot anymore be acknowledged. 
The idea that predication is without force comes from thinking of a
thinkable content as essentially what is perceived in a moment of pass-
ive apprehension, as Descartes did, or essentially what is mentioned
without making a claim, as Frege did. But a thinkable content is essen-
tially something to think - to make (conceive) in the sense of making a
claim - and only secondarily something to mention or perceive. We
should not analyse making a claim as consisting of two acts, a passive
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moment of “content's being available to one” and an act of endorsement
or rejection. To fnd the words for what one wants to say, and meaning
what one says, are not two separate acts, the frst a preparation for the
second. In a basic case, to combine subject and predicate is to form a
judgement or claim. It is true that one can mention a claim without
making it, or use it in other ways which withhold assent, but what is
then mentioned is still the sort of thing which one can also make, the
kind of thing to which one could assent or dissent: not the forceless
thinkable that the sky is blue, but the claim that the sky is blue. We can
agree with a claim, or disagree with a claim; we cannot agree or disagree
with a forceless thinkable content (only with the claim that it is true or
false). Along these lines we can avoid the Fregean two-stage analysis of
judgement. It will be the task of the next chapter to develop this altern-
ative.
2 That is a correction to the dualistic conception of judgement. We
also have to reject the dualistic conception of perceptual awareness as
mere acquaintance. If the problem with dualism is that it construes
being given something as mere acquaintance, then the answer is that
seeing is knowing: to see how the wave is is to know, among other
things, that it is rising. Just as things are not divorced from how they
are, so seeing things is not divorced from seeing how things are. For
things to be present to the perceiving subject is for her to see how they
are: for instance how they are spatio-temporally arranged, shaped and
coloured, and - in the case of animals - what they are doing. “Seeing
that the wave is rising” can be genuinely a receptive achievement, a
matter of awareness of what is there before our eyes.
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Of course, one may see something perfectly clearly and yet fail to tell
how it is in various respects. When I see a sandpiper I may still fail to
recognise it as a sandpiper, or not until later, or I may fail to even have
the concept of a sandpiper — and yet nothing needs to be lacking in my
experience of the bird. My experience puts me in a position in which I
can, if I exercise an additional capacity, come to know that this is a
sandpiper, but it is not itself already knowing this. In so far dualism is
right. The presence of things constitutes a potential for knowledge: it
makes us, as Mark Eli Kalderon puts it, knowledgeable of our surround-
ings. (Kalderon 2011: 225) But recognising something as being some
way is done on the basis of awareness of how it is. How can I recognise
the bird as a sandpiper if I do not at least see how it is shaped and col-
oured, where it is over time, and what it is doing? The knowledge
potential aforded by experience resides, like all potential, in something
actual: a self-conscious awareness of how things are.11
Sometimes one fails to have a self-conscious awareness of how things are.
Say that a buzzing noise is distracting me from my work; I only realise
this once it stops (it was the fridge). In such a case my sensing, and my
knowing what I am doing, are two separate acts. I do not know what I
am doing in and in virtue of doing what I do; I only know it in virtue of
an act of recognition which is separate from my sensory awareness.
One could say that my ears are registering the noise, but with a certain
special emphasis on the frst-person pronoun, I am not hearing it.
Experience is more than merely a matter of receiving sense impres-
sions. Or better, it is just receiving sense impressions, but when my
11 This corresponds to McDowell's argument about recognising a cardinal as
such in McDowell 2008.
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senses are a seamless aspect of the unity which I am, informed by my
understanding, for my senses to receive sense impressions is for me to
see how things are around me. (Just as my feet transporting me for-
wards on the pavement, may be, on an occasion, my doing groceries.) I
then know what I am doing in and in virtue of doing it. (Just as it is by
being awake that I know that I am awake.)
Sometimes one fails to have a self-conscious awareness of how things are
in some important respect. A familiar case is that of listening to an
unfamiliar language. If I hear people speak in a language I do not know,
then not only do I not hear the meaning in their words, I cannot even
hear where one word ends and the next one begins. No matter how hard
I focus, I do not hear the sounds they make as words, even though I can
recognise that they are words. Generally I do have the capacity to grasp
more familiar kinds of unity in my surroundings, such as the causal
connection between a person, the movement of his legs, and his process
across the promenade. But it is imaginable that I would fail to have this
capacity, as I fail sometimes to properly exercise the capacity. Think of
being under an illusion that a mime artist's arms and legs are being
pulled by strings, and then reassuring yourself that he is moving them
himself. When things fall into place this shows in a dramatic way what
normally, being at home in the world, is always already there. (The
mime artist afords the pleasure of a temporary and local alienation,
and the hint of a deeper horror.)
In both of these cases, I fail to have a self-conscious awareness of how
things are; still, in some sense, I am enjoying perceptual awareness.
One may think that because I can fail to see that something is the case
without failing to see at all, seeing cannot be seeing that something is
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the case. It must be being presented with something on the basis of
which I can tell that something is the case. Being presented with some-
thing is what would be there both in the good and the bad case, but in
the bad case my response would be of. But what the good case and the
bad have in common is not something on the basis of which I can make
a judgement. Of course, if my experience is only bad in one respect,
then I can still make judgements on the basis of what I do see: if I cannot
individuate the words of a foreign language, I might still be able to hear
the sounds being made, and recognise that this is meaningful interac-
tion of some sort. But if the frst moment is supposed to be devoid of
understanding altogether, then it is just not the moment of being given
that on the basis of which I can make a judgement. We can only think of
failure as a deprivation, a departure from the norm, which is determ-
ined by a successful exercise of the capacity for perception. Such a
failure is perception only in a qualifed sense. To see things (when “see-
ing things” is said without qualifcation) is to see how they are; more
specifcally, that they are thus and so.
3 This illustrates some of what it means for experience to be a self-
conscious awareness of how things are. But how can experience be that?
Dualism, and the dualism inherent in Fregean monism, ofers various
reasons for thinking this impossible. Reviewing and answering these
objections will allow me to develop my view further.
First objection
What impresses itself on our senses, and thus becomes present in perceptual
experience, is concrete and particular. Although we do speak of “seeing that
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the wave is rising,” this cannot be a matter of receptivity. That the wave is
rising, or the concept of rising, is not something which is before our eyes. We
tell that something is the case on the basis of the presence of things in experi-
ence. (Cf. Frege 1918: 292)
This is the ontological thesis of dualism. When it is stated naïvely, as if
it is just obvious that the world is made up of particulars, the mistake is
to forget that things are not divorced from how they are. When a wave
is before my eyes, then so is the way it manifestly is. The dualist actu-
ally has more in mind than just the naïve idea: he conceives of the way
things manifestly are as again a particular. But this, I have argued, is a
mistake. 
An analogous mistake in the theory of judgement (see chapter II) leads
the Fregean to construe that the wave is rising as an object, so that “seeing
that the wave is rising” is parsed as awareness of that the wave is rising.
Since this latter thing is not to be found among the things in our sur-
roundings, the Fregean concludes that “seeing that the wave is rising”
cannot be seeing in the sense of visual awareness. It really consists of
two acts: a passive moment of acquaintance with something concrete
and particular, and an act of bringing it under an abstract generality.
When we reject the two-stage analysis of judgement generally, we can
also reject - what is really a special case of it - this two-stage analysis of
“seeing that”. To see that the wave is rising, when this is really seeing, is
not to be aware of an abstract object; it is to see the wave, and in doing
so, to see how it is: rising. “That the wave is rising” is a specifcation of
how the wave is. And how the wave manifestly is is there before my
eyes when the wave is before my eyes, but of course not as an additional
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item. The world consists of things I can think of, but also, and of course
not as an additional item, of how they are.
I am not denying that a thought has a certain generality. What one
grasps in seeing that something is the case is repeatable: something
else, or the same thing at another time and place, may be the same way.
But why should only what is unique be visible? That conviction led to
the impossible attempt to construe what is given as something inef-
fable. The dualist may be impressed by the fact that there are many
ways of being some way. For example, there are many ways of being
blue: painted blue, naturally blue, light blue, dark blue, and so on. But in
so far as these are all ways of being blue, they are all ways of being the
same. It is true that the blue of the sky is unique, in a way: nothing else
can be blue in exactly the same way. But in another way it is a repeat-
able: in so far as the sky is blue, it is the same as the blue car, and the
blue lake: that is the point of using the same concept. It is a mistake to
move from the fact that the blue of the sky is diferent in other respects
to the thesis that the blue of the sky is absolutely unique and distinct
from what we express by means of the concept of blue.
Second objection
For things to be present to me is not for me to apply concepts. Perceptual
awareness is an achievement of the senses, not of the understanding. My
senses present me with my surroundings; in response I make up my mind
about which concepts to apply. There are a number of reasons why this must
be so. 
(a) Experience is determined by a causal interaction in which the perceiver is
the patient. By contrast, concepts have their place in the activity of reason. We
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cannot make sense of the application of a concept as merely the upshot of a
causal process. But we can understand experience in this way. So experience
cannot already involve the exercise of conceptual capacities.
(b) We have mostly the same sensory capacities as other mammals (and as hu-
man infants before they have acquired the ability to speak or reason). Despite
not being able to use concepts, they are nonetheless able to move about in the
world, pursue goals, discriminate between things on the basis of their appear-
ance, focus their attention on objects in their environment. In short, they are
able to see how things are. So seeing how things are cannot already require
conceptual capacities.
(c) The character of conceptual activity is very diferent from that of perceptu-
al experience. In an experience of a rising wave, I am presented with an infn-
ite array of sensible detail. What I see far outstrips my capacity to describe it.
There is even much more than I can notice in any single moment, or ever.
When I say what I'm seeing, I put words together in order to articulate this
one aspect of my experience; but this aspect which I isolate lacks, thus isol-
ated, that which makes experience special. What I can say is intimate to the
mind in a way that what is given is not.
This is the epistemological thesis of dualism.
As McDowell argues, (a) is based on a restricted conception of nature;
that is to say, of causal interaction. If we think of causal interactions as
fully determined by the agent, on the model of bombardment, there is
no room for such a thing as receptivity. But even outside the present topic
that would be mistaken. Living things generally engage in a form of
causal interaction which is best described not as a confrontation but as
a collaboration between agent and patient. The patient is not merely
subjected to an alien force. Aristotle describes this dynamic in terms of a
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combination of change and preservation: a change is afected in the
patient, but this change is the actualisation of a potential and so in that
sense something remains the same: what was already there in capacity
(dunamis) comes to be there in activity (energeia) (Aristotle, De Anima
II.5). As an illustration of this idea, I found the following passage by
Michael Thompson very helpful, which is given in the context of an
investigation into the concept of life (Thompson 2008: 40-1):
[T]he efect of the hydrogen bomb on a rose, and on a roadbed, will be pretty
much the same—at least if they are both at ground zero. I mean not only that
the efects will be similar, but also that the type of causality will be the same. It
is in a more restricted range of cases that we seem to see a diference, if the af-
fected individual is an organism. I mean: sunlight makes the asphalt warm;
moisture and cold make it crack; the H-bomb turns it to a vapor. These things
are all on a level. The asphalt is in a sense passive in the face of any of them.
But, in the familiar metaphors, the rose or maple is ready for certain of these
‘infuences’—rising spring temperatures, for example—it is already on to
them, it takes advantage of them. Green leaves are not subjected to the light, if it
is not too strong; they are not in the same sense passive in respect of it; the ac-
cess of photons is not to be understood on a model of bombardment—that is,
as it would have to be if we were discussing the fading of a book cover or the
warming of a stone. This, I think, is the contrast one is trying to register, in
placing ‘responsiveness to stimuli’ among the characteristic marks of the
concept life. 
Thompson is describing causal interactions involving living things. It is
characteristic of such interactions that the patient exercises a passive
power. (Beere 2010) One could admit this much and still resist the idea
that causal interaction can involve conceptual capacities. But this
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second idea is just a version of the frst, as it comes to expression in the
study of what it is to be a thinking animal. We are also responsive to
stimuli, though our responsiveness is of a diferent kind than that of
other animals. (Boyle 2012) As leaves are ready for sunlight, and as our
ears are ready for sounds within a certain range of frequency and loud-
ness, so we, but in a higher register, are ready for the familiar forms of
unity which we fnd around us, such as the unity of a chord or melody,
the unity of a sentence, or the unity of an animal and its movements.
Our capacities for grasping such forms are, I have argued, already exer-
cised in sensibility itself. A musician does not frst hear notes and then
come to hear them with understanding, as hanging together in the
ways that they do. The understanding is already at work in hearing
itself.
It may be a bit of a stretch to call such a capacity conceptual. After all,
words don't really enter into it. If we think of a conceptual capacity as
essentially a capacity for using a word, it may seem implausible - a
form of intellectualism - to claim that conceptual capacities are already
at work in sensibility. But we do not have to think of a conceptual capa-
city in that way. All that is needed for monism is that seeing things is a
matter of apprehending, in sensibility, that the things one sees are
ways for things to be. A capacity for hearing a perfect ffth as such is, in
this sense, a conceptual capacity: it is a capacity for apprehending that a
certain musical interval is this way for a musical interval to be: a perfect
ffth. By apprehending this in experience one is in a position to put this
into words. Even without knowing the words “perfect ffth” one is in a
position to refer to what one hears demonstratively, in a way that relies
on the structure of the experience. So there is an intimate relation
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between words and understanding, but the discursive exercise of a con-
ceptual capacity does not need to be prior to its exercise in perceptual
experience.
(b) It is true that many animals see how things are in a sense. But that
does not mean that they see how things are in the sense that we do; the
sense relevant to an account of experience as providing reasons for
what we are to think and do. A dog can hear spoken words, cock his
head when you ask him a question, and respond to various commands.
But he does not distinguish between subject and predicate, or grasp
their unity in a predicative sentence. It seems to me that the dog is not
aware of all that we are, and even what dog and human are both aware
of, they are not aware of in the same way. The dog's sensibility is
informed by understanding too, in a sense. But when it comes to the
sort of things that we are interested in hearing (admittedly an unfair
comparison), the dog's hearing stands to ours as the hearing of a tone-
deaf person stands to the hearing of a musician. In a certain sense, the
tone-deaf person and the musician receive the same input. But that
again is not to say that the musician hears what the tone-deaf person
hears, and performs another act in addition: combining what he hears
in the light of his understanding. There is only the frst act, which is
already informed by understanding. Moreover, it would be mistaken to
presume that what is really there is only what the tone-deaf person and
the musician both hear. The harmony and melody which the musician
hears is really there — you just need to have the right capacity to hear
it.
(c) That doesn't mean there can't be diferences in character between
experience and other exercises of understanding. In a discursive judge-
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ment, I put words together in order to say how things are. This is a dif-
ferent kind of activity than that of an experience, where what is around
me impresses itself on my senses and thus determines which concep-
tual capacities I exercise. This diference accounts for the great contrast
in character between discursive activity and perceptual experience. But
this contrast does not mean that when I think in words, “It is raining,”
and when I see that it is raining, two diferent conceptual forms are in
play. These are two diferent ways for the same conceptual form to be
enmattered. The same judgement is made in both cases: It is raining. It
is a consequence of the perfection of reality - “perfection” in the ori-
ginal sense of “completely made” - that in experience such judgements
cannot come in isolation.12 To see how things are is to see the way things
are, in their infnite concrete particularity. That is easily construed as
seeing something else than that things are thus and so. But the whole is
not independent of its parts. I cannot see the way things are other than
by seeing that elements of the world are ways for such things to be. (See
chapter III.)
Third objection
I will grant you that human sensibility is informed by understanding, and so
is not passive in the way that receiving a blow to the head is passive. Nonethe-
less, it is not active in the way that judgement is. For things to be present to
me is not for me to do anything; it is not an exercise of rational agency. In ex-
perience my senses, informed by my understanding, present me with how
things are; in response I make up my mind about what to think. It must be this
way because experience must provide an external constraint to reason.
12 “By reality and perfection I understand the same.” (Spinoza, Ethics II.Def.6)
47
This is, so to say, the most monistic that the epistemological thesis of
dualism can get within a Fregean framework. It corrects for the dual-
istic separation of sensibility and understanding, but retains the
separation of understanding and judgement (the will). If experience is
to be self-conscious awareness of how things are, we must reject this
separation as well. 
The conviction that receptivity must be passive is what really deserves
the name “the Myth of the Given.” Whenever I make a contribution to
my experience, so the conviction goes, this cannot be a matter of
receptivity, of awareness of what is there before my eyes and around
me—it must instead be adding something to what is given, interpreting
it, giving a name to it, carving it up, bringing it under a concept, attach-
ing a force, or whatever shape the idea may take. Under that
assumption, experience cannot be simply seeing that something is the
case, or at least it cannot be that in so far as it is receptive. McDowell
points the way out of this predicament, but he stops short before the
destination. His core insight can be put as follows. The subject can make
a contribution to experience which is receptive. In experience I am not
merely subjected to sensory impingement. The emphasis is on
“merely”: in a sense I am undergoing sensory impingement – experi-
ence is a transaction in nature – but this impingement should not be
conceived on the model of bombardment. Rather, I am in various ways
ready for the forms of unity which I fnd around me, as a catcher is
ready for the ball fying into his mitt.
But the metaphor of readiness only gets us so far. In an experience I am
not waiting around for the world to come to me; the experience is the
meeting itself. For experience to be knowledge, it must be active. Note
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that outside of philosophy we normally speak of experience in the act-
ive voice, with the perceiving subject in the grammatical subject
position: I see... . The exception is when there is some reason to be sus-
picious - “My senses tell me …, but I cannot believe them.” -, when we
are in some way alienated from our senses or the world around us. Nor-
mally, when our capacities are working as they should, we simply see
how things are. The subject can make an active contribution to experi-
ence which is nonetheless receptive. Instead of the metaphor of being
given something, it may be better to speak of taking. But maybe the ori-
ginal metaphor will still do. After all, in the sense of passivity indicated
by the passive mood, the catcher is not really any more passive than the
pitcher, even when he holds his hands still in the act. If someone dis-
tracts the catcher, then he is being distracted (sufering), but as long as
all goes well, he is the one who is doing the catching. Receiving is some-
thing one does.
McDowell might object that receptivity must be passive in order to put
an external constraint on my thinking, and in that way satisfy the crav-
ing “for a limit to freedom” which underlies the Myth of the Given
(McDowell 1994: 10). But what is reason when it stands in need of an
external constraint? The underlying idea is that reason is, in itself, free
activity, which would be irresponsible if it were not constrained from
outside. McDowell contrasts experience with “deciding what to say
about something.” (McDowell 1994: 10) But although keeping up one's
end in a conversation may be said to be free in that sense, judgement -
taking something to be so - is not a matter of choice. We are not
responsible for it in the way that we are responsible for our choices. In
the moment when we think judgement stands in need of an external
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constraint, what we have in mind is not judgement, and it does not then
become judgement when we build a fence around it. What we need is
not a limit to freedom, as if freedom were in itself anarchy, but a limit
which is freedom, and so not a limitation. That is the genuinely Kantian
idea which cannot fnd a place within the Cartesian framework of Mind
and World. What is right in the idea of “external constraint” is just that
experience must be immediately receptive. Or in other words, what is
right is that my experience is the way it is because of how the things I
experience are — and this my view accommodates.
Given how easily this is accommodated, it may seem that something
else underlies McDowell's need for external constraint. Although he
defends it by an appeal to the Kantian problem of the contentfulness of
thought, and plays down the importance of the Cartesian problems of
knowledge and illusion (“It does not matter much that one can be
misled.” (9)), when it comes to flling in the distance between passive
experience and active judgement all McDowell has to ofer is the need
for accepting an appearance at face value or rejecting it as an illusion.13
So it may seem that this, the fourth objection, is what motivates him:
Fourth objection
On your view, to be under an appearance that things are a certain way is nor-
mally already to take things to be that way. But sometimes we have reason to
suspend judgement. We then decide, on the basis of our experience, whether
or not to take it at face value. Therefore, to be under an appearance that things
are a certain way is not the same as taking it to be so.
Although something like this argument may seem to underlie McDow-
13 I am alluding to the distinction made in Conant 2014.
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ell's account in Mind and World, he himself shows us how to resist it. On
this argument, “being under an appearance to the efect that things are
thus and so” fgures as a “highest common factor” (McDowell 1998: 390)
between a good and a defective case. Say that the good case is one in
which I am seeing that the sky is blue, and the defective case is one in
which I have reason to distrust my recently acquired contact lenses.
What makes the second case defective is not necessarily that I am under
an illusion, but just that I have reason to suspect that I might be. This
allows me to hold an appearance at arm's length and decide whether or
not to take it at face value a  something I normally cannot begin to do.
Say that there is nothing wrong with my contact lenses, and what I am
seeing is in fact the way it appears to me. In a sense I am seeing a blue
sky. But unlike in the good case, I do not know that I am seeing a blue
sky in and in virtue of doing so: my knowing this is conditional upon
my assuring myself that there is nothing wrong with my contact lenses.
And so in the relevant sense, the blue of the sky is not present to me – it
is not self-consciously present to me. This is McDowell's view in his
Aquinas lecture (McDowell 2011); my example is a variant of the one
given there. What the present considerations show is that this view is
incompatible with the Fregeanism of Mind and World.14
14 This is especially clear in a response by McDowell, given after writing Mind
and World but still defending the same view, about an analogous case: “Her
having her visual impression was her seeing that the tie was green, and it was
not itself a matter of accepting, in any way, that the tie was green.” (McDowell
2002: 278) That is just what the Aquinas lecture denies. In a situation where
she has reason to distrust her experience, the act of seeing is separate from
the act of recognising what she is seeing, so the green of the tie is not self-
consciously present to her: “We should not conclude … that the thing's green-
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One falls for the argument from illusion when one thinks that the sense
in which the blue of the sky is present to me in the defective case is just
the same as the sense in which it is present to me in the good case. But it
is not the same. The defective case is necessarily an exception. I am able
to assure myself that I am really seeing a blue sky only against a back-
ground of generally successful exercises of my capacity for knowledge.
It could not be that I would generally hold appearances at arm's length
and only decide in response whether or not to take them at face value.
Conclusions
It is true that our surroundings consist of such things as leaves and
their rustling, things which we can only speak or think about. But
thinking answers to how things are. When we speak about things, we do
not speak about how things are. When we speak about things, we say
how things are; more specifcally, that things are thus and so. (We say,
state, what is the case – a fact.) We can think of something that it is
some way, and when we think truly, the very thing we think of is the
very way we think it is. 
This is not to draw a relation between something which can be before
ness is visually present to her in the relevant sense. As I said, a perceptual
state in which a feature of the environment is present to a subject, in the rel-
evant sense, would have to be a non-defective exercise of a self-consciously
possessed and exercised capacity to get into perceptual states that put the
subject in a position to know, through perception, that things are the relevant
way in the environment. And that is not how it is with the subject's perceptu-
al state in the case we are considering.” (McDowell 2011: 47-8)
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our eyes and something which cannot be before our eyes. First of all, it
is not a relation, but rather the unity which is thought in thinking of
something that it is some way. Second, what is thus combined can itself
be present in experience. In perceptual experience concrete particulars
indeed impress themselves on our senses and are in that way present to
us. But just as things are not separated from how they are, so seeing
things is not separated from seeing how things are. For things to be
present to us is for us to see how they are: for instance how they are spa-
tio-temporally arranged, shaped and coloured, and - in the case of
animals - what they are doing. “Seeing that the wave is rising” can be
genuinely a receptive achievement, a matter of awareness of what is
there before our eyes. What our words make manifest we can, in per-
ceptual experience, fnd enmattered in the here and now.
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II The Thing that is Thought
§1 Introduction
All that the intellect does is enable me to perceive the ideas which are subjects
for possible judgements; and when regarded strictly in this light, it turns out
to contain no error in the proper sense of the term.
[T]he will simply consists in our ability to do or not do something (to afrm
or deny, to pursue or avoid); or rather, it consists simply in the fact that when
the intellect puts something forward, we are moved to afrm or deny or to
pursue or afrm it in such a way that we do not feel ourselves to be determ-
ined by any external force.
So what then is the source of my mistakes? It must be simply this: the scope
of the will is wider than that of the intellect; but instead of restricting it with-
in the same limits, I extend its use to matters which I do not understand.
René Descartes, Meditations on First Philosophy IV: 39-40
Descartes, in the course of giving his answer to the problem of error15,
ofers a conception of spontaneity (free will, judgement) and receptiv-
ity (perception, understanding), both deeply problematic and
surprisingly attractive. My aim in this chapter is to bring the problem
to the surface and to suggest an alternative. Let me describe the target
which I have in mind as follows.
15 This could be seen as a form of the problem of evil: if I am created by an omni-
potent and benevolent God, why do I sometimes err? I won't have anything
to say on this aspect of the passage.
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Judgement really consists of two moments: perceiving a thinkable con-
tent, and thinking of it that it is true. The frst moment is diferent each
time in so far as the perceived content is diferent each time; the
second moment is always the same. A thinkable content is essentially
what is given in the frst moment. It is given, perceived not conceived,
and thus independent of the activity of thought. As such it lacks that
which is added to it in the second moment: acknowledgement of its
truth. Thinkable contents do not have afrmation or denial internal to
them. To combine subject and predicate is not, as such, to make a
judgement; it is only to form a thinkable content. To make a judgement
is to combine the thinkable content again with something else: to think
is to think of a thinkable content that it is true, that this is how things
are, that the world is accordingly, etc.
We can also state the same doctrine as a thesis on judging manifestly in
spoken or written words: assertion. The idea is then as follows. When
we say how things are, what is said is, in itself, essentially something to
mention, not to assert. We can refer to it by means of a 'that' clause
(“that things are thus and so”) or a nominalisation of an indicative sen-
tence (“things' being thus and so”). Although when we make an
assertion we only have to write or say a combination of name and verb,
which expresses a thinkable content, what we are really doing is saying
of the thinkable content that it is true, or something equivalent to that:
that things are thus and so, that the world satisfes things' being thus
and so, etc. So to assert that something is the case is not merely a mat-
ter of combining subject and predicate. It would be logically
perspicuous to indicate this by adding something like an assertion
sign: to write the assertion sign is to assert what follows it. As a ques-
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tion is a combination of proposition and question mark, so an assertion
is a combination of proposition and assertion sign.
Maybe I am stating the view more bluntly and naïvely than a pro-
ponent would. My interest is not so much in fnding the most
defensible version as in seeing the deep problem at the core of a certain
way of thinking about thinking. What tends to happen instead is that
symptoms are rejected while the problematic framework is allowed to
remain in place. The Cartesian may acknowledge that if combining
subject and predicate is not yet making a judgement, we cannot think
of judging as a matter of combining the combination of subject and
predicate with something else; if predication is generally without
assertoric force, this also holds for predicating “is true” of a thinkable
content, or anything else which is supposed to play the same role. So
Gottlob Frege, for example, writes that we declare the recognition of a
truth in an indicative sentence (Frege 1918: 294):
We do not have to use the word 'true' for this. And even when we do use it the
real assertoric force lies not in it but in the form of the indicative sentence
and where this loses its assertoric force the word 'true' cannot put it back
again.
That is, I believe, exactly right. An assertion is made by manifestly
combining name and verb in an indicative sentence, not by combining
the combination of name and verb with 'is true' or anything like that.
And although this combination can, in a sense, “lose its assertoric
force” - that is, occur unasserted -, that does not mean that in itself it
lacks assertoric force. But I will argue that this insight can only fnd its
place when we reject the Cartesian view which makes it seem that the
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assertoric force does lie in some kind of addition to the thinkable con-
tent.
§2 A sign for the angels
1 Though the doctrine is widespread, the defence which is the most
relevant to the present topic is to be found in the work of Frege. It is
introduced near the beginning of Begriffsschrift and remains central to
his view throughout. Let me start with the view as it is introduced in
the late essay “Der Gedanke.”
There Frege draws a distinction between three acts (Frege 1918: 294):
(1) The apprehension of a thought – thinking;
(2) the acknowledgement of the truth a thought – judgement;
(3) the manifestation of this judgement – assertion;
What Frege calls thinking is really grasping a thought without taking a
stance on its truth; it may be less misleadingly called entertaining a
thought. It is in essence the same moment as that described by
Descartes as the mere perception of an idea. Making a judgement is,
frst, having a thought in mind and, moreover, holding it to be true.
Frege compares this to asking a yes-no question, and answering it with
yes or no. Grasping the thought is like asking oneself a yes-no ques-
tion; holding a thought true is like answering it afrmatively. Making
an assertion is performing another act in addition: making one's judge-
ment manifest in spoken or written words.
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Although the distinction is drawn in terms of acts, it is characteristic of
Frege to postulate various items corresponding to these acts; in this
case: a thought, an assertoric force, an indicative sentence and the
judgement stroke. Before discussing what these are, let me use them as
placeholders in an an overview of the doctrine. Schematically speak-
ing, thinking is having a thought in mind; judging is holding a thought
together with assertoric force; and asserting is making the combina-
tion of thought and assertoric force manifest by means of a
combination of sentence and judgement stroke. At least it would be
that way in a logically perfect language, one that lays bare the structure
of pure thought, as Frege's Begriffsschift is supposed to do. In everyday
discourse we normally need only to say or write a sentence in indicat-
ive form, and a convention16 will allow the hearer or reader to know
when we mean it assertorically.
A thought is that which can be true or false: “Without meaning to give a
defnition, I call a thought that for which the question of truth even so
much as arises.” (Frege 1918: 292) I take it that this is not a defnition
because it does not live up to Frege's stringent standards for defni-
tions. It does seem a defnition in the looser sense that it tells us how
Frege uses the word “thought”: if something can be true or false, it is
thereby (per definition) a thought in Frege's sense; or maybe more pre-
cisely, a thought is to be that which determines a question of truth, so
that it depends only on how things are whether the thought is true or
false. Frege thinks this already excludes everything visible or audible,
or generally perceptible by the senses, from the realm of things for
16 At least that is the interpretation both of Geach (1965) and of Dummett (1973).
Frege may not be committed to its being a convention.
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which truth can come into question. “Is a picture, then, as a mere vis-
ible or tangible thing, really true, and a stone, a leaf, not true?” (290)
We can take something visible to represent things as being some way,
but then it is not merely the visible thing as such, but also out inter-
pretation, which determines the question of truth. A picture does not
represent unless “an intention comes with it (dabei wäre).” (290) When
an intention does come with it, the combination is more transparently
expressed in the form of a sentence.
But a thought also cannot be a sentence. Frege does sometimes indicate
that there is an intimate connection between a thought and a sentence.
The internal structure of the thought mirrors the structure of a sen-
tence which expresses it transparently. (Frege, 1984: 390) But it is also
important to Frege that there is no unique way of doing so. One and the
same sentence can, depending on the context, be used to express difer-
ent thoughts, and one and the same thought can be expressed by means
of structurally diferent sentences. The same idea can be approached in
terms of analysis and the context principle. Frege writes that he does
not start with concepts and builds thoughts by means of them; rather,
he starts with the whole thought, and gets to the parts by means of
analysis. (Frege, PW: 16, 253) Since any one thought can be analysed in
many ways, just as it can be expressed in many ways, some Fregeans
(Bell 1996, Travis 2008, Kemmerling 2010) conclude that in itself the
thought must be a structureless whole. A thought would be distanced
from its apprehension or assertion in words. It is difcult to see how,
on this view, one can express a thought in words: it would seem words
stand in between the thinking subject and the thought. But Frege does
sometimes suggest that language is merely a material means of
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presenting thoughts to ourselves and others in visible or audible form,
not internal to what the thought is in itself. In itself, the thought is
something non-sensible (Unsinnlich). “One communicates a thought.
How does this happen? One brings about changes in the common out-
side world which, perceived by another person, are supposed to induce
him to apprehend the thought and take it to be true.” (Frege 1918: 310)
This is another instance, besides the one that will take centre stage, of a
distinction between the thought as it is in itself and the thought as it is
thought (as a discursive act).17
What will take centre stage is the following. Going by the idea that a
thought determines a question of truth, one might still think that a
thought is the same as a judgement. When I judge that it is raining, it
depends only on how things are, on whether it is raining, whether my
judgement is true. But Frege observes that one can grasp a thought
without judging it to be true. One way of doing so is by asking a ques -
tion. When I ask whether it is raining, I employ the same form of
words, which express the same thought, as when I say (assert) that it is
raining. But only in the latter case do I commit myself to the truth of
this thought. The assertion “contains something more” than the
thought (Frege 1918: 294), just as the corresponding question contains
something more: we might call these “assertoric force” and “inquisitive
force” respectively. But Frege observes that in an indicative sentence,
thought and assertoric force are so closely entwined as to be hardly
distinguishable. They are indeed. Frege wants to distinguish what I say,
17 I believe this view must be resisted, and so it may not be the most charitable
interpration of Frege. It is nonetheless one strand of his thinking. For an al-
ternative interpretation, see Dummett 1973, 1991, and Sullivan 2004.
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mean, in saying that it is raining, that it is raining, from the thing that I
say: that it is raining (try to hear the copula without force). 
Since the same form of words is used in both cases, this provides an
additional motivation for separating of the sentence as a third ele-
ment: the sentence expresses the thought, but does not express the
assertoric force. But then again, it does: “the real assertoric force lies …
in the form of the indicative sentence” — that is what it is for expres-
sion of content and expression of force to be so closely entwined. Let
me quote the conclusion of a posthumously published piece, “My Basic
Logical Insights”, in which the tension comes to expression (Frege, PW:
252):
Now the thing that most clearly indicates the essence of logic is the assertoric
force with which a sentence is uttered. But no word, or part of a sentence, cor-
responds to this; the same series of words may be uttered with assertoric
force at one time, and not at another. In language assertoric force is bound up
with the predicate.
No word corresponds to the assertoric force, but in language assertoric
force is bound up with the predicate. Whatever wriggle room the
change in formulation gives, this is illusory: Frege may as well have
written that no word expresses assertoric force, but in an indicative
sentence the verb does. His view, I believe, is that in a language which
is material, as human language unfortunately is, we express assertoric
force by means of the verb. But the same word can be used without
assertoric force, as is inevitable for a mere sign. After all, signs by
themselves do not represent, but only when an intention comes with it.
Logic is a struggle to free the human spirit from the dominion of the
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materiality of language. In a logically perfect language, which only
angels could speak, assertoric force would be expressed by a sign that
isn't a material sign: one that is pure intention. We will be occupied
with this difculty for much of the present chapter.
Asking a question is only one way of employing a thought without
committing oneself to its truth. Other cases are asserting a conditional
(one does not commit oneself to the truth of the antecedent, and only
conditionally to the truth of the consequent), indirect speech, and
merely entertaining a thought. Frege also contrasts assertion with
making as if to assert, for instance when saying something on stage in
the context of a play. If the latter were an important motivation for
Frege, his argument would be a straightforward application of the ar-
gument from illusion. The idea would be that we should understand as-
sertion as whatever assertion and mock assertion have in common,
plus something. The thinkable content then becomes the “highest com-
mon factor” of these two acts: something which is in itself not meant.
In order to mean it, we have to add something to it, for instance the
words, “I really mean it.” But of course these words can again be said
“without the requisite seriousness,” and the situation is hopeless. That
Frege clearly realises, but he does not draw the conclusion that asser-
tion and mock assertion are just not on a par. It would make more
sense to understand mock assertion as a degenerate case of assertion.
Let me use Frege's own comparison of an assertion on stage with stage
thunder. It is as if he thinks thunder is whatever thunder and stage
thunder have in common, plus reality. But we can only make sense of
stage thunder as an attempt to imitate thunder. We can know what
thunder is without having any conception of stage thunder, but not the
62
other way around. Just so, our understanding of what assertion is is
prior to our understanding of what it is to make as if to assert.
Although Frege mentions it often, mock assertion is not the most
important contrasting case. The case of merely entertaining a thought,
which Frege suggestively calls “thinking”, is much more central. We
may think of merely entertaining a thought as asking oneself a ques-
tion. One should be able to ask the question without knowing the
answer. So there must be a neutral form of awareness of a thought
which does not already involve taking a stance. This neutral form of
awareness is the same, I believe, as what Descartes meant by perceiv-
ing ideas, which for Descartes explains the possibility of making
mistakes. I make mistakes because “the scope of the will is wider than
that of the intellect; but instead of restricting it within the same limits,
I extend its use to matters which I do not understand.” (Descartes 1641:
40) Just this underlies Frege's doctrine as well, a conception of the
intellect (understanding) as a faculty of perceiving - merely entertain-
ing – ideas, separate from the will, understood as the capacity for
judgement. It is only in judgement that we expose ourselves to risk of
error. (Cf.  Frege 1918: 306)
More broadly speaking, Frege wants to safeguard logic from all that is
merely subjective, changeable, and material. The three-fold distinction
allows him to do that. It separates of what belongs to the order of being
true from what belongs to the order of holding true. In logic we study the
laws of truth. We are not concerned with how human beings happen to
think, but how they should think in order to reach the aim of thought:
truth. Moreover, logic is not concerned with the way people should
think in this or that area of human inquiry. It is only concerned with
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truth as such. So the logician does not study human bodies or human
minds, but what Frege calls “the mind”. And logic is not about the
human activity of thinking, which as such is just one more phe-
nomenon in nature; it has to be about the things which, in that activity,
we endorse or reject. This requires separating of those things both
from the activity of thinking, and so from the force used in asserting
them, and from the material means we use to present thoughts to oth-
ers and ourselves. It may not itself provide an argument, but it explains
why Frege feels the need to argue in this direction.
2 Frege says that an assertion “contains something more than the
thought”, and calls this assertoric force. But what does an assertion
contain in addition to the thought? What is assertoric force? 
Speaking of containing may be misleading here. The content of the
assertion is the thinkable content. If the assertoric force is also con-
tained in the assertion, it sounds like it is part of the content. Just that is
commonly said to be a mistaken way of understanding what Frege
meant his judgement stroke to be. In his concept script - both as it is
introduced in Begriffsschrift and under later revisions - the judgement
stroke does the work of indicating assertoric force.18 This, everyone
18 Let me quote one of the passages in which he introduces this sign. To write an
equation, Frege writes, only gives us “expressions for truth values (Ausdrucke
von Wahrheitsweten), without that thereby anything is judged (behauptet). This
separation of the act from the subject matter of judgement seems to be indis-
pensable; for otherwise we could not express a mere supposition [bloße An-
nahme] - the putting of a case without a simultaneous judgement as to its
arising or not. We thus need a special sign in order to be able to assert some -
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knows, should not be understood as a contribution to the content.
Whereas the content is semantic, the judgement stroke indicates force;
whereas the content can be analysed in terms of functions and argu-
ments, and so both expresses and refers, the judgement stroke is the
only sign in Frege's system which does neither. The reason is that the
judgement stroke does not say of what follows it that it is asserted: it
actually asserts it. “⊦ 2+3=5 does not designate anything; it asserts some-
thing.” (Frege 1891: 22fn)
Critics have sometimes taken this to mean that the judgement stroke
asserts something in the same way that a person does. A sign cannot do
such a thing, as for example both Wittgenstein and Davidson observe.
But it seems we are in accord with Frege's use of the judgement stroke
when we say that writing it is to assert what follows. Which means that
thing.” (Frege 1891: 21-2)
Frege recognises, of course, that this is a reversal of the ordinary state of
things. Just before this remark he writes that an equation is normally under-
stood as an expression of the corresponding judgement. In everyday dis-
course, which includes mathematical discourse, we do not need a special sign
to assert something, and we can still express a mere supposition — by saying
that it is a mere supposition. But now it looks as if a supposition has the form,
“Suppose that p” whereas a judgement has the form “p”, whereas Frege thinks
it is the other way around: a supposition has the form “p” and a judgement the
form “⊦  p”. This refects Frege's belief that a proposition only expresses a mere
supposition. To assert it is to add something to it, but to put it forward as a
mere supposition is not to add something to it: it is to put it forward as the
thing that it is. One recognises in this the Cartesian view: the content of a
judgement is given in an act of passive apprehension; in a judgement we do
something with it.
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the judgement stroke asserts a thinkable content under the same
aspect of the verb as that used in, “A key opens a lock,” or indeed, “The
sentence 'The sky is blue' says that the sky is blue.” To turn the key is to
open the lock, to say the sentence is to say that the sky is blue, and to
write the judgement stroke in front of a proposition is to assert that
proposition.19 The judgement stroke says, under this aspect, what fol-
lows; it does not say of what follows that it is asserted. (But doesn't “The
sky is blue” already say, under this aspect, that the sky is blue? But
how could the judgement stroke assert something in any stronger
sense? Surely one still needs to write it in order to use it to make an
assertion.)
So we cannot replace the judgement stroke by something like, “I afrm:
p.” I would think of such a device as follows. To say “I afrm: p” is to
announce what one is going to do (afrming that p) and then to do it.
The announcement makes something explicit which is internal to the
act announced: it is internal to afrming that p that one thereby knows
oneself to be doing so (afrmation is a self-conscious act). So there is
certainly something special about “I afrm,” but what is special about it
is not that it cannot be paraphrased; it can: the speaker afrmed that p.
The judgement stroke thus understood would have a semantic role,
even if it is one of making explicit what is already internal to the act
announced. A more perspicuous representation of assertoric force
would be to replace the judgement stroke by the convention to drop
one's voice at the end of an assertion. When one paraphrases a question
one does not mimic the concluding rising voice; just so, lowering one's
voice would always pertain to the speaker's assertion, not to whatever
19 I am ignoring, for now, the horizontal sign.
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assertion the speaker may be paraphrasing. Such a convention is ima-
ginable, and if the judgement stroke meant only that, it could hardly be
philosophically problematic. Though we should also think about the
fact that in ordinary discourse we have no need for this convention.
Now Frege does in fact use a sign, something which looks paraphrasable
even if we are told that we should not. (That is what I mean with it
being a sign for the angels. It would be better if it had no look.) And
although it may be a misunderstanding to think of this sign as making
a contribution to the content, this is not, I believe, the reader's misun-
derstanding. It is forced upon the reader in the attempt to make sense
of Frege's doctrine. The problem is that Frege thinks of what follows
the judgement stroke as essentially something which takes the place of
a name in a predicative proposition, or of a thing in a predicative fact;
rather than essentially a combination of name and verb.20 On his later
view, for example, what follows the judgement stroke is the name of a
truth value.21 The judgement stroke asserts of this name that it names
the True. But that means it does two things: it turns the name of a truth
value into the claim that it names the True, and then it commits the
speaker to this claim (all this under the aspect of the verb explained
above). The frst thing it does is, unlike the second, paraphrasable. This
20 By itself, a thought is a name for its truth value. In an intensional context
such as “I think that p” the words “that p” refer to a thought, and so here it
takes the place of a thing in a relational fact (I – think – that p).
21 The judgement stroke is followed by “the horizontal”, itself followed by any
concept. The horizontal turns, so to say, whatever follows into the name for a
truth value: either the name it already is, if it already is the name for a truth
value, or else a name for the False.
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part of what the judgement stroke does is replaceable by something
like '___ is true'. By afxing 'is true' to the name of a proposition, we
get that proposition again: we get something a speaker could commit
herself to.
We fnd the same idea in Frege's early work. There the judgement
stroke is supposed to precede a proposition, which it asserts.22 Without
the judgement stroke, we are left with a sentence that refers to (bedeutet)
a thinkable content, which we can refer to as “the proposition that,” or
“the circumstance that.” (Frege, 1879: 2) A thinkable content, thus con-
ceived, is the name of a circumstance, and so not the sort of thing one
can think. To think it, assert it, is to transform it into the claim that the
circumstance obtains. That is why Frege characterises the judgement
stroke as a predicate: it predicates “is a fact” of the thinkable content.
Since it thus becomes the main verb of every judgement, Frege de-
scribes it as “the common predicate of all judgements.” (ibid.: 4)
That remark is generally treated as an aberration. After all, Frege also
says explicitly that predication cannot be assertion. Moreover, the doc-
trine that a thought is a name for a truth value is often treated as a pe-
culiarity of Frege's thinking, which we can reject while retaining what
is central to his thought.23 But these are not aberrations. They are forms
22 The proposition, in its turn, consists of the horizontal stroke followed by a
sentence. The horizontal stroke is supposed to “transform” the sentence into
a unity (apparently the sentence is not already a unity).
23 Even among those contemporary philosophers self-consciously following in
Frege's footsteps, very few endorse either the view that a thought is the name
of a truth value, or the use of Frege's judgement stroke. But the ways in which
these are usually rejected retains the source of the paradox, and, moreover,
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which the most central element of his thinking can take, and the prob-
lem is really this Cartesian view, no matter the details. According to
that view, the content of a judgement is given. To think it is to do more
than merely have it in mind; it is to think that this is how things are,
that the world is accordingly, or something synonymous – in short, to
think that p is to think of that p that it is true. But then that p is not the
whole of what we think. We do not only think it; we think of it that it is
true. But now the thinkable content is construed as a name or name-
able of which truth is predicated. This name or nameable is not yet the
claim that it says how things are, and so it is not yet something a
does away with something deeply right in Frege's approach to logic. 
Although the content of a judgement or assertion is not taken to be the name
of a truth value, it is still taken to be a thinkaboutable, which in judgement we
relate to the world. We fnd this idea in Travis's view that a thought is a zero-
place concept, or in McDowell's use of “that things are thus and so” as a refer-
ring expression.
And although contemporary logic does without the judgement stroke, this is
because it deals with mere unasserted propositions and the logical relations
between them. It retains the idea that a proposition is, as such, without as-
sertoric force, but disagrees with Frege that we need anything more for logic.
But Frege had a good reason for thinking that we need more. If the premises
of a syllogism are unasserted, the conclusion is implicitly conditional. It
should really read: if the premisses are true, then this conclusion is true. But
the point of a syllogism is that you can eliminate the premisses, retaining
only the conclusion. 
There seems to me something deeply right in this idea. But what is at issue is
the assumption shared between Frege and the recent tradition, that without
the judgement stroke what we would have are mere forceless thinkables.
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speaker can commit herself to. It is just part of the Cartesian view that
in the second moment, that of judgement, the speaker both needs to
transform the content into a claim and commit herself to it.
So it may seem clear that these two tasks of the judgement stroke must
be distinguished. Maybe we should give the frst task to “the horizontal
sign”, which accompanies the judgement stroke. The horizontal
doesn't have much to do anyway: on the early view, it is redundant if
propositions are already unities, which they are, and on the later view
it is redundant as long as we only write the horizontal in front of full
propositions. So say that the horizontal transforms the name of a truth
value (circumstance) into the claim that this name names the True (that
the circumstance obtains). Now the judgement stroke can be genuinely
a force indicator, unparaphrasable, committing the writer to this
claim. Are we out of the woods? No. What would, on present assump-
tions, be the content of an assertion? It would be the claim that the
name which follows the horizontal names the True. But this, that it
names the True, is, on Frege's view, the name for a truth value. It still
needs to be transformed into something assertible - the claim that it
names the True - in order to be asserted. So the transformation of name
to claim cannot be efected before the assertion. The content of an
assertion can only be a name, which forces us to think of assertion as
saying of the name that it names the True. It is in making a claim that a
name is made into a claim.
This is why Frege speaks of assertion as a matter of saying of a thought
that it is the True, rather than simply saying the thought. “Thus here
we are not just writing down a truth value … but also at the same time
saying that it is the True.” (Frege 1891: 22) It is also why commentators
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fnd it irresistible to write something like “Merely to have a thought -
in the sense of grasping it and fxing one's attention on it - is diferent
from judging that that thought is true… .” (Dummett 1971: 298) It is sig-
nifcant that Dummett feels the need to write “that __ is true” around
the thought. The act of judgement cannot be merely a matter of think-
ing a thought; it must be thinking of a thought that it is true. The same
can be said of assertion. The judgement stroke does not, after all, say
what follows; it says of what follows that it is asserted. Nonetheless,
unlike, on the Fregean view, ordinary saying of something that it is
asserted, this would simultaneously be actually a matter of assertion,
of committing the speaker to this claim.24 But that is really incoherent,
as can be shown in the following two ways.
(1) The reason the judgement stroke is needed in the frst place is
that predication was supposed to be without assertoric force (Frege,
1892: 35):
Subject and predicate (understood in the logical sense) are just elements of
thought; they stand on the same level for knowledge. By combining subject
and predicate, one reaches only a thought, never passes from a sense to its
reference, never from a thought to its truth value.
If now an exception is made for saying of a thought that it is true, why
not make the exception immediately for saying of a thing that it is
24 Dummett puts it in this way: “We of course do not explain what this activity
of assertion is by saying that it consists in saying that a certain truth-value –
the truth-value of the thought expressed by the sentence – is truth; for the ex-
pression 'say that' is here used, not to mean 'utter a sentence expressing that,'
but as a synonym of 'assert that'.” (Dummett 1971: 298)
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some way? That would be consistent with the view that assertoric
force lies in the indicative form of a sentence and not in the words “is
true”. Also note that the suggestion that the judgement stroke “actually
asserts” what follows meant only that it asserts what follows under the
same aspect of the verb as that in which “The sky is blue” says that the
sky is blue. But under that aspect “The sky is blue” already says that the
sky is blue. To say “The sky is blue”, in appropriate circumstances, is to
say that the sky is blue; to write the judgement stroke in front of it, in
appropriate circumstances, is still to say that the sky is blue. There is
really nothing special for the judgement stroke to do.25
25 This idea comes to expression in the Tractarian rejection of Frege's view:
The verb of the proposition is not 'is true' or 'is false' – as Frege thought – but that
which 'is true' must already contain the verb. (4.063)
Every proposition must already have a sense; assertion cannot give it a sense, for
what it asserts is just the sense itself. And the same hold for denial etc. (4.064)
(Frege's assertion sign “⊦ ” is logically quite meaningless. In Frege (and in Russell) it
only shows that these authors hold as true the propositions marked in this way. Thus
“⊦ ” belongs to the proposition no more than does the number of the proposition. A
proposition cannot possibly assert of itself that it is true.) (4.442)
Elizabeth Anscombe thought that these passages evince such a misunder-
standing of Frege's view that they must have been written in response to Ber-
trand Russell's interpretation of Frege, and this has become a common
criticism. On the surface, Frege does not believe that “is true” (and certainly
not “is false”) is the verb of the proposition; and the terminology used by Wit-
tgenstein, such as “assertion sign” instsead of “judgement stroke”, is Russell's.
But if I am not mistaken in the above, then that is only on the surface, and
Wittgenstein is deeply right about what Frege is really committed to. Because
the assertion sign is tasked with turning a name into a claim, it takes over the
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(2) If thinking that p is really thinking that that p is true, then the con-
tent of this act is not that p but that that p is true. But this is again only a
name for a truth value; in fact, it is just the very same thought again. It
still stands in need of transformation into something assertible. To
think it is to think that that that p is true, and so on forever. We could
never think anything, because we can never get to the point where
what we think has the form of something that we can think. Of course,
a Fregean would say that the content of the judgement is that p, not that
that p is true. The words “content of the judgement” are interpreted to
refer to this. That is said from the perspective of the theorist looking at
what people say. If instead we direct the theorist at what he himself is
saying when he speaks of “judging that that thought is true” he will
have to conclude that what is judged is that that thought is true — and
thus the regress begins.
On the Fregean view, there are really two standpoints one can take up:
there is the standpoint one takes up in thinking that it is raining; and
there is the standpoint which the Fregean takes up in saying what it is
that one is then doing: predicating truth of the thought that is raining,
naming the True, and so on. But this second standpoint is sideways-on.
From this standpoint, it seems a thought is not the sort of thing one can
work of the verb of the proposition, so that the verb comes to seem devoid of
assertoric force. We are led to read the assertion sign as saying of a
thought/proposition that it is true. But it is redundant if it says this under the
same aspect as the aspect under which the verb “is blue” in “The sky is blue”
says that the sky is blue (“The sky is blue” already says that the sky is blue),
which is the point of the frst two remarks; and it cannot say it under the as -
pect under which a person can say that the sky is blue, which is the point of
the last remark.
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think; it is only half a thought. One cannot think a grammatical subject;
one can only predicate something of it. One cannot think a name; one
can only think that the name names the True. And so on for every
other attempt to say what the distance between a thought as it is in
itself and a thought as it is judged (asserted) comes to. In short, one
cannot think that it is raining; one can only think that it is true that it is
raining. But now the problem repeats itself when we apply the theory
to itself. If that it is raining is only half a thought, then that it is true that it
is raining is still only half a thought.
This paradox, the source of which Wittgenstein already criticised in PI
22, lies behind the “paradoxical truism” of PI 95:
“Thinking must be something peculiar (Einzigartiges).” When we say, mean,
that such and such is the case then with what we mean we do not stop any-
where short of the fact, but mean that  such-and-such – is – so-and-so. – But this
paradox (which has the form of a truism) can also be expressed in this way:
one can think what is not the case.
The frst sentence is almost a direct quotation from Frege: “Judgement
can be seen as the advance from a thought to its truth value. Of course
this cannot be a defnition. Judgement is something quite peculiar
(Eigenartiges) and incomparable.” (Frege, 1892: 35) All that is needed for
the sense of paradox is that there seems to be some distance between
when “such and such is the case” is said the frst time, as merely some-
thing meant, and when it is said the second time, as being — as if
something is achieved in that way. It is a paradox in the form of a tru-
ism, because the paradox is that a truism seems to say something
substantial. We know that nothing is achieved: all that Wittgenstein
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really says is, “When we say that something is so we say that some-
thing is so.” And yet we can recognise the ambition if we feel there is
something to aim for. The reifcation of “what we mean,” - its being
essentially something to mention, distinguished from what is claimed
in asserting it - is just what makes it seem that there is something to
aim for. With “what we mean” we stop nowhere short of the fact.
“What we mean” = that such and such is so and so. But what we mean
(claim) is that such and such - is - so and so. In the frst instance the
thought is mentioned, as a thing to refer to, whereas in the second case
it is asserted. On Frege's view, there must be a diference between what
is mentioned (a thought) and what is asserted (that the thought is true),
but when we look again, we see that what is asserted is just what is
mentioned.
§3 Monism
In a mind no volition—that is, no afrmation or negation—occurs except
that which the idea involves just because it is an idea.
Corollary: the will and the intellect are one and the same.
Baruch Spinoza, Ethics II§49
1 Let me recap quickly. On the Cartesian view, a thinkable content
is given in a moment of passive apprehension; in a judgement we do
something with it. The thinkable content as such lacks what is added to
it in the second moment. It has its proper place as a name in a predicat -
ive proposition, or as a thing in a predicative fact: it is a forceless
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thinkable. To think the thinkable is to think of it that it is true. Two
tasks are performed at once: turning a forceless thinkable into a claim,
and making this claim (committing the author to it). They must be per-
formed at once, because if we try to perform the frst task frst, the
result is just a thinkable content again, which still stands in need of the
same transformation. This, we saw, is incoherent: on this conception
thinking that p is not thinking that p.
It may seem that the solution is to deny that there is a distinction
between an act of judgement and the content of that act. What is judged
is, of course, not a token act of judgement - my judging here and now
that it is raining. But can't it still be the type of act I thus perform, and
which someone else, somewhen and somewhere else, can perform as
well: judging that it is raining? This seems an appropriate bearer of a
truth value: an act of judgement determines, in Frege's sense, a ques-
tion of truth. But Peter Geach (1965) and others have argued that such a
view cannot accommodate the point - which Geach calls “Frege's
point” - that a proposition may occur both asserted and unasserted. In
the syllogism, “If p then q; but p, therefore q,” the two occurrences of p
must mean the same. We have to distinguish between what is repeated
here – the proposition p – and its being used frst as an antecedent and
then as an assertion. And that does seem to mean that what is repeated
cannot be an act of judgement, not even a type act of judgement. If the
proposition just were an act of judgement, it seems that to use the pro-
position would be to make this judgement. But to use a proposition is
not always to make the corresponding judgement; it is not, for
example, when the proposition is used as antecedent. Frege's point
does show that we must distinguish between an act of judgement and
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its content. I will use the words “thought” and “judgement” synonym-
ously, and take the content to be a proposition: a sentence individuated
by logical criteria, so that two sentences, as presently understood, are
the same if and only if they are understood to mean the same. I will
write a proposition between German quotation marks: » The sky is
blue «.26
There may still be a very intimate connection between act and content.
This would be so if a thinkable content is essentially something to
think, rather than, as on the Fregean view, essentially something to
refer to. We would have a resolution to the paradox when a proposition
in indicative form is already a claim, not something that stands in need
of transformation. And indeed it is truistic that it is already a claim, as
Wittgenstein's paradoxical truism brings out. To think that the sky is
blue is not to think that things are accordingly; it is to think that the sky
- is - blue. As a key opens a lock, so » The sky is blue « says that the sky is
blue. Under that aspect, the indicative mood expresses assertoric force.
Since it is the predicate which is negated (to think that it is not the case
that the sky is blue is to think that the sky is not blue), we may say that
it carries assertoric force.
26 This corrects for the remaining side of Frege's three-fold separation between
force, thought and sentence. I argue for this briefy in chapter III.  This under-
standing of the notion of a proposition accords with Geach's, and with the
Tractarian distinction between sign and symbol. On the Tractarian view, two
visible or audible signs are the same symbol if they are used to mean the
same: “In the proposition, ‘Green is green’—where the frst word is the name
of a person and the last an adjective—these words do not merely have difer -
ent meanings: they are diferent symbols.” (TLP 3.323) A proposition is made
up of - and is itself - a symbol. 
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But now Frege's point can easily distract us from this idea. It seems it
prevents us from saying that to combine subject and predicate is to
make a judgement, or that to manifestly combine name and verb is to
make an assertion. To do so is only to make a thinkable content, which
can still occur unasserted. It now seems that to judge is to do more than
thinking, saying or writing the proposition. Even if there is a sense in
which the verb expresses assertoric force, this is not assertoric force in
the sense in which it is given to the proposition in the act of judgement.
So when I think that the sky is blue, there is more in my mind than
merely the proposition » The sky is blue «. In addition, there is the
assertoric intention or force with which I say these words to myself. I
may, so to say, imbue the verb with this intention, but it is still separ-
able from the verb as such, since it can be used without this intention.
The assertion sign is meant to be this intention purely; pure spirit
without matter. (You can say, “I love you,” without meaning it, but you
cannot say the spirit without meaning it. The spirit is your meaning it.)
On the Fregean view, the assertoric force which is expressed by the
verb cannot be the same as the assertoric force which is given to the
proposition in the act of judgement. But in an act of judgement there is
nothing else than the proposition. To paraphrase a remark of Wittgen-
stein, when I think in words, I don't have “forces” in my mind in
addition to the verbal expressions; rather, language itself is the vehicle
of judgement.27 When a proposition is judged or asserted, the commit-
ment of the thinker or speaker comes to expression in the proposition
27 This is the original: “When I think in words, I don’t have ‘meanings’ in my
mind in addition to the verbal expressions; rather, language itself is the
vehicle of thought.” (PI §329)
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itself, not in anything added to it. To make a claim (assertion) is just to
make a claim (predication).
So how can that be compatible with Frege's point? It is true that we can
combine subject and predicate without thinking it. But that does not
mean that to think, say or write a proposition is, by default, merely to
put it forward for consideration, and when you want to assert it you
have to do something else in addition. Things are just the other way
around. To combine subject and predicate is, in an ordinary context, to
think this combination unless one does something else in addition. By
an ordinary context I mean one in which words are taken seriously,
rather than, for example, the context of a play. And by doing some-
thing in addition I mean doing something that would cancel the
assertoric force, such as adding a disjunct or a question mark. This can
itself be seen as a matter of linguistic context. In the right context, all
one needs to do is combine subject and predicate. To do so manifestly,
in spoken or written words, is to make an assertion. We should not
understand the absence of a force-cancelling context with the presence
of a force indicator.
Frege puts assertion on a par with making as if to assert, with other
speech acts, and with occurring as a clause (antecedent, disjunct, etc.)
within a larger assertion. The judgement stroke is supposed to indicate
a contrast with all types of cases. It is supposed to show that the author
is really committed to the proposition that follows, that it is an asser-
tion and not a command or some other speech act, and that it does not
occur in some larger context (it is not an antecedent or disjunct, etc.). It
is important to see that none of these contrasts require a special sign,
and in some cases a special sign really ruins it. By seeing this, we see
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that to distinguish the primary use of a proposition from these second-
ary uses is not an act in addition to combining name and verb.
(1) Most obviously futile, and a familiar target of criticism, is the
attempt to use the assertion sign to draw a contrast with making as if to
assert. If we had to use an assertion sign to express commitment, actors
would have to use it on stage in order to give a convincing perform-
ance, as Geach and others observe. Or worse, if we had to say, “We
really mean it,” in order to mean something, we could never mean any-
thing. This is not something special about assertion; it holds for saying
stuf generally. When you ask a question you commit yourself to its
presuppositions; when you issue an invitation you give the addressee
the right to take it up; and even telling a story comes with a certain
responsibility. In order to avoid such commitment you either need to
say it in a special context, such as a play, or say something additional
such as “I don't really mean it.” But in order to commit to what you are
saying you don't need to do anything special. And even when you don't
commit yourself to that which is embedded in some such context, you
are still responsible for the embedding. This larger context is occurring
by itself. When I say, “I want to say: Entweder Spinozismus oder keine Philo-
sophie,” I distance myself from Hegel's claim, but commit myself, at
least for the time being, to the claim that I want to agree with Hegel. 
It is not a convention that by default we mean what we say. If it were,
we should be able to imagine abolishing this convention and replacing
it by the assertion sign. The assertion sign would indicate commit-
ment, really meaning what one says. Its absence would naturally be
taken to mean that what follows is merely put forward for considera-
tion. So to say, “The sky is blue,” would mean something like what,
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“Suppose that the sky is blue,” means now. That it would mean that
would be the default: it replaces the default assumption that we mean
what we say. So whenever someone would say something, we would
need to write this as follows: “…,” she supposed. But then how could
anything be said? Even the new convention would just be understood
as: “I say: the sky is blue,” she supposed. We would not be able to cancel
this default understanding by a convention, just as, in our actual lan-
guage, we can't cancel default saying by a convention. Even if we
introduced the convention that everything we say between midnight
and 3pm we don't really mean, then when we said something in those
hours, we would mean that we don't mean it. So this idea comes to
nothing. That by default we mean what we say is not a convention but
belongs to what saying is.
It seems that Frege thought of forming a thinkable content as a tentat-
ive exercise, a means of testing for logical connections. The expression
of the thinkable content “that opposite magnetic poles attract each
other,” in absence of the assertion sign, “is to produce in the reader
merely the idea of the mutual attraction of magnetic poles, say in order
to derive consequences from it and to test by means of these whether
the thought is correct.” (Frege 1879: 2) This remark does not describe
Frege's conception of inference: to “derive consequences” is not to
infer, because we cannot infer from false premises – that is just why
Frege needs the judgement stroke in the representation of a syllogism.
But it still tells us something about his conception of thinkable content.
The idea is produced in the reader; the reader, though drawing on his
understanding, is not exercising his will, and so is passive in this trans-
action, just as Descartes's narrator is passive when he perceives ideas
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without yet deciding on their truth. And corresponding to the passivity
of the subject is the inertia of the ideas perceived: they are things
which only in judgement we relate to reality. This amounts to a certain
conception of what it is to put words together. What discursive activity
is is modelled on speaking without conviction. Language on a holiday -
or rather, as in Frege's comparison, on stage - is taken to show us the
essence of reason. But even when we are in the course of an investiga-
tion, searching for a solution to a problem, we do not put words
together without conviction. To fnd the right words to say what we
want to say is not a separate act from meaning it.
(2) That is not something about assertion, but about saying stuf
generally. What is special about assertion is that it is the simplest thing
to say, or at least the simplest thing to do with a combination of subject
and predicate.28 Assertion is not on a par with other speech acts, or
28 Commanding, issuing an invitation, and so on are even simpler: you don't
even need a subject. Philosophers have often treated imperatives as taking a
proposition as object, so that, “You will sit down,” when said and understood
with imperative intention, is to invite the second person to make this propos-
ition true. (See, e.g., Davidson 1979) But making a proposition true is only one
of the many things you can invite someone to do. Another one is to sit down.
Maybe it is because of this simplicity of imperatives that the frst few ex-
amples of language-games in Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations
consist of imperative moves “Slab!”, “Block!” When the question is raised
whether such a game, in the absence of any more sophisticated moves, can be
called a language, Wittgenstein responds with his famous city comparison (PI
§18):
Don’t let it bother you that languages (2) and (8) consist only of orders. If you want to
say that they are therefore incomplete, ask yourself whether our own language is
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with the occurrence of a proposition as antecedent or disjunct.
Although a proposition can be used in non-assertoric ways, its primary
use is in an act of judgement or assertion. When you want to explain to
someone what the proposition » The sky is blue « means, what you
explain is what it is for the sky to be blue, so what is judged in judging
that the sky is blue. And so also in philosophy we cannot have a con-
ception of propositions independently of a conception of judgement. I
do not mean to say that a proposition is improperly used when it is used
as, say, a question. It is just that such uses are in some way secondary
to judgement or assertion, though it is not easy to spell out in which
way. A question is understood against a background of knowing what it
would be to answer it. But an answer is an assertion.
The Cartesian thinks that in order to merely suppose a proposition we
only have to have it in mind; but in order to think it we need to do
something in addition. But in truth it is the other way around. When
you want to turn a combination of subject and predicate into a ques-
tion, you add a question mark; in a disjunction, you add a disjunct; a
supposition, you add “suppose”; but to assert it you don't add anything.
We may think of the propositions » p « and » p? « as the same in
respect of content but diferent in respect of force. But the diference is
not that the second has something instead of the frst: it has something
in addition to the frst. What the frst has, the “assertoric force” dis-
complete — whether it was so before the symbolism of chemistry and the notation of
the infnitesimal calculus were incorporated in to it; for these are, so to speak, sub -
urbs of our language.
Now it seems to me mistaken to think that we can make sense of a language
consisting only of orders. If it were a city, it would be a city without schools,
streets, public transport, and sanitation – that is, the essentials.
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played by the verb or copula, is still there in the second. The question is
whether things are this way, as opposed to not this way. It is a mistake
to treat the assertion sign as on a par with a question mark. The same is
true for disjunctions, hypotheticals, and so on. The assertion sign is
trying to do what the predicate already does. But what the predicate
does is clearly not comparable to what the question mark does. So to
have “assertoric force” in this sense is not exactly the same as to be an
assertion: it is to be an assertion unless the context, both linguistic and
non-linguistic, says otherwise.
This is not a mere convention, as both Geach (1965) and Dummett
(1973) thought.29 In that case we should be able to imagine replacing
this convention by something like an assertion sign. Let us accept that
by default what is said is really meant, but the assertion sign distin-
guishes what is said from other speech acts. Its absence may be taken
to mean that what is said is a question. To only combine name and verb
29 Geach dismisses the signifcance of a proposition's occurring by itself as
“something of a clue to what is meant assertorically,” and continues (456):
There is a certain presumption - though of course it can be upset in various ways -
that an author of a nonfctional work intends a sentence to be read as an assertion if it
stands by itself between full stops and grammatically can be read as an assertion. The
assertoric force of a sentence is thus shown by its not being enclosed in the context of
a longer sentence.
He adds that there may be something corresponding to this in the realm of
thought, mentioning Spinoza's example of a boy who thinks only of a winged
horse, having no reason to think that it does not exist, and thereby believes in
its existence. That is how I would describe it. Geach can only hear this ex-
ample through a Cartesian prism; he writes that the boy, “cannot but assent
to the thought of there being a winged horse.” (457)
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and thus to express an indicative sentence would, in this language, be
to ask a question. In order to make an assertion we would, say, have to
put an exclamation mark behind it. But then what if we knew both that
it either rains or pours, and that it doesn't pour? We could write, » It
rains or it pours! « and » It doesn't pour! « to obtain » It rains «.  It
seems we would have no right to place an exclamation mark behind
this conclusion: what is obtained by disjunction elimination is exactly
the frst disjunct, nothing more and nothing less, and the frst disjunct
is, as such, without exclamation mark. Nor can we put an exclamation
mark behind each disjunct to begin with: the disjuncts are not asserted.
But without exclamation mark, the conclusion means only the ques-
tion “Is it raining?” If asking questions were the default in the way that
assertion is now, disjunctions could only be disjunctions between
questions, and the same for hypotheticals and so on. Our thought
experiment falls apart: what may seem to be only a convention really
belongs to the essence of thinking. And it is this which doesn't allow
the problems which the judgement stroke is supposed to resolve even
to get started.
In conclusion, two things are going wrong with the Fregean treatment
of assertion. First, assertion is tasked with turning a name into a claim.
But there is no need for this: as a key opens a lock, so an indicative sen -
tence already expresses a claim. Second, assertion is put on a par both
with making as if to assert and with other speech acts. The assertion
sign is supposed to indicate the speaker's taking a side in both con-
trasts. But neither work can be done by a special sign which we add to
the proposition. The frst is the default for saying stuf, and the second
is the default for combining name and verb. The context, both lin-
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guistic and non-linguistic, can mean that this case is not default, but
we should not confuse the absence of cancelling embedding with the
presence of a force indicator. To do so is to take away the life of signs,
and then there is no way to breathe life into it again by means of
another sign: this additional sign will be just as dead, as semantically
inert, as all signs now seem to be.30
2 Though this is a view of thinking, it is hardly distinguishable
from the conception of perceptual experience, and what in it we experi-
ence, which I defended in the previous chapter. It amounts to a
rejection of the basic conviction which underlies both dualism and Fre-
gean monism: that to be aware of something is not to take any stance on
how it is. I argued that that conviction in the end means that the pres-
ence of things in experience cannot be self-conscious awareness of how
things are. In the present chapter I have tried to go to the root of this
conviction, fnding it both in the Descartes's fourth Meditation and in
the way Frege construes the distinction between act and content. My
deeper aim in rejecting that view is to reject the separation of will and
understanding. That separation makes the will seem blind, and the
understanding seem powerless, its content inert.
The dualist has an additional reason to conceive perceptual judgement
dualistically: sensibility cannot be informed by the understanding, so
that it, and what we experience, cannot already be conceptually shaped.
I believe that McDowell and others have said what needs to be said in
order to correct for this. But although McDowell allows for sensibility
30 Compare “Every sign by itself seems dead. What gives it life? — In use it lives. Is
it there that it has living breath within it? — Or is the use its breath?”  (Wit-
tgenstein, PI §432)
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informed by the understanding, he still, per the Cartesian conception,
separates the understanding and the will. That means that he holds on
to the idea that perceptual judgement consists of two acts: one of “con-
tent's being available to one” (10) (being under an appearance to the
efect that things are thus and so), and one of afrmation (taking the
appearance at face value) or denial (rejecting it as an illusion). The frst
moment is something like an “invitation” to make a judgement, as he
later put it, “I think receiving an impression, having things appear to
one a certain way, does not itself imply accepting anything, not even
that things appear to one that way.” (McDowell 2002: 278) This is
saddled with all the problems of the Cartesian paradigm. The moment
of presentation seems inert, powerless to convince the subject, whereas
the moment of afrmation or denial seems blind. These problems dis-
solve when we think of perceptual experience as paradigmatically a
successful exercise of our capacity for knowledge, as McDowell himself
suggests in other work (McDowell 2011). But that should really mean a
rejection of the Cartesian view. To see how things are is not to be
presented with a thinkable content, to which we then still need to
attach a force. On that view, it comes to seem that the thinkable content
is on our mind. But what is actually on our mind are what the constitu-
ents of the content are of: some thing we think of, being some way we
think it is. To see things is already to see that things are thus and so.
The Fregean monist view of experience comes together, at least impli-
citly, with a relational conception of truth and judgement: for a
thinkable content to be true is for it to be the same as a fact. Maybe that
is already saying too much, since on McDowell's view, truth is really
indefnable: it is not that truth lies in the sameness of thinkable and
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fact; rather, as Hornsby puts it, “is true” and “is a fact” mean the same.
But we cannot help but want some kind of asymmetry between think-
ing and being. Our thinking answers to the facts: the facts make our
thinking true, not the other way around. And so although it is right, I
believe, that truth is a oneness of thinking and being, we also need to
preserve a certain asymmetry between thinking and being. Just as that
asymmetry goes missing in the defationary formula “p is true if p,” so
it goes missing in McDowell's formula, “I can think that spring has
begun, and that very same thing, that spring has begun, can be the
case.” (McDowell 1994: 27)
According to Frege, truth is indefnable. Since judgement aims at truth,
and since the content of a judgement is not yet the claim that it names
the True, it seems that, on Frege's view, judgement aims for something
beyond itself. But we cannot say what it is, because upon refection the
diference dissolves. The regress Frege notes is a version of the one I
described before (Frege 1918):
In a defnition certain characteristics (Merkmale) would have to be stated, and
in application to a particular case the question would always arise whether it
is true that the characteristics are present — so one goes round in a circle.
Truth would indeed be indefnable if we had to do it in that way, by
looking at a thought, and saying of it when it would be true. But if we
stop looking at the thought and instead take up the standpoint of judge-
ment, we can defne truth as being so: for me to think truly is for the
things I think of to be the ways I think them to be. When I think truly »
The wave is rising «, this is because the wave is, in fact, rising. Here on
the right-hand side I use (not mention) the proposition to explain why
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it is true. Falsehood can be defned similarly: for it to be false to say »
The wave is rising « is for the wave to be not rising.
The insight in Fregean monism is that when we think truly, there is no
distance, no gap, between our thinking and the reality which determ-
ines its truth. Truth lies in a oneness of thinking and being. But this
oneness is not a sameness of thinkable and fact. To describe it in that
way is to stand back from a judgement and refect on it, relating it to the
world from this perspective. This is the standpoint forced upon us by
the Cartesian view. But from the standpoint which we take up in judge-
ment, what is on our mind is not the thinkable content, but the thing
we think of, and the way we think it to be. So the oneness of thinking
and being fnds better expression in the formula above, which is Aris-
totle's: “It is because of the thing’s being, or not being, thus-and-so that
the predication is said to be true or false.” (Aristotle, Cat. 5:4b 8–10) Not,
“The very thing which one can think can also be the case,” but: the very
thing I think of can be the very way I think it is. But the formula simul-
taneously captures the asymmetry between thinking and being. The
circumstance explains the truth of the claim, not the other way around:
“It is not because of our having the true thought that you are pale, that
you are pale; rather it is because of your being pale that we who say so
have a true thought.” (Aristotle, Met. Th.10: 1051b 6–9)
3 I do not say much in this dissertation about the sense/reference
distinction. In one way, the notion of sense is central to the present
issue. Behind the notion of sense lies the idea that thoughts (and con-
cepts) are to be individuated according to their cognitive signifcance.
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This is also central to McDowell's Mind and World. He can, he writes,
formulate a main point of his lectures in terms of the Fregean notion of
sense (180):
[I]t is in the context of that notion that we should refect about the relation of
thought to reality, in order to immunize ourselves against the familiar philo-
sophical anxieties. … [T]he whole point of the notion of sense is captured by
the principle that thoughts, potential senses of whole utterances, difer if a
single subject can simultaneously take rationally conficting stances towards
them (say, any two of acceptance, rejection, and neutrality) without thereby
standing convicted of irrationality.
Although I sympathise with the general idea, this formulation is
another expression of the Cartesian paradigm. It is as if we could think
a contradiction on pain of being sent to corrective training. But if the
will and the intellect are one and the same, there is just no such thing as
thinking a contradiction, just as there is no such thing as not believing
something once one has sufcient reason to believe it.31 Judgement is
not a free, spontaneous act in response to being given the content. So
we can remove the redundant qualifying phrase. The reference to time
(“simultaneously”) may also be distracting. It is not really about simul-
taneity; you cannot, without changing your mind, think p and not p at
diferent times either. What is left is the Kantian idea that representa-
tions are to be individuated according to whether they can be held
together in one consciousness. And that is certainly my general
31 If something has a sense when it can be thought, then a contradiction is, as
the Tractatus says, without sense (sinnlos), though not nonsense (unsinnig)
since it is part of the symbolism: something is shown by the fact that combin-
ing symbols in this way one gets a contradiction.
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approach.
That is not yet to say anything about reference. One can think of the
sense/reference distinction as an answer to a puzzle which arises when
one is inclined, as comes natural in the tradition started by Frege, to
hear such phrases as “what is said” and “what is seen” purely extension-
ally, so that the way in which it is said or seen (Frege's “Art des
Gegebenseins”) does not enter into their semantic value. Thinking in
this way, one is bound to become puzzled about the informativeness of
true identity statements, or the possibility of distinguishing between
thoughts and concepts which are extensionally identical. How can “a =
b” say anything if the semantic contribution made by “a” and by “b” is
determined purely by the things they stand for? How can we distin-
guish between two diferent thoughts - that Venus is self-identical; that
the morning star is the evening star - when they are true in the same
possible circumstances? In answer to this puzzlement, we can remind
ourselves of the criterion of cognitive signifcance, and see that con-
cepts and thoughts which are extensionally the same can still difer in
this way.
But the sense/reference distinction easily lends itself to a dualistic con-
strual, as happens when Frege speaks of a step from sense to reference.
When we individuate thoughts according to the criterion of cognitive
signifcance, we draw them closely to the mind, and this intimacy may
seem to contrast with the otherness of that which determines the truth
of our thinking. And so it may seem that when I speak of a circum-
stance, I am speaking of something in the realm of reference, whereas
claims are in the realm of sense. But we must not confuse the distinc-
tion between claim and circumstance with that between sense and
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reference. The latter distinction cuts across the frst. We can individu-
ate both claims and circumstances extensionally, so that the
claim/circumstance that Venus is self-identical is the same as the
claim/circumstance that the morning star is the evening star, and we
can individuate both fnely, so that these claims/circumstances are dis-
tinguished. We individuate them fnely when we use the criterion of
cognitive signifcance. It is true that this draws circumstances close to
the mind, but that is just the point: our surroundings, when we are at
home in them, are not radically other. But we can still recognise that
diferent circumstances can be the same in this respect. We can distin-
guish between Venus as morning star and Venus as evening star, as we
do when we say that they are two diferent aspects of one and the same
thing. Venus as morning star and Venus as evening star are not
products of the mind. It is the way things are, the relative position of
Earth and Venus, which allows for these two diferent perspectives on
Venus.
So I do not disagree with the need for a notion of sense, thus under-
stood. It is only a mistake to think of sense and reference as two
separate things, like a lens and what is seen through it. They are more
like a planet (or the concept of a planet), and the planet as seen from a
certain angle (or the concept of a planet as seen from a certain angle).
The mistake would be to think that Venus, or its being as it is, or its
being identical to itself, makes it true that the morning star is the even-
ing star. It is easy to think this when it is thought that a reference is
independent of a sense, as if it is something about our mind or language
that there are these diferent perspectives on the reference. It then
seems that in giving a theory of truth we can relate reference and sense
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from sideways-on: it is true to think this sense because of this refer-
ence. It is true that the morning star is the evening star because Venus
is self-identical. But that Venus is self-identical would be just another
sense. The most the view could come to is that coarsely individuated
thoughts can be used in explaining why fnely individuated thoughts
are true. But that isn't so. Because we do not understand why it is true
that the morning star is the evening star once we understand, which we
do anyway, that Venus is self-identical. » The morning star is the even-
ing star « is true because the morning star is, in fact, the evening star —
if the proposition on the left-hand side is fnely individuated, in
accordance with the criterion of cognitive signifcance, the proposition
on the right-hand side must be, too.
Claims/circumstances individuated either way can fgure in the idea
that “seeing that something is the case” is a receptive achievement.
Looking at a computer simulation of our solar system one can see that
the morning star is the evening star. Of course one can only see this
against a background of knowing how to identify the morning star and
how to identify the evening star, which, after all, is part of having these
concepts. But knowing this, to see that they are the same is to see that
Venus passes through both points over its course through the sky. If
there is such a thing as seeing that Venus is self-identical, maybe it is to
see Venus as one body over the course of a simulated night. To see that
the morning star is the evening star is, one could say, an aspect of this
achievement: it is to see that this one body is frst in the one place and
then in the other.
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Conclusions
On the Cartesian view, judgement is an act of free will in response to
being given a thinkable content. To think, write or say a proposition is
merely to put it forward as supposition; to assert it one has to do some-
thing in addition. But then a proposition comes to seem forceless, and
so not yet something that can be afrmed or denied. But that is inco-
herent: to think that p is, on this conception, not to think that p. We can
fnd a resolution to the paradox when we see that things are really the
other way around: to think, write, or say a proposition is, by default,
already to make a claim; to put it forward as mere supposition, or as
another speech act, or as clause of a larger assertion, is to do something
in addition, or to think, write or say the proposition in a context which
means that it is not asserted. 
This amounts to a rethinking of the relation between spontaneity (will,
judgement) and receptivity (perception, understanding). On the
Cartesian conception, spontaneity is a response to receptivity. We exer-
cise free will in response to being given something. On the Spinozistic
conception, we do not have free will except in so far as we understand:
we can only think what we think is true.
Within such a conception, monism can come into its own. To be aware
of something is already to be aware of how it is: seeing things is seeing
that things are thus and so. Truth (falsehood) lies in being (not) so: » The
man is pale « is true (false) because the man is (not) pale. So there is a
distinction and an asymmetry between thinking and being, between
claims and circumstances, but this distinction is not one of diferent
things which stand in some relation to each other.
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The guiding idea behind Frege's notion of sense – individuating
thoughts and concepts according to the criterion of cognitive signifc-
ance – is central to this sort of conception. But we must not confuse the
sense/reference distinction with the claim/circumstance distinction.
The frst cuts across the second: both claims and circumstances can be
individuated fnely, according to the criterion of cognitive signifcance,
while allowing for two diferent claims/circumstances to be extension-
ally the same—that is, to be aspects of one and the same thing. 
With that I conclude the positive statement of my own view. In the
coming two chapters, I will mainly be concerned with a critique of the
views of Travis and McDowell. These view are instances of dualism and
Fregean monism respectively, and in that way should also throw some
light on the descriptions of those views given in the previous chapter. I
also hope my own view will stand out more clearly in contrast to theirs.
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III Reaching beyond the conceptual
§1 Introduction
In this chapter I discuss three theses of Charles Travis. The frst and
central thesis expresses a dualism of scheme and content. According to
Travis, the world - what thought answers to, and what is given in per-
ception - is not conceptually structured. When we say how things are,
the words we use impose a conceptual structure onto the world, but the
world is not in itself already partitioned in that way.32 So it is not
already structured in things one can think or speak of, and ways one
can truly think or say they are. What thought answers to, and what is
given in perception, is infnitely particular: it is the way things are (or
“things being as they are”), so that if things were in any way diferent,
they wouldn't be the way they are.33 By contrast, a thought, that which
can be true or false, is something general. For anything that one can say
32 “To represent things as a certain way is to impose, or deploy, a particular
scheme for categorizing things being as they are” (Travis 2008: 162) 
“[A thought]'s generality is also a scheme for partitioning the world: there are
those things whose being as they are is their falling under that generality, and
there are those things whose being as they are is not that.” (Travis 2011: 2)
33  “It is that pig’s being as it now is, or was last Tuesday at 10, or something
else’s being as it now is, which is, or is not, a case of something snufling.
Such are the particular cases which instance such generalities as a way for a
thing to be. (Of course, the pig is not as it is unless things (catholic reading)
are as they are. We could say: the pig refects things in general from its own
porcine point of view.)” (Travis 2013: 4)
96
or think to be so, there are endlessly many cases of things being as they
are that would count as cases of things being so.34 Say for example that
it is raining. Then there is some unique way in which it is now raining.
It would still be true that it is raining even if things were somewhat dif-
ferent than the way they are: if the rain were falling harder, or from a
diferent angle, or were of a diferent pH level, or if there were difer-
ent people walking about, and so on ad infinitum. Travis concludes that
for the thought to be true is for it to stand in a relation to the particular
case. He calls this relation instancing when seen from one direction (the
particular case instances the thought), and reaching when seen from the
other (the thought reaches to the particular case).35
The second thesis is that a thought, what can be true or false, is in itself
a forceless, structureless whole. It is distinguished both from what one
commits oneself to in a judgement, and from the linguistic means
needed to grasp or express it. A thought is not what one commits one-
self to in a judgement, that it is raining, but the thing that one thus
presents as true: that it is raining (try to hear the copula without
assertoric force).36 As such, this thing is defned by when it would be
34 “... if things being as they are is a case of things being such that Sid smokes,
such is one way for this to happen—one among indefnitely many ways. Nor
is this feature peculiar to things being such that Sid smokes. It is built into the
very idea of a way for things to be; a feature of any such way.” (Travis 2013: 6)
35 “In the terminology used in these essays, a way for things to be (or for a thing
to be) reaches to, or is instanced by, indefnitely many distinct (possible) cases.”
(Travis 2013: 6)
36 Travis puts this point in terms of a distinction between “representing as” and
“representing to be”. “Representing as may be merely representing things be-
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true, which means, according to the frst thesis, when things being as
they are would be a case of things being so. In expressing the thought
in words, or analysing it, we read some structure into it: we can think
of its truth as turning on how some element of the world is, and
whether it is some way for elements of the world to be.37 In that way we
also impose a structure onto the world.38 But we can do so in endlessly
many ways, on diferent occasions, for diferent intents and pur-
poses.39 The way we should structure a thought is relative to human
sensibilities and present purposes. So a conceptual structure is some-
thing merely psychological; it is merely a way of presenting the
thought to ourselves and others in visible or audible form.40 The
ing thus and so. It thus ranges wider than representing to be. One might rep-
resent Pia as the darling of the silver screen (for example, by drawing her in
an open-top Duesenberg, silk scarf futtering, waving as to fans), without in
the least suggesting that she is one.” (Travis 2013: 27)
37 “A thought makes truth turn on whether things (catholic reading) are a cer-
tain way. What it thus does can be broken down, decomposed, into parts. If
the thought makes truth turn on whether that pig is snufling, it does this, in
part, in making truth turn on who, or what, is snufling, and in part in mak-
ing truth turn on how that pig is.” (Travis 2013: 4)
38 “Conceptual schemes (of course) belong to the conceptual. What they capture
—what falls under, or fts, them—belongs to the non-conceptual. If they are
adequate, what they are adequate to is things being as they are, which admits
of being articulated in the way they call for.” (Travis 2013: 132)
39 “[T]he way things are factors diferently (and in mutually incompatible ways)
into ways things are on diferent occasions for the factoring.” (Travis 2013:
132) See also Travis 2008.
40 “the work words do in meaning what they do—the work for which they are
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thought in itself, apart from some way of expressing it, is a forceless,
structureless whole.
The third thesis is a form of naïve realism. According to Travis, to be
given the particular case in perception is not something we do, not
even in the sense in which believing and knowing are things we do.41 In
so far as perception is a receptive achievement, it is not, as knowledge
and belief are, an expression of rational agency. It is merely something
that happens to us, something which our senses do for us. Travis
thinks of receptivity as a matter of having access to our surroundings;
this afords an opportunity to judge how things are. Our senses
“merely bring our surroundings into view for us; aford us some
awareness of them.” (Travis 2013: 30) In response we decide for
ourselves which things can be said to be there, and how they can be
said to be. To see that it is raining is really to tell, on the basis of being
given the particular case, that it can count as a case of things being such
that it is raining. The particular case is before our eyes; the generality
we bring it under is not. On this view, one cannot see (in the sense of
thus equipped—is entirely at this frst step [of expressing thoughts], and not
(directly) a contribution to that work, at the second stage, of being true or
false (a truth or falsehood) at all. In this sense, meaning is not to be under -
stood in terms of the notion of being true. On this view, a sentence is a dedic -
ated device for achieving representing. As I will understand this, used for
what it is for, it makes a specifc contribution to achieving recognition of how
things are thus represented as being. It is a specialised tool for use in authoring
representing.” (Travis forthcoming b)
41 Travis describes a perceptual experience as “something one undergoes -
something inficted on, sufered by, one,” and he adds, “And it is unclear what
it would mean to sufer something intentionally.” (Travis 2015: 45)
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awareness of what is there before one's eyes) that things are thus and
so. Anything that can be expressed in words is an abstract thing which
lies outside of what is given, standing in a relation to it.
I will argue against all three theses, and more generally, against the
form of realism which Travis in this way defends. Travis is motivated
by the conviction that reality, as it is given in perceptual experience,
must be independent of thought. One way or another, every philo-
sopher will want to say as much, at least in the minimal sense that
saying so doesn't make it so. What is characteristic of Travis's form of
realism is this, he analyses what it is to be aware of how things are as
falling apart into two moments, two distinct forms of awareness: pass-
ively receiving what is there, and actively making out how things are;
and correspondingly, he draws a distinction between two separate
objects of awareness: the particular case, and a thought. Described at
such a level of abstraction, this form of realism is still very common,
even though Travis develops it in original ways. But it is not the only
option. It may be helpful if I briefy restate my alternative, which to
Travis looks idealistic.
On the contrasting conception, the world consists not only of what is
particular, but of a unity of particularity (matter) and generality (form).
The world is all things one can think of, being all the ways one can
truly think they are. It is true that the world consists of particulars -
the leaves, their rustling - which we can only think or speak about. But
thinking answers to how things are. In speaking about things, we do
not speak about how things are. In speaking about things, we say how
things are. So truth does not lie in a relation between a thought and
something given, but in a oneness of thinking and being: we can think
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or say of something that it is some way, and when we think truly, the
very thing we think of is the very way we think it is. Correspondingly,
in perceptual experience things are present to us, but for them to be
present to us is for us to see how they manifestly are. This includes at
least how things are spatio-temporally and causally arranged, and in
the case of animals, what they are doing. Just as the rain's falling is not
a thing in addition to the rain, so one's seeing that the rain is falling is
not an act in addition to seeing the rain. To see that the rain is falling
can be genuinely a visual (receptive) achievement, a matter of fnding a
conceptual form enmattered in the here and now. In order to make
sense of this, we have to reject the Fregean separation of thought,
force, and sentence.
Although I will disagree with Travis both in essentials and in details, I
believe he is one of the most incisive and consistent proponents of the
frst type of realism. Few philosophers would endorse all three theses,
but these theses are merely the result of thinking consistently through
the commitments of what Wilfrid Sellars called “the framework of
givenness,” and that framework is still very much in place in contem-
porary philosophy. So it seems to me that a critique of his view can
serve as a critique of the type of philosophy it instantiates.
I will proceed as follows. In §2 I introduce the formula, “Things being
as they are is a case of things being such that Sid smokes.” Unfolding
this formula is unfolding Travis's philosophy. In §3 I discuss the Fre-
gean background, which explains what the formula is supposed to do.
It is supposed to say what we do in judging a thought to be true. But
why does it take this specifc form? I explain this by means of two
related forms of realism (in addition to Frege's anti-psychologism)
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which Travis defends: scheme-content dualism (§4), and naïve realism
(§5). The upshot of all this is a conception of the world as lying beyond
the conceptual sphere, as comes to expression in the formula. In §6 I
argue why that conception makes no sense.
§2 Travis's Move
I will have to discuss pretty much every aspect of his philosophy, but it
is best to begin where Travis himself begins—with his theory of rep-
resentation, or what comes to the same, his theory of truth. Travis
holds that representation is a three-place relation between a repres-
enting subject, a thought, and a particular case.42 For Sid to represent
the pig as snufling is really this, it is for Sid to bring the particular case
of things being as they are under the thought that the pig is snufling. 43
Sid does so truly when the particular case does fall under the thought.44
In Travis's terminology, the particular case then instances the thought;
the thought reaches to this particular case. So Travis ofers something
like a theory of truth: for it to be true that p is for things being as they
42 “We can think of representing-as as a three-place relation: in the frst place, a
representer (some agent, or some item by which he represents, or, perhaps,
some item which, in some other way, bears content); in the second place,
what is represented as something or other; in the third place, a way for what
occupies the second place to be represented as being.” (Travis 2013: 3)
43 “Tings being such-and-such way is … that third term which a whole thought fxes. …
What … occupies the second place … is history, or historical—what encompasses such
episodes as that bird chirping on the branch, the pig snufing around the roots below.
Tings being as they are (history being as it is, or has been so far) is, or is not, things be-
ing such that a pig is snufing.” (Travis 2013: 4)
44 “If the thought is true, then it is things being as they are which is (a case of) things being
as represented.” (Travis 2013: 4)
102
are to be a case of (to instance) things being such that p.45
The purpose of the formula is to draw a contrast between the particu-
larity of the changeable world (the historical), and the generality of
thought (the conceptual). For anything that one can think, there are
endlessly many ways for things to be so that they are accordingly—
45 Travis tends to start his investigations at this point, introducing the thesis by
quoting Frege's Kernsatz 4: “A thought always contains something by means of
which it reaches beyond the particular case to present this to consciousness
as falling under something general.” But although the pressures underlying
Travis's thesis are present in Frege, the latter rejected any attempt to defne
truth, in particular the attempt to defne truth as a relation between a thought
and something else.
It seems to me that the thesis is closer to J.L. Austin's conception of truth
(1950: 116): “A statement is said to be true when the historic state of afairs to
which it is correlated by the demonstrative conventions (the one to which it
'refers') is of a type with which the sentence used in making it is correlated by
the descriptive conventions.”
Travis, like Austin, is partly motivated by occasion-sensitivity (see Travis
2008). The same idea, which he calls “conceptual relativity”, led Putnam to a
similar defnition of truth (1991: 115): “The suggestion I am making, in short, is
that a statement is true of a situation just in case it would be correct to use the words of
which the statement consists in that way in describing the situation. Provided the con-
cepts in question are not themselves ones which we ought to reject for one
reason or another, we can explain what 'correct to use the words of which the
statement consists in that way' means by saying that it means nothing more
nor less than that a sufciently well placed speaker who used the words in
that way would be fully warranted in counting the statement as true of that
situation.”
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and so endlessly many possible cases of things' being accordingly. In
thinking that something is some way, we bring the world, the particu-
lar case, under the generality of the thought. There is a shift here from
ordinary discourse. One would expect that in thinking of the pig that it
is snufling, one brings the pig under a generality; namely, the concept
of snufling. But Travis thinks there is still something general about
the pig. Although the pig does belong to the historical, it takes the
concept of a pig to individuate it as such. The world in itself, what
thought answers to and what is given in perception, is not already par-
titioned in that way. So Travis is led to conceive of what is particular as
things “in a catholic sense” (that is, in an all-encompassing sense), so
that it is a solecism to ask “Which things?”46 What is brought under a
generality is not an element of the world but the world as such. And the
generality it is brought under is not a way for an element of the world
to be, but a thought, which Travis thinks of as a way for the world to be.
To represent the pig as snuffling is really to represent the world as being
such that the pig is snuffling. Travis treats the world (things being as they
are) as itself a particular, and the thought as a concept of a way for the
world to be.47
It is not difcult to see the picture which guides Travis. Like others
46  “I will also speak of a zero-place concept; for example, my cup (now) being
empty. This is not a way for an n-tuple of objects to be, for any positive n. It is
rather a way for things to be. Here ‘things’ has its catholic sense, as in ‘Things
have been slow around here lately’.” (Travis 2013: 93) It seems to me that this
example does not quite suit his purpose. In any mundane use of such a phrase
one may still ask for specifcation. “What has been slow lately?” - “Business.”
47 A concept of “a way for the world to be” is what Travis calls “a zero-place
concept”, in the sense on which the concept of smoking is a 1-place concept.
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before him, he is impressed by the infnite particularity of the change-
able world, and the way this seems to contrast with the discreteness
and fnitude of words. One of his main inspirations is J.L. Austin, who
warned against modelling the world on the word, and wrote, “[S]tate-
ments ft the facts always more or less loosely, in diferent ways on
diferent occasions for diferent intents and purposes.” (Austin 1950:
124) Austin describes the world as held together by relations of simil-
arity and dissimilarity, but not already structured in the ways that we
structure it when we say how things are. The relations of similarity are
natural; those between words and world are conventional. The frst
allow conventions, so to say, to get a grip on things.48 (Similarly, Travis
distinguishes between relations of efect-representing, which are nat-
ural, and the three-place relation of representation which, if not
conventional, is still determined by human sensibilities.) This suggests
a picture on which the changeable world is continuous in a way that
contrasts with language, which carves the world up in discrete blocks,
in things and properties. But don't we also perceive discrete boundar-
ies in the world? Don't some things exhibit a kind of internal unity,
staying the same thing over time, and hanging together with other
things causally and in other ways? (How else could there be relations
of similarity and dissimilarity? Some things, of some comparable
sorts, can be similar or dissimilar in some respect.) From the perspect-
ive of Austin, it is true to say that there is this kind of unity and discord
in the world, but in doing so we carve the world up in ways which are
48 “The world must exhibit (we must observe) similarities and dissimilarities … :
if everything were either absolutely indistinguishable from everything else
or completely unlike everything else, there would be nothing to say.” (Austin
1950: 115) 
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relative to our sensibilities and interests. The way of carving up is
something we are responsible for, not the world. In philosophy we
have to get clear on who is responsible for what, “above all in discuss-
ing truth, where it is precisely our business to prise the words of the
world and keep them of it.” (118) I think this is also a good model for
seeing what Travis is trying to do, though with a Fregean twist: “ways
for things to be” instead of words.
Reading Travis's recent work, it seems the infnite particularity of the
historical - for anything that one can think, there are endlessly many
ways for things to be accordingly - is already supposed to justify his
move. My immediate task is to show that this is not so. First note that
the formula by itself, when heard without Travis's deeper intentions in
mind, is merely convoluted. Instead of saying of the world that it is
such that the pig is snufling, it would be more straightforward simply
to say of the pig that it is snufling. It is as if Travis is saying, “I walked
to the station in one of the ways of walking there.” This draws attention
to the way in which he walked to the station. It invites the question,
“Oh, in which way was that then? Across the bridge? Through the tun-
nel?” Travis may respond, “I walked across the bridge; that is, I walked
across the bridge in one of the ways of doing so,” again inviting the
same counter question. The only way to stop the regress would be to
add, “In the way that I did it,” which is in efect what Travis's formula
does say. But what could be the point of saying that?
We have to understand the philosophical pressures under which say-
ing, “Things being as they are is things being such that …”, can seem
philosophically insightful, even if admittedly uninformative. The
point - but of course only in the context of a philosophical discussion -
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would be Austin's: to prise the words (or ways for things to be) of the
world (things being as they are). For Travis, the way one walks to the
station belongs to the world, whereas a way of walking to the station
belongs to thought. Travis believes that what is general cannot be there
in the world, and that philosophers are making a grave mistake when
they ignore, deny or forget it. That is why he thinks there is a point in
reminding them of this fundamental feature of reality, “the particular-
ity, the concreteness, of the non-conceptual” (2013: 127) It is this
assumption which turns what would otherwise be a merely convoluted
paraphrase into a philosophical thesis. It is, then, this assumption that
we have to understand. I do not want to challenge the idea that a
thought exhibits a certain generality, nor that in experience something
concrete and particular is immediately present to us. But why can't the
general inhere in the particular? Since the world here means the sens-
ible world, we can also put the question in this way: even if what is
before our eyes is only one case of a snufling pig, unique in its way,
why can't we see, in and by seeing the unique scene, that there is a pig
there, and what it is doing? (That is, why can't “seeing that” be a recept-
ive achievement, a matter of awareness of what is there?)
It seems to me that, having isolated the thesis from what would other-
wise be merely a paraphrase, there is something suspect about it. Can
we really conceive of the world as a thing which, in thinking, we bring
under a generality? Shouldn't the world be something radically difer-
ent from an element of itself? If the world were a thing which, in
thinking, we bring under a generality, it would not be all there is. What
makes a thought true would be - not the world - but how the world is;
that is, that it falls under the generality. And now “how the world is”
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would be what thought answers to, so what should really be called the
world. Again, can we think of a thought as a way for the world to be?
Shouldn't a thought be something radically diferent from a compon-
ent of itself? A way for things to be is not something we can think; we
can only think that something is that way. So if a thought is a way for
things to be, we cannot think a thought, we can only think that the
world is accordingly. But what is a thought if it cannot be thought? If
there is a categorical distinction between a world and its elements, and
a thought and its components, then Travis breaches categorical dis-
tinctions. (I will return to these problems.)
It will take me a while to explain fully how Travis is led to his move
from ordinary objects of reference to “things being as they are”. For
this I will sometimes have to depart from the way Travis understands
himself. He thinks of himself as a philosopher in the tradition of Frege
and Austin, merely “unfolding concepts” (Frege) and making observa-
tions on “what we would say when” (Austin). One can indeed
understand such remarks as, “That the pig is before you is not before
you,” (Travis, forthcoming a) as observations on ordinary grammar:
this negation has to be understood as “It does not make sense to say…”.
But Travis, like his guides, is also a very systematic philosopher. My
impression is that when it comes to the heart of the matter, his system,
or the underlying motivations, informs observation rather than the
other way around.49 Travis views the mundane through a metaphysical
49 Take for instance his infuential and suggestively titled paper “The Silence of
the Senses”. His aim there is to oppose representationalism about perceptual
experience. To see things is not to represent things as being some way, nor for
things to be presented to us as being some way. Representation is something
we do in response to what our senses do for us: “our senses merely bring our
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lens, a form of metaphysics made possible by anti-psychologism. It is
characteristic of his philosophy to fnd a logical structure hidden
underneath the structure that is manifest to the thinking, perceiving
subject. This latter structure he thinks of as merely psychological.
Although we normally say, “Sid smokes,” this is really to say, “Things
being as they are is a case of things being such that Sid smokes.”
Although we speak of seeing that Sid is smoking, and to do so is not
temporally or psychologically distinguishable from seeing what Sid is
doing, to do so is really to tell that Sid is smoking on the basis of seeing
things being as they are.
It is difcult to fnd one's way into the system, and once inside, even
more difcult to fnd one's way out. Each element supports the other,
and has to be understood in the light of the whole view, so that strictly
speaking, no single element can be introduced without frst introdu-
cing the others. But I can only present it in a linear narrative. For this
purpose I will start with the Fregean framework within which Travis
develops his view. Within this framework, there is a move to be made
surroundings into view; aford us some sort of awareness of them. It is then
for us to make of what is in our view what we can, or do.” (Travis 2013: 30)
The bulk of the paper is taken up by a supposedly exhaustive survey of the
ways in which we talk about looks and appearances. But its central claim is
that these divide neatly into two categories: visible looks which cannot be
thought, and thinkable looks which cannot be seen. To think there is more,
that its looking to one as if things are some way can be both visible and think-
able, is to try to “mix two immiscable notions” (47). But this is not anymore
an observation on what we would say when. That the survey is exhaustive is
not part of the data collected. It is the expression of a philosophical convic-
tion, alluded to as “Frege's point,” which he does not there spell out. 
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from a thought to a judgement, and so from the thought to what is out
there when the thought is true. This will allow me to say what Travis's
formula - “Things being as they are is a case of things being such that
p.” - is supposed to do. I will then discuss ideas more particular to
Travis, which can help make sense of the specifc form which the for-
mula takes. These ideas, like the framework itself, revolve around a
contrast between the passivity of receptivity and the activity of judge-
ment. Along the way I will express my criticism of the moves being
made, but only in the end I will argue that the resulting separation of
the conceptual and the historical is nonsensical.
§3 Anti-psychologism
1 Travis inherits the notion of a thought from Frege, in particular
from the late essay “Der Gedanke”. There Frege introduces this notion
in the context of distinguishing the subject matter of logic from that of
the empirical sciences. But it is evident that the deeper aim is to safe-
guard logic from all that is merely subjective, changeable, and
empirical. Logic, Frege writes, is the study of the laws of truth. This
distinguishes it frst of all from psychology. It does not study how
human beings happen to think, but how they should think in order to
reach the aim of thought: truth. It would not be of interest to logic if
everyone thought that 2+2=5, since it would not bear on what it is cor-
rect to think. Nor is logic concerned with how people should think in
some specifc area of human inquiry, such as biology or chemistry. The
way to think in some specifc area is not yet a law of truth. In logic we
study not this or that truth (the biological ones, the psychological ones)
but what truth is as such. In Aristotelian jargon one might say logic is
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the study of truth qua truth—or what should come to the same, the
study of being qua being: it does not study this or that thing in the
world (human bodies, human minds), but what the world is as such.
Given this ambition, it may seem better not to introduce a kind of
thing which logic is supposed to be about. Nonetheless, Frege intro-
duces a thought - which is a thing, but as it soon turns out, not a thing
in the world - as the bearer of a truth value: “Without meaning to give a
defnition, I call a thought something for which the question of truth
arises,” (Frege 1918: 292) Frege writes. That may only mean that a
thought is that which can be true or false. But as Travis insightfully
explains, the crucial thing for Frege is that a thought determines a
question of truth, one for the world, and only the world, to answer. A
thought is defned by when it would be true. It thus belongs to the
order of being true, and is to be distinguished from what is needed to
hold a thought to be true, or to present it to ourselves or others in vis-
ible or audible form. 
It is this distinction, even opposition, between being true and holding
true, which lies at the source of Frege's separation between three sep-
arate acts (Frege 1918: 294):
(1) The apprehension of a thought – thinking;
(2) the acknowledgement of the truth a thought – judgement;
(3) the manifestation of this judgement – assertion;
Correspondingly, Frege distinguishes between three separate items: (1)
the thought; (2) the assertoric force; (3) the sentence. It is really one
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separation, in which thought falls apart three ways. Since I have
already treated this separation in the second chapter, but since, on the
other hand, it is essential to the present topic, I will now only briefy
repeat the paradox again.
Given the notion of a thought (that things are thus and so) as distin-
guished from what one commits oneself to in a judgement (that things
are thus and so), something is added to the thought when we hold it to
be true. It must be, because to grasp the thought cannot already be to
hold it to be true. Moreover, for there to be such a thing to think cannot
already be for it to be true to think it. There is the thought, and then
there may be, or there may not be, what is out there when the thought
is true. When we judge that things are so, we do not merely have the
thought on our mind (that it is raining); we also say that it is true (that
i t is raining). We thus relate the thought to what is out there. This is
what Frege came to call the step from Sinn to Bedeutung; that is, from the
sense of a sentence, a thought, to its reference, a truth value.
But “it is asserted” cannot add anything to the thought. The relation
drawn in the act of assertion is not something which we can spell out in
words.  Sometimes Frege suggests that “in language” the assertoric
force is associated with the main verb of the sentence. But he is also
committed to the main verb being, as such, inert, since the same form
of words may occur both asserted and unasserted. Nor can we bring the
form of words to life by adding “is true” or “it is asserted” to it, or, as I
have been doing in a doomed attempt to present the view, italicising
the main verb or copula. According to Frege, the words “is true” do not
add any content to the thought, and the same would obviously hold for
italicising the copula. The thought that it is true that it is raining is the
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same as the thought that it is raining is the same as the thought that it
is raining. What would make a diference is to assert the thought - to
say that it is raining-, but this diference cannot be made explicit in the
form of a contribution to the content. It is not possible to say, put into
words, what assertion contributes to the thought, because the contri-
bution is not one of words, but one of relating what words express to
the world.
This is a characteristic occurrence in Frege's philosophy. His own posi-
tion pushes him to the point where he feels the deep issue is inefable,
and he has to ask the reader not to begrudge him “a pinch of salt” when
he nonetheless tries to convey it. Like many Fregeans, Travis inherits
the view without feeling the force of these difculties. He distinguishes
between a realm of thought or sense (the conceptual) and one of actual-
ity or reference (the historical), and seems to fnd it unproblematic to
describe the relations between them. Even though in everyday life one
would express the thought that Sid smokes by saying, for example, “Sid
smokes,” from the philosophical perspective taken up by Travis this is
to be paraphrased as, “Things being as they are is a case of things being
such that Sid smokes.” (Travis 2013: 6) This as it were makes explicit
what is added to a thought by asserting it. It makes explicit the relation
one then draws between thought and world. Travis expresses this, for
example, as follows (Travis 2011: 232):
Judging is engaging with the world precisely so as to be right or wrong about
it according to how it is. A thought is the content of a judgement. It is, that is,
a particular way of making one’s fate—being right or wrong—depend on how
the world is. It decides how the way things are matters to thus being right or
wrong, how the world is to speak to that. It does that in fxing when things
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being as they are would be one’s being right. The thought is that things are
such that p; one is right just where things being as they are is things being
such that p. The role of the thought is to fx when this would be.
One sees here the Fregean separation between the thought (“the
thought is that things are such that p”) and what one commits oneself
to in a judgement (“things being as they are is things being such that p”
- the emphasis is Travis's). It is as if the thought is an arrow, and the
judgement is the shooting of the arrow from the bow, towards the
world. There is a range of cases of things being such that the arrow hits
the target, in which cases the thought is true, and a range of cases of
things being such that it doesn't, in which cases the thought is false. 
But “Things being as they are is things being such that p” is also a para-
phrase of the thought, and so it can, like what it paraphrases, be
entertained without taking it to be true. Thinking of the paraphrase in
this second way, it adds nothing to the thought, but merely spells it out
in a diferent way. We would still need to assert it in order to draw the
relation which it is supposed to spell out. But then of course we'd be
asserting the very same thought as when we simply say, “Sid smokes.”
So one could think of the paraphrase as an attempt to capture, in the
form of a merely apparent contribution to the content, the contribu-
tion that is made by attaching assertoric force to the content. The
paraphrase thus fails to do exactly what “is true” fails to do according
to Frege—naturally, because it is Travis's attempt to unfold the concept
of truth.
2 One might think that if a form of words does not yet indicate the
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force, at least it displays the content. The content is just what would be
in common between the same form of words employed one time as a
question, another time as an assertion. Standardly Frege is read as
showing a certain intimacy between the way a sentence is composed
out of words, and the way a thought can be analysed as being composed
out of concepts. And this is certainly one strand of Frege's philosophy.
But Frege also thinks of language as something psychological, which
can, at times, even get in the way of the logical. Language is the only
means we have of displaying a thought in visible or audible form, or as
Frege at one point puts it crudely but revealingly, of inducing someone,
by means of a causal chain, to grasp a thought: “One communicates a
thought. How does this happen? One brings about changes in the out-
side world which, perceived by another person, are supposed to induce
him to apprehend a thought and take it to be true.” (Frege 1918: 310) The
thing we thus try to get across is, in itself, invisible, inaudible, and
independent of language. Though human beings can only think in lan-
guage, maybe some other being (angels?) might do better.50 Travis
develops this strand of Frege in order to argue that a thought is, in
itself, a structureless whole.
We already saw that a thought has to be something outside the realm
of actuality. “A thought is something immaterial,” Frege writes, “and
everything perceivable by the senses is excluded from the realm of
50 “[T]hat a thought of which we are conscious is connected in our mind with
some sentence or other is necessary for us humans. But that does not lie in
the nature of the thought, but in our own nature. There is no contradiction in
supposing there to exist beings that can grasp the same thought as we do
without needing to clad it in a form which can be perceived by the senses. But
still, for us humans there is this necessity.” (Frege, PW: 269)
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things for which truth even so much as comes into question.” (Frege
1918: 292) That is, nothing that one can take in by the senses can be the
ultimate bearer of a truth value, although it can have one in a second-
ary sense, parasitically, so to say, on a thought. Let me explain Frege's
argument roughly as Travis does. Something sensible – a picture, a
spoken or written sentence – can be understood as representing things
as some way, and understood in that way, it may be true or false. But it
can be so understood in any out of many ways, depending on what
would be reasonable under the circumstances, for instance because of
the intentions of the author. “Paint patterns cannot teach us how a can-
vas represents things.” (Travis 2011: 230) So even if we think of the
visible thing as something which can be true or false, its truth value is
not determined solely by the world it answers to, but also by how it is
to be understood. One and the same visible thing, as visible thing, can
be understood in a variety of ways. But on an occasion, we may be able
to understand it as representing things in such a way that whether
things are so - as thus represented - depends solely on how things are.
We then understand the visible thing as expressing a thought.
When we understand a picture as representing, say, a cathedral as
being situated on an island, this can always be expressed more trans-
parently in a sentence: “The cathedral is situated on an island.” So there
seems to be something special about sentences; they are more intim-
ately linked to the expression of thoughts than other visible or audible
things (naturally, that is what sentences are for). “The thought, in itself
immaterial, clothes itself in the material garment of a sentence and
thereby becomes graspable for us. We say that the sentence expresses a
thought.” (Frege 1918: 292) By using the sentence, “It is raining,” in the
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familiar way that it is used, in the right circumstances, one asserts the
thought that it is raining. Which thought that is will depend on the cir-
cumstances; in particular, on when and where one says it. It may seem
that the intimacy of sentence and thought mitigates the invisibility of
the latter. And it would, if we were to follow this strand of Frege's
thinking.
But Frege also sometimes suggests that language is something merely
psychological, a way of presenting thoughts to ourselves or others, not
internal to what the thought is as such. Travis takes this second strand
of Frege's thinking very seriously. He invokes Frege's context principle
to argue that a thought is, as such, a structureless whole. A thought is
defned by when it would be true, which Travis reads as, when the
world (things being as they are) would be such that the thought is true.
Only on an analysis, on some way of reading structure into the
thought, can we think of its truth as turning on how some element of
the world is, and whether it is some way for an element of the world to
be. But there are endlessly many ways of doing this. For any one
thought, there are endlessly many structures we can read into it, and
for any one structure, there are endlessly many thoughts it can, on an
occasion, express. Sometimes, “There is tea on the table,” may be a way
of saying that there is fresh tea in the pot on the table, sometimes that
there is tea spilled on the table, sometimes that there are tea bags on
the table (see Travis 2008 for better examples). The way we partition
the thought, and thereby the world, is relative to our sensibilities and
the purposes of the occasion. It is merely a way of presenting the
thought to ourselves and others, not internal to what the thought is.
Again, it is a way of presenting the thought in audible or visible form;
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in itself, a thought is an abstract, structureless whole.
3 So Travis distinguishes between a thought as apprehended in
words, and the thought as it is in itself. And I do not want to challenge
the idea - which seems right to me - that any one thought can be
expressed in indefnitely many ways, depending on the occasion, and
any one expression can, depending on the occasion, express an indef-
inite variety of thoughts. We can know that a thought as expressed in
one way on one occasion is the same as what is said in a diferent way
on a diferent occasion. But that does not mean that in philosophy we
have to rise above all possible occasions and form a conception of a
thought as it is in itself. There is something mysterious about that doc-
trine. Whenever we think a thought, express it in words, we apprehend
it under some aspect. How then can we, in philosophy, talk about the
thought as it is in itself? It seems this would require a radically difer-
ent point of view than the one we normally take up in thinking. But
surely philosophising is a form of thinking. When Travis says that the
thought that the pig is snufling is defned by when it would be true, it
seems we can understand what he means. Whether it is true that the
pig is snufling depends on how things are; more specifcally, on how
the pig is; more specifcally, on whether it is snufling. But these spe-
cifcations provide, according to Travis, a merely psychological
perspective on when things would be so. But then how are we to form a
conception of the purely logical thing? How are we to form a concep-
tion of “when things being as they are is a case of things being such that
the pig is snufling” if we are not allowed to understand this through
our understanding of “when the pig is snufling”? I do not see how we
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can. If specifying is moving from the logical to the psychological, then
nothing is introduced when the philosopher introduces the logical. We
so far have no conception of a thought as Travis presents it. One could
also say, more paradoxically, that a thought as it is in itself, when this
is distinguished from a thought as thought, would be out of mind's
reach, something unthinkable, and therefore not a thought. But this
second way of putting the point requires throwing away the ladder at
the end.51
But it seems to me that Travis does argue persuasively that there is no
limit to the variety of thoughts that can be expressed by means of one
and the same expression, and the variety of expressions which can be
used to express one and the same thought. It seems only by means of
an ad hoc decision could we select some one privileged structure as the
structure that the thought has in itself. But in fact this is not the only
way to avoid the doctrine of structureless thought. Travis moves from
the premise that there is not one structure which a thought has in itself
51 Another example of this sideways-on perspective is the following. Travis in-
troduces his thesis of occasion-sensitivity by giving examples of diferent oc-
casions on which one would understand diferently what it is for a leaf to be
green, or for a pig to snufle, and so on—what it is for things to be some way
for things to be. (Travis 2008) But how are we supposed to understand his in-
vocation of “a leaf's being green” and so on? Does he here speak of a way for a
thing to be on no understanding of what it would be for something to be that
way? That would make no sense. A completely indeterminate understand-
ing? That would contradict the thesis. It seems that he introduces his thesis of
occasion-sensitivity from the only context that is supposed to be free of occa-
sion-sensitivity: the philosophical. (Sid and Pia are locked in time  Charles
is not.)
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to the conclusion that in itself a thought is structureless. We might be
inclined to deny the premise, and conclude that in itself a thought has
one essential structure. I would rather deny the hidden assumption
behind both, really the core of the Fregean doctrine, that there is such a
thing as a thought in itself apart from the thought as thought
(asserted). One and the same thought can be expressed in many ways,
but given some discursive point of view, we can regard the thought as
structured according to the way we would express it from that point of
view – even if under diferent circumstances we would express the
same thought diferently, and then regard the same thought as struc-
tured diferently. We can form a conception of a thought as the same
expressed one way or another, but that does not mean that we have a
conception of a thought as expressed in no way.
§4 Scheme-content dualism
On Travis's view, to analyse the thought, to view it under some struc-
ture, is also to partition the world, to view it under some structure. Not
just the thought, but also the world, is, in itself, a structureless whole
(in the sense of conceptual structure) – and these are two sides of the
same coin. This, the idea that the world is in itself independent of the
way we structure it in language, is the frst thesis in the introduction. It
is motivated by a combination of two types of concerns: Travis com-
bines Frege's anti-psychologism with a dualism of scheme and content
inspired by Austin and others: “a thought's generality is also a scheme
for partitioning the world.” (Travis 2013: 2) 
In one way this combination is natural. Travis exploits the structure of
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Frege's view in order to keep everything that is psychological away
from the order of being true. He is more interested than Frege was in
the ways in which linguistic phenomena are relative to our human
constitution, and the discursive purposes of the occasion; but he
exploits the room Frege already made for this. It is relative to our cul-
ture and biology, and the purposes of the occasion, which shapes in the
conceptual we pick out; but that there is such a thing to think, such a
way for things to be, and that it reaches to the historical in the way that
it does, is independent of us. This is, in broad outline, the story of
Travis's Objectivity and the Parochial.
But the core Austinian insight could not be more alien to Frege. (Travis
used to emphasise this.) One can fail to say something even so much as
false without failing to say something at all. In order to say something
either true or false, a certain ft or harmony is required between the
shape of the concepts used, the occasion of using them, and the partic-
ular case to which they are applied. This ft is a human achievement,
fully within the scope of rational assessment. That things are either so
or not so is itself something that might fail to be so. Therefore, the con-
ceptual schemes we employ are answerable to how things are (Travis
2008: 162):
To represent things as a certain way is to impose, or deploy, a particular
scheme for categorizing things being as they are: their being that way places
them in the one category, their not in the other. It is open to the world to ob-
lige such representing by articulating into things being the way in question,
or things not; or, again, to fail so to oblige. 
Travis thus opposes what Jean-Philippe Narboux has insightfully iden-
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tifed as the Harmony Fallacy: “this idea that the harmony between
words and world is an all-or-nothing matter that conditions, and
therefore falls outside of the scope of, assessment.” (Narboux 2011: 206)
To commit the Harmony Fallacy is to construe thinking something
truth-evaluable as a preparation for thinking something (taking a
stance)—a separate act which, in a logical sense, has to be achieved
frst. Since it comes before thinking something, it falls outside the
scope of rational evaluation: it is not something for which one can be
held responsible, but merely a matter of being given the thought.
Judgement is parsed into a passive moment of receiving a thought,
understood as a yes-no question, and an active moment of saying yes
or no to it. Put like this, the Harmony Fallacy is just another name for
Frege's separation of force and content. To oppose it, as Austin does, is
to oppose the most central thing in Frege's philosophy.
Why is the Harmony Fallacy a fallacy? Austin argues as follows. There
are many ways of going wrong besides falsehood. Truth and falsehood
constitute one dimension along which to assess what we say, but there
are others. Given the importance that this remark has for Travis, it is
worth quoting in full (Austin 1950: 124):
We say, for example, that a certain statement is exaggerated or vague or bald,
a description somewhat rough or misleading or not very good, an account
rather general or too concise. In cases like these it is pointless to insist on de -
ciding in simple terms whether the statement is "true or false." Is it true or
false that Belfast is north of London? That the galaxy is the shape of a fried
egg? That Beethoven was a drunkard? That Wellington won the battle of Wa-
terloo? There are various degrees and dimensions of success in making state-
ments: the statements ft the facts always more or less loosely, in diferent
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ways on diferent occasions for diferent intents and purposes. 
Austin gives examples of statements which may, depending on the
occasion and the way things are, not be apt enough even so much as to
be evaluable as true or false. But seeing that this is so is itself a case of
rational evaluation, not separate from the act of judgement. One can-
not decide on the aptness of words used to describe a particular case
before deciding on the truth of what is thus said. Finding the right
words to say what one wants to say, and meaning what one says, are
two aspects of one and the same activity. So Austin does not simply call
for disqualifying the statements in question as meaningless or empty.
There is still something to evaluate, but we must resist a simple yes-no
answer to whether these statements are true or false. They may not be
flatly true nor flatly false, but one or the other on some further specifc-
ation, or some further determination of the circumstances of speaking.
I take this to be an insight, one which can be accommodated without a
dualism of scheme and content. But it is not hard to see how the insight
can motivate such a dualism. Broadly speaking, if which words one
should use depends not only on the object of description, but also on
the perspective we take on things, a perspective parochial one way or
another (merely human, or merely for specifc purposes), then it
would, it seems, “slight the independence of reality” to say that the
world is structured in terms of those words. So we are led to stand back
from any parochial perspective and conceive of the world as what is
seen from nowhere. We thus conceive of the world as a thing in itself,
somehow behind or underneath the way it appears in language. 
In the work of Austin this idea comes to expression as follows. In say -
123
ing what makes it true to say something, we must, he thinks, stand
back from the words used, since it is just the aptness of those words
which is under evaluation. Standing back from them, “prising the
words of the world”, Austin defnes truth in terms of two types of rela-
tions, a demonstrative relation between a statement and a state of
afairs, and a descriptive relation between a sentence and a “type”—
which Austin then again explains in terms of sufcient likeness to
paradigmatic instances. The general picture is one of reality as hanging
together according to relations of resemblance, which allows for both
demonstrations and conventions to get a hold on reality, so that there
can be relations between statements and the world (116):
A statement is said to be true when the historic state of afairs to which it is
correlated by the demonstrative conventions (the one to which it 'refers') is of
a type with which the sentence used in making it is correlated by the de-
scriptive conventions.
Note the similarity with Travis's defnition (indeed, “the historical” is
so-called because of Austin). And as Travis tells us nothing about
where one particular case ends and the rest of the world begins, so
Austin (as Strawson noted) tells us nothing more about states of afairs.
I suggest this is because “the particular case,” and, “the state of afairs,”
though at frst introduced as elements of the world, are really meant to
refer to the world without relying on any conceptual scheme, any way
of partitioning it one way or another a  these terms are really meant to
refer to the world as such.
Travis continues and transforms this line of thought in original ways.
He develops further and more systematically the ways in which the
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shape of our concepts, and how we understand them on the occasion, is
determined by “our parochial sensibilities”: as human thinkers, we
have a non-rule-like, not-fully-articulable sense for how words are to
be understood on an occasion, and when it is relevant to say what. But
the point, for Travis, extends beyond words. Even what words speak of,
ways for things to be, “admit of understandings.” The words “is a pig”,
used as what they are for in English, speak of being a pig, a way for a
thing to be. There are indefnitely many ways of understanding what it
is for something to be that way. On one understanding, a peccary may
count, but not on another. One one understanding, a piece of meat
would count, but not on another. For any way for things to be, it is an
occasion-sensitive matter when things would count as being that way.
It takes a parochial capacity to tell both how a way for things to be is to
be understood on the present occasion (what the reach is of what is
said, and so which thought is expressed), and whether this case of
things being as they are can count as a case of things being so (whether
the world instances this thought). This capacity goes beyond anything
that we can spell out. A rule would only give us more of the conceptual,
not a way of relating the conceptual to the historical. Travis fnds this
conception of thought in Descartes's Discourse on the Method, and refers
to the relevant sense of a thinker as a “Cartesian thinker”. Let me quote
a striking passage, if only because it is, to my mind, Travis at his best
(316):
‘Reason’, Hilary Putnam wrote, ‘can transcend whatever it can survey’. Such
is Descartes’ idea. Take any implementable theory of how to do such-and-
such—a theory with defnite predictions as to the thing to do when faced
with such a task. A Cartesian thinker is always prepared to recognize ways of
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performing the task other than those the theory dictates; moreover, to recog-
nize whether such a new way, and not the theory’s, would be the thing to do
—and whether the task itself is a thing to do. We, but not swallows, can re-
cognize when old ways of building mud nests, or times for building them, are
not best. Our sensitivity to the world’s bearing on the thing for us to do is, un-
like theirs, unbounded in this sense. 
We will later see that this conception of reason allows Travis to give
content to the idea that perception is logically, even if not psychologic-
ally or temporally, prior to taking a stance on how things are. It is
natural that Descartes's idea should be invoked here, because it is pre-
cisely meant to draw the line between what we share with other
animals, such as our sensory apparatus, and what we can do that they
can't: improvise in the face of novel circumstances. Travis thinks that
this second capacity marks us of as thinkers in a demanding sense. 
Moreover, Travis thinks this is not merely a feature of us, but in some
way pervades the nature of thought itself. For this to be in accord with
his anti-psychologism requires him to walk something of a tightrope.
On the one hand, it takes being human to assess how a way for things
to be, as spoken of by someone on an occasion, is to be understood for
present purposes; that is, when things would count as being that way.
Likewise, it takes being human to assess whether this case, here and
now, of things being as they are can count as falling within this range.
So one might think that the parochial determines the shape of the con-
ceptual: it determines the shape of the thoughts which we can think.
But that might seem to be in contradiction with the idea that a thought
is defned by its reach. It is intrinsic to any thought to reach to the his-
torical in the way that it does. If it did not so reach, it would, per
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impossibile, not be this thought. “[O]ne may interpret an assertion in tak-
ing it to be the expression of this or that thought, but one cannot
interpret a thought.” (Travis 2011: 9) So Travis does not think of our
parochial sensibility as determining the shape of thoughts, but rather
as selecting thoughts of a certain shape52, thoughts which are anyway
there to be thought.53 Our parochial sensibility, and the purposes of the
occasion, can make it the case that words and what they speak of (ways
for things to be) are to be understood in a certain way. The words by
themselves, meaning what they do, being used for what they are for, do
not determine how they are to be understood. This is an elaboration of
Frege's idea that a sentence by itself does not determine a question of
truth.
This calls for a slight correction to the theory of truth which I ascribed
to Travis before. Instead of, “For it to be true that p is for things being as
they are to be a case of things being such that p,” we should write, “For
52 “The parochial selects for us ways for us to represent things to be. That need
not be for it to operate on any given such way so as to decide when things
would be like that. One could say correctly: ‘The parochial shapes what would
count as things being such that F (though not whether things being as they
are is things being F— something decided just by how things are). But this
can just mean: the parochial fxes what it is we mention, what one speaks of,
in speaking of F—how talk of ‘being F’ is to be understood. It need not be seen
as deciding, of what we in fact speak of, how that reaches. All of this can be
seen as no more than grammar.
“This idea guides this whole collection.” (Travis 2011: 19)
53 That they are anyway there to be thought is a feature of the world: “Had evol-
ution omitted sloths, there would be no such thing as judging that sloths like
bananas.” (Travis 2011: 264)
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it to be true that p is for things being as they are to count, for present pur-
poses, as a case of things being such that p.” That adjustment shows an
additional reason Travis has for drawing apart thought and world in
the way that he does. His relational conception of truth makes room for
the parochial and occasion-sensitivity. It allows for incorporating the
idea that the shape of our thinking is relative to (though not determ-
ined by) our human sensibilities and the discursive purposes of the
occasion, without thereby turning truth itself, or the world itself, into
something relative to us. 
Travis ofers a form of “conceptual relativity” (Putnam 1991: 190) which
stops short of the whole, both of the whole thought, and of the world as
a whole. The whole is the way it is independently of us. But in thinking
and expressing thoughts we partition it one way or another.54 The way
54 “Selecting” thoughts is also a matter of carving up the stance someone takes
into particular stances. “The stance” someone takes has to be understood in a
way analogous to “the way things are” - it is, in itself, infnitely particular:
“Any thinker at a time exposes himself to risk of error. He is exposed to the
error he is. He sets his course, or is prepared to, as he does, or is; there are
countless ways for him to go awry. One arrives at the lecture hall at four
o’clock to discover that the lecture was at three, or is in the basement, or is
not the lecture one expected—had one but known, he would have stayed in
bed. Such are among the myriad disappointments a given thinker, at a time,
exposes himself to sufering.” (Travis 2013: 250)
In representing someone as taking a certain stance, ascribing beliefs to him,
we partition the stance he takes into individual stances: his thinking that the
lecture was at four o'clock, on the frst foor, on ethology, and so on: “For a
thinker to think a particular thing there is to think—that things are such-
and-such way—is for his exposure to error to articulate in a particular way,
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we partition the whole is partly dependent on the world and partly on
us. The world may allow for a certain way of speaking by articulating
into things being that way and things being not that way. What is pos-
sible is determined by what is actual. But that we partition the world in
this way, group these possible cases together (that is, select this
thought), is due to our interests and sensibilities. And so in that sense
the structure does not belong to the world as such. It is a way of parti-
tioning reality, one way among others, none the way to partition
reality. In itself, the historical is a structureless whole. The phrase
“things being as they are” may be heard as “things as they are in them-
selves, not as they appear to us in language.” 
This becomes clearer once we consider the rule-following problematic,
which is also one of Travis's main motivations. (Travis 2006) There is
no limit to the variety of cases which we can be confronted with. Being
Cartesian thinkers, we can improvise in the face of novel circum-
stances, and assess, for a novel case, whether this can count as a case of
things being thus and so. What determines whether our assessment is
correct? Not a rule, according to Travis. A rule, or any other bit of the
conceptual, can only show us relations between bits of the conceptual.
It cannot show how the conceptual reaches to the historical. The same
would hold for anything that we can spell out in words, exactly because
judgement, on the present conception, is a matter of assessing how
what words say relates to the world. What makes a particular judge-
ment correct or incorrect is, in one sense, nothing: it is intrinsic to the
for there to be a certain discernible pattern in the way he is liable to disap-
pointment, or to escaping it.” (Travis 2011: 250) Maybe then, corresponding to
“the way things are,” there is such a thing as “the thought” which in thinking
we partition into thoughts. 
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thought to reach as it does. But for any case of someone representing
something as being some way, there is the question of how to under-
stand this representation, and the answer to this question is
determined by what is the thing for one to do. So in another sense,
whether this case can count as a case of things being as they were rep-
resented to be is determined by what, given our sensibilities and
interests, would be reasonable.
The problem is now as follows. If we go by the minimal answer,
Travis's view faces the same problem that Frege did. If it intrinsic to the
thought to reach as it does, then how can there be this distance
between the thought and what it reaches to? Would it not be equally
intrinsic to things being as they are to be a case of things being so?
Surely it wouldn't be this particular case if it did not fall under the gen-
eralities that it does. But then what makes the thought true is not
things being as they are generically, but more specifcally, that things
are so. We are left with nothing to give substance to the sense that
there must be a relation, and so some kind of distance, between what is
said and what determines the truth of what is said.
The second answer ofers a more substantial conception. But taken as
an answer to the rule-following problematic, it would be a wrong
answer. Parochial agreement would determine whether this case of
things being as they are counts as a case of things being as they were
represented to be. Judgement better be in touch with the reason why.
So when I want to judge whether this can count as a snufling pig I
really want to know what people would agree on. But people generally
agree for a reason. Specifcally, they would agree that this case can
count because it does. Judgement is not in general like acting according
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to etiquette. It is not in general a matter of doing what one is to do.
Rather, what one is to do is itself determined by the facts. What makes
it correct for me to think that the fork goes on the left side of the plate
is that this is the thing people do, since this is the kind of fact that is
determined by communal agreement. But what in general makes it
correct to judge something – say, that there is this knife here – is that
there is, in fact, this knife here. Our thinking answers to the facts. By
placing the world beyond the facts, Travis can tell a story about the
relation between the shape of facts, human interests and sensibilities,
and the world. But this story is the wrong answer to what thinking
answers to. Parochial agreement comes to seem bare agreement. What
goes missing is that when we agree, we agree for a reason, and when we
are right to agree, we agree because that is the way things are.
I do believe that there is something deeply right in the ideas of occa-
sion-sensitivity, the parochial, and “reason transcends whatever it can
survey”. Travis takes up the suggestions of his predecessors and shows,
with remarkable depth and clarity, how they can fnd their place in a
systematic philosophy. I regret not being able to do full justice to this
side of his writing. My objection is only to the dualistic metaphysics
which he thinks is needed to accommodate these ideas. A rejection of
the Harmony Fallacy need not come together with a dualism of scheme
and content. Just because thoughts have presuppositions, so that what
we say can fail to be even so much as false (a yes-no question can fail to
have a yes-no answer), does not mean we have to stand back from
these presuppositions when we want to say how the thought stands to
reality. We can think of the presuppositions as constituting the stand-
point of thinking the thought. The lesson to learn from these sort of
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refections is that we cannot say how the proposition stands to reality
from another standpoint, a sideways-on point of view. We can only
exploit the standpoint of the thought itself, by using it to say when it
would be true: it is true to say that the pig is snufling because the pig
is, in fact, snufling. Yes, the truth of the thought depends on things
being as they are; but more specifcally, it depends on the pig's being as
it is; more specifcally again, it depends on whether the pig is snufling.
That to Travis seems a form of idealism, and we can see how these con-
siderations may re-enforce that suspicion. But even if the shape of our
thinking is determined, in some way, by parochial sensibilities and
occasional interests, that does not need to mean that we cannot fnd
these same shapes in the world around us. It is not, of course, that our
biology and culture in general creates the circumstances our thinking
answers to (though it determines some of them), but it opens our eyes
to facts which are anyway there. It may be surprising to note that this
idea, though defended maybe most forcefully by McDowell, is also
central to the work of Travis. We fnd it in the idea that parochial sens-
ibilities do not shape the thoughts we think, but enable us to think
thoughts which are anyway there to think. But given such an objective
conception of conceptual shape, what could be the further objection to
thinking of the world as conceptually shaped?
§5 Naïve realism
1 For this we must turn to Travis's account of perception. It is
undeniable that for any empirical thought, there are many ways for
things to be so (in contrast to the mathematical case). Travis pictures
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this in terms of the metaphor of something particular falling under
something general. He seems to take it to be almost self-evident that
only what is particular can be visible, not the range to which it belongs.
To judge that the sky is blue is to group together what is present, what
can be seen, with what is currently not present: other possible cases of
blue skies. Nor is the standard present to which they all live up. There
is something persuasive about this way of thinking. But it smuggles in
that the sky's belonging to this range, its being blue, would also be invis-
ible. In fact, Travis hears “its being blue” as referring to an episode of
the sky's being blue, itself conceived as an object of awareness like the
sky; its being blue, for Travis, is not what one apprehends when one
apprehends that the sky is blue. These would have to be two diferent
senses, or at least understandings, of what it is to be some way. So it
seems to Travis that it cannot be perceived that the sky is blue. But we
have yet to see why.
At the heart of Travis's view lies a realist conviction: thought answers
to how things are; the role of perception is to give us that to which
thought answers; only in response do we take a stance on how things
are (Travis 2013: 31):
[P]erception, as such, simply places our surroundings in view; afords us
awareness of them. There is no commitment to their being one way or anoth-
er. It confronts us with what is there, so that, by attending, noting, recogniz-
ing, and otherwise exercising what capacities we have, we may, in some
respect or other, make out what is there for what it is—or, again, fail to. It
makes us aware, to some extent, of things (around us) being as they are. It is
then up to us to make out, or try to, which particular ways that is. Perception
cannot present things as being other than they are. It cannot present some
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way things are not as what is so. That would not be mere confrontation.
Perception confronts us with what is there. To be confronted with
something is not already to take a stance on how it is. We cannot be
given that things are thus and so; we must judge that things are thus
and so on the basis of what is given. So Travis thinks that one cannot
see, in the sense of visual awareness, that the sky is blue, that one coin
is larger than another, that it is raining outside, or that a pig is snuf-
ling around the roots below. He will of course acknowledge that we use
the expression “seeing that”, and that we use it correctly the way that
we do, but he claims that this should not be understood in the sense of
visual awareness. It is not a mere receptive achievement.  To “see that
things are thus and so” is really to tell that things are thus and so on the
basis of seeing things (Travis, forthcoming c):
[A]wareness-that is not access to how things are. It is not a channel through
which to learn anything as to this. It is responding to what one has access to in
registering something as to how things are.
So there can be no truth or falsehood in perception: it confronts us with
what determines whether our thoughts are true or false, but only what
we think in response can be true or false. In this way Travis rejects the
common conviction that things can be, or fail to be, in accordance with
a perceptual experience; they would fail to be so when the experience is
an illusion. According to Travis, illusions arise not because perception
fails to bring our surroundings into view, but because we go wrong in
our response. Some things may look misleading, but if we go astray,
this is because we are prone to respond wrongly to the look they in fact
have, and which perception makes available to us. Travis traces this
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back to Descartes's solution to the problem of error in the fourth Medit-
ation. There Descartes explains the possibility of making mistakes by
distinguishing between two faculties, the intellect or understanding,
which merely perceives ideas, and cannot do so falsely (and so also not
truly), and the will, which afrms or denies ideas. Mistakes arise
because “my will extends farther than my understanding”. Applied to
perception as Travis does, this becomes the view that perception itself
is entirely neutral, not yet a matter of taking a stance, and so neither
true nor false. In response we take a stance, and thus expose ourselves
to risk of error.55
This provides one explanation for Travis's move. Schematically speak-
ing, whatever the thinking subject contributes in responding to what is
given cannot already have been there in what is given. If it is only in
response that we bring things under concepts, then what is there can-
not already be conceptually shaped. At frst one might think that what
is there, what is given, are material objects and the ways they are. But if
perception is mere confrontation, these, though they are there, cannot
be given as the objects which they are. For me to have a pig in view is
not already for me to judge that there is a pig there. Just so, for me to
have its snufling in view is not already for me to judge that it is snuf-
ling. What is given to me is not the particular case of the snufling pig
as such—not as a case of a pig's snuffling, nor even as a case of the pig's
55 Travis quotes Frege, “By the step by which I win an environment I expose
myself to risk of error.” But really Travis thinks it is only in the next step that
error can come about. “The step by which I win an environment,” for Frege, is
precisely the step from receiving sense impressions to seeing things. “To re-
ceive visual impressions is not to see things... Something non-sensible must
be added.” (Frege 1918: 308)
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being as it is, but merely as a case of things (catholic sense) being as
they are.
I have tried to explain Travis's move by means of the epistemological
separation of empirical judgement into two separate acts. Parsing
empirical judgement into two acts, two distinct forms of awareness,
motivates a distinction between two distinct objects of awareness: the
particular case, and a thought. But it may be a bit artifcial to look for a
priority either way. Given the epistemological separation, we can
argue for the ontological separation as above. Given the ontological
separation, we can argue for the epistemological separation as follows.
A particular case is not the sort of thing one can know in the sense of
knowing that things are thus and so (French savoir). It is rather the sort
of thing one can know in the sense of acquaintance (French connaître).
So perceptual awareness, in so far as it is receptive, cannot already be
knowing that things are thus and so. It is mere acquaintance with what
can be proof that things are thus and so, a conclusive ground for believ-
ing this. To be acquainted with this ground is unlike what we normally
understand by being acquainted with a person. When you're acquain-
ted with someone, you thereby know some things about the person – it
is not enough merely to have met without knowing it. But on the relev-
ant philosophical concept, acquaintance is in itself not yet knowledge.
When one is acquainted with a particular case one will undoubtedly,
simultaneously and psychologically inseparably, also know some
things about it, but to know this is to bring what one is acquainted with
under a generality, on the basis of the acquaintance, and so as a
response to it. Given that what is there is not the sort of thing one can
know, reception cannot be knowledge; knowledge adds something to
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reception. Perception is logically, even if not always temporally or psy-
chologically, prior to knowledge.
What does it mean for perception to be logically prior? We can under-
stand this, as above, ontologically: what is given is the sort of thing one
can be acquainted with, not the sort of thing one can know. But we can
also understand it epistemologically: its being given is in a sense prior
to our bringing it under a generality. In what sense? The answer Travis
would give employs his notion of a Cartesian thinker, as explained
above. Say that I have a certain routine for recognising snufling pigs
by sight and hearing. Immediately upon perceiving a snufling pig I
come to believe, in fact to know, that there is a snufling pig before me.
I do not deliberate on the basis of what I see whether this can count as a
case of a snufling pig. I do not articulate this knowledge to myself.
Psychologically, one could say, my seeing and hearing the snufling pig
and my knowing that it is a snufling pig are one. What makes them
logically separate, according to Travis, is that I am prepared to step
back from my routine should the occasion call for it. Say the farmer has
told me that there is a strange pig virus going about, which causes the
animals to uncontrollably contract their nostrils, make snifng
sounds, and root in the ground - behaviour which shouldn't be con-
fused with snufling. Following my ordinary routine, I would have said
this is snufling. But now in my ethological report (I am making obser-
vations) I will be careful not to classify it as such. To be able to step
back in this way is what makes me a thinker. It is only because in the
routine case I am already prepared to step back, should this be needed,
that I am arriving at beliefs rationally, rather than merely being caused
to believe what I will. That is to say, it is only because of this that they
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count as beliefs at all. And it is just this that make even the routine
belief formation logically posterior to perceptual awareness of the
scene.
When we abstract away the judgements made in a perceptual experi-
ence, what remains is what Travis calls perception, mere access to our
surroundings. Instead of “perception” Travis also often writes “our
senses.” He appropriates a metaphor of Austin's (Austin 1962: 11):
[O]ur senses are dumb—though Descartes and others speak of ‘the testimony
of the senses’, our senses do not tell us anything, true or false.”
The point of the metaphor, for Travis, is that perception is not a matter
of representation; to see things is not to represent things as being one
way or another, nor to be represented to. This relies on construing per-
ception as something our senses do for us (Travis 2013: 30):
Our senses merely bring our surroundings into view; aford us some sort of
awareness of them. It is then for us to make of what is in our view what we
can, or do.
But it is odd to describe perception as something which our senses do
for us, as if the senses are external to the subject. It may be true that the
senses do not tell us anything, but the senses also do not see. We see,
with our senses—not with the help of our senses, as I may be said to
see with the help of my glasses. My glasses do some correcting for me,
bringing together lightwaves in the appropriate locations of the ret-
inas. The retinas do not do my seeing for me. They don't tell me
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anything, because no part of me tells me anything.56 So the fact that
telling how things are is something I must do for myself, as Travis is
right to emphasise, does not mean that it is external to perception. One
would think that to see things - for things to be sensorily present to us
- is to see how things are, for instance how the things in the surround-
ings are shaped and coloured, and spatio-temporally and causally
arranged. This is, so to say, to have our feet in the world, to be in our
surroundings; not waiting for them, not merely to have outsourced a
task to the senses.
Travis seems to agree that awareness is not to outsource a task to the
senses. But instead of concluding that perception is not something our
senses do for us, he concludes, absurdly, that perception is not yet
awareness. Perception merely afords awareness of how things are
around us. “Sight affords awareness of what is before the eyes … . If it
thus puts opportunities on ofer, enjoying awareness would be taking
these up.” (Travis 2013: 11) On this view, even seeing has to be construed
as a response to perception. “Searching the kitchen counter for my
favourite knife, it might be 10 minutes before I fnally see what was all
along in plain view. Here seeing is registering.” (Travis 2013: 11) Travis
thinks of “seeing” in the sense of registering as a response to “seeing”
understood so that it does not yet involve registering. The latter sense,
which for Travis is perception properly so-called, is merely to have a
scene in view, or merely having one's eyes open, not yet using them to
see (if I may use “seeing” in the way which we ordinarily do). Nonethe-
56 Maybe I should add “qua part of me”. The pain in my side may tell me that I
have a problem, but now the pain has made my side something alien to me,
something that detracts from the unity of the self.
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less, Travis is not merely proposing a terminological change, using
“perception” for what we would ordinarily call an opportunity for per-
ception. What he calls perception is already supposed to be the
moment of being given our surroundings, even if it is not yet aware-
ness (it is just this which allows him to conceive what is given as
devoid of generality). Given his starting assumptions, it is not surpris-
ing that he is led to the conclusion that perception is not yet awareness;
what is surprising is that he does not regard this as a reductio of his
assumptions.
Evidently there are deep philosophical pressures at work here. Unless
Travis is misled by the English idiom “I can see” as a way of saying “I
see,” he is not merely observing how we speak about perception. We
normally express our perceptual experiences in the active voice, with
the perceiving subject in the grammatical subject position: “I see …”.
This is refective of the fact that seeing is something we do, not some-
thing that merely happens to us. Though it is receptive, awareness of
what is there, it is not passive in a way that would contrast with know-
ledge. Travis can only make it seem passive by moving the moment of
reception so far back that it comes before seeing, as if reception were
merely waiting around for the world to show up. But as long as we are
waiting, the world is not given yet, and when it is given, we are not
waiting around anymore. The moment of waiting around is just not the
moment of being given the reason for a judgement, and so it cannot
elucidate the character of this reason. 
2 Now Travis is of course not alone in construing perception as
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passive. Almost all philosophers describe perception as passive, in
terms of being appeared to, or being represented to, or being confron-
ted with our surroundings, or indeed being given something. Why? Or
going back to the case at hand (this will throw light on the general pre-
dicament), why does Travis describe perception as something which
our senses do for us? I mean to ask this question in a therapeutic spirit.
We may try to answer the question by ascribing to Travis a restricted
conception of natural interactions. This would ft in with the diagnosis
which John McDowell gives in Mind and World for why philosophers
fall into the Myth of the Given. According to McDowell, the concept of
nature - or what comes to the same, of causality - has undergone a
restriction in our thinking since the rise of modern science. Under the
restriction, there is supposed to be nothing to nature except what can
be captured in natural-scientifc terms, or understood in the way nat-
ural phenomena are understood in the natural sciences. Now
perceptual experience is, in a sense, a “transaction in nature,” a matter
of our surroundings impinging themselves on our senses. And so it
seems it has to be understood just like any natural phenomenon. An
important special case of this is that we share our sensory apparatus
with non-rational animals: we have to understand our case just as we
would theirs in a biological or otherwise natural-scientifc investiga-
tion. This would leave a philosopher with a dilemma. Either reason is
special, not the sort of thing that is exhausted by natural-scientifc
description, and then perceptual experience cannot bear rationally on
what we are to think and do; or it can, but this has to be understood as a
mere causal interaction, on the model of making a dent in the clay tab-
let of the mind. McDowell argues that both options are hopeless.
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Perceptual experience does bear rationally on what we think and do; it
must, lest our thinking would be “spinning in a frictionless void.” But
rational bearing cannot be understood on the model of making a dent
in the clay tablet of the mind, or generally in the way we understand
things in natural science. Reason is governed by norms which exactly
stay out of view from the standpoint of the natural sciences (this can
even be seen as the point of clearly demarcating that standpoint in the
way that the rise of modern science does). So if we want to think of per-
ceptual experience as reason-giving, we have to make room for a form
of causal interaction which is special, one that is at once receptive, a
matter of our surroundings impinging themselves on our senses, and
an expression of our rational agency, an actualisation of our capacity
for understanding.
McDowell seems to have designed his diagnosis on the model of the
pressures visible in the work of C.I. Lewis, Wilfrid Sellars, and Donald
Davidson. But in recent years McDowell has accused Travis of falling
into the Myth of the Given, and so maybe we can apply the diagnosis
here as well. We should then say that Travis takes the second horn of
the dilemma: he conceives of perception as “forming images on
retinas,” and something our senses do for us, therefore as non-concep-
tual, and nonetheless it is supposed to bear rationally on what we are to
think and do. That does seem to be so. So given McDowell's diagnosis,
we can explain why Travis falls into the Myth of the Given. But in fact,
Travis is hardly concerned at all with the nature of causal interactions,
except for just the same reasons as McDowell is: to oppose a reduction
of rationality to a mere object of natural-scientifc description. He
opposes such a reduction in very similar ways deeply inspired by
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McDowell. Nor is he much concerned with the continuity of nature, or
the similarities between humans and other animals, except again for
the purpose of demarcating just the discontinuity that is also of con-
cern to McDowell: the capacity of human animals to step back from
routines and evaluate them in the light of reason. Travis does conclude
that the diference does not lie in perceptual experience, but in the way
we respond to ita but that is a result of his view, not the motivation for
it. Even if he would be under a restricted conception of nature (I see no
reason to think that he is), this is not his reason for construing percep-
tion as something which our senses do for us. 
More generally it cannot be the deep reason why philosophers fall into
the Myth of the Given. It is merely one form of the Myth. One form of
the Myth is the view that in perceptual experience a chain of causal
interactions (understood as one would in natural science) leads, so to
say, up unto the doorstep of the mind, where the mind picks it up and
employs it as a justifcation for a belief. McDowell is right to say that
this would be to ofer “exculpations where what we wanted was justi-
fcations.” (McDowell 1994: 8) But more generally the Myth is the
generalised form of the Cartesian/Fregean view — the idea that there
can be a completely neutral form of awareness, a way of examining the
object of awareness while standing at a distance from it. To be aware of
something in this way is not yet to commit oneself to its being one way
or another. And thus awareness and being are drawn apart. Something
is laid down on the doorstep of the mind; in response we pick it up.
Since picking up is only done in response, the foundling is construed as
lying still. In the intellectual version of this structure in Descartes's
fourth Meditation, what is given is an idea. And since it is only in
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response that we judge that the idea is true or false, the idea does not
have afrmation or denial inherent to it.
McDowell himself, who ofers modern philosophy a way of undoing
the restriction on the concept of nature, nonetheless falls into the gen-
eral form of the Myth of the Given, as I argue in other chapters. There
is of course a glaring diference with Travis's view: McDowell thinks
the world itself, as it is given in experience, is already conceptually
structured. Travis is more impressed with the concrete particularity of
the sensible world, and the way in which this contrasts with a thought,
as we have to conceive it within the Fregean paradigm. He is also
impressed (rightly, I think) by a diferent line of thought which goes
against the Fregean paradigm, the idea that even so much as to think
falsely requires a commitment to things' being one way or another.
This would mean that even so much as to be under the appearance that
things are thus and so requires taking a stance, and so cannot be the
neutral form of awareness that they both think perception must be. But
despite their diferences, they share the Fregean paradigm, and what
comes with it, the basic structure of presentation and response which
they think is needed in order to avoid “slighting the independence of
reality.” (McDowell 1994: 27-8)
So the deepest root of our current predicament is this structure of pass-
ive presentation and active response itself. The modern conception of
objectivity, of realism, requires that perception, in so far as it is a
receptive achievement, is a neutral form of awareness, involving no
commitment to things being one way or another. The role of percep-
tion is merely to aford access to what thought answers to, so that we
can judge for ourselves. If to have access to reality were already to see
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things as being one way or another, perception would be prejudiced,
depriving us of the freedom to make up our own mind. Access has to be
a neutral meeting point, which is provided by the senses, part of the
world in one sense, part of the subject in another. The senses thus func-
tion as a window upon our surroundings. In response, we look through
this window by “making out what is there.” Here looking through the
window is not a metaphor for looking or seeing, but rather for telling
how things are on the basis of seeing.
§6 Out of reach
The above is a direct argument against Travis's theory of perception. It
is also an indirect argument against his conception of what is given,
and thereby, his theory of truth. If what is given is “things being as
they are,” distinguished from things one can think of, being ways one
can truly think they are, then awareness of it has to be, in so far as it is
receptive, mere acquaintance, and Travis himself is led to construe this
as coming before awareness. But then it is just not the moment of being
given our surroundings. Travis construes what is given in such a way
that it cannot be given.
But my correction to the Cartesian paradigm is easily misheard. Like
McDowell, I say that experience must already be conceptually shaped,
lest it does not bear rationally on what we are to think and do. To
Travis, this seems to express a restricted conception of reason's reach.
(Travis 2013: 118-143, forthcoming a, forthcoming c) It is as if we are
saying that there is something reason cannot do: it cannot engage
immediately with the non-conceptual. The non-conceptual must frst
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be conceptualised, brought under generalities, before it can bear on
what one is to think and do. But then this work of conceptualising can-
not itself be a rational task. If experience were already conceptualised,
the perceiving subject would be deprived of the freedom to judge for
herself whether things being as they are can count as falling under
such and such generalities. So, Travis concludes, the idea that experi-
ence must be “already conceptually shaped” is just a mistake. Instead of
saddling experience with content, we better reject the dogma that
reason can only engage with something of conceptual shape.
But that, of course, is not what I am saying. I am not saying that there is
something that reason cannot do: judging how things are on the basis
of acquaintance with things being as they are. Rather, only an illusion
of sense, a philosophical illusion, can make it seem that we even have a
“something” in mind when we speak of acquaintance with things being
as they are. This was supposed to be a form of awareness, but when we
thought through the idea, it turned out to be no form of awareness (as
even Travis admits). Moreover, when I reject this idea of acquaintance I
am also rejecting a conception of the object of awareness as non-con-
ceptual. To argue that experience must already be conceptually shaped,
that it is a matter of fnding a conceptual form enmattered in the here
and now, is a way of arguing that the conceptual form can be right
there before our eyes. That is also what McDowell meant to argue by
means of “saddling experience with content,” although that formula-
tion distracts from the insight. Travis's response just shows how
difcult it is to dislodge the conviction that what we can express in
words must be removed from the sensible world.
We can also argue against that conviction directly, by showing that the
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alternative, a conception of truth as a relation between a thought and
what is given, makes no sense. Now in order to see that, it is important
to reject an understanding of the instancing relation which does not
satisfy the ambitions inherent to the picture. Particular cases are frst
introduced as elements of the world. Thinking of a particular case as a
thing in the world, the generality it is brought under is an element of
the thought: just as in thinking that Sid is smoking, one brings Sid
under the concept of smoking, so in thinking that the particular case is
such that Sid is smoking, one brings the particular case under the
concept of being a case of Sid's smoking. This shift from ordinary
objects of reference to particular cases is as pointless as it is harmless.
It does not serve Travis's purposes. The problem is that a particular
case is just another type of thing to refer to. Thought answers to how
things are. So conceiving particular cases as elements of the world,
thought would answer to how they are. The world would be, not the
particular case, but how particular cases are, and this is still, on Travis's
terms, something within the conceptual. One can say how a particular
case is, as Travis does say: “Things being as they are is a case of things
being such that Sid smokes.” But Travis does not want the world to be
made up of the kind of thing one can say. And if we anyway are going
to have a conception of the world as within the conceptual, there would
obviously be no point in having it be how particular cases are, rather
than just how things are.
Travis wants to think of the world as made up of what we think about,
not of what we can truly think. But he also wants to think of the world
as how things are, that which determines whether a thought is true or
false. So he needs to think of “how things are” as an object one can
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think about, not something one can itself express in words. In the sense
in which “how things are” is what determines whether a thought is
true or false, and is what is given in perception, one cannot say how
things are. And conversely, in the sense in which one can say how
things are, one cannot see it—that things are thus and so cannot be
given in perception. This inexpressible but perceptible object is what
“the particular case of things being as they are” is supposed to be. So
the world, as Travis wants to conceive it, is not how the particular case
is (not that things being as they are is a case of things being such and
such), but: the particular case. A philosophy according to which the
world is thinkable, sayable, would confne reason within the concep-
tual.
If we accept Travis's view, we should conclude that truth does not lie in
a relation between a thought and the world, but in the worldly relatum:
things being as they are. What makes it true to think that the pig is
snufling lies outside of the thought. Whether the thought is true
depends all on what is before my eyes when I'm looking at the pig, and
what is before my eyes, according to Travis, is things being as they are.
So what Travis should want to say is, “It is true that p because: things
being as they are”. He should want to point at the ultimate reason why
the thought is true. It can only be pointing, because the reason itself
must be, given the current pressures, the sort of thing one can only
think about, not the sort of thing one can think.57
But pointing to something, referring to something, is done within the
context of a proposition, within the context of saying how it is. It so far
makes no sense to say, “It is true that p because: that.” We could make it
57 Compare McDowell 1994: 9.
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grammatical by saying, “It is true that p because of things being as they
are.” But what does it mean to say this? One can say, “It is true that the
train is late because of how the tracks are,” but this cries out for a spe-
cifcation: more specifcally, because the tracks are in need of repair.
The specifcation takes the form of a full proposition. Similarly, one
can point at a thing in order to draw attention to it, but this is best seen
as a preparation for saying something about it. So to say, “It is true that
p because of things being as they are,” is merely a generic way of pre-
paring the way for a more specifc explanation of the truth of p. But this
more specifc explanation will again take propositional form. It would
take the form of saying how things are. But if we say how the particular
case must be in order for the thought to be true, we will resort to the
instancing relation again, and we already saw that this should not sat-
isfy Travis's ambitions.
Now Travis is not in fact tempted to take up this point of view in his
philosophy. It is rather the point of view which he ascribes to us in
everyday life. According to Travis, in perceptual experience we are
acquainted with things being as they are; but to be thus acquainted is
not as such to know anything about it. We thus have a form of aware-
ness of things which is not awareness that they are thus and so. This is
an everyday analogue of “pointing at the ultimate ground”. In his
philosophy, however, Travis thinks we can take up a diferent point of
view, one from which we can draw a relation between the conceptual
and the historical. Even though in life we would say, “Sid smokes,”
from the point of view taken up in Travis's philosophy this is to be
paraphrased as, “Things being as they are is a case of things being such
that Sid smokes.” We already saw that this expression is unsatisfactory
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if “things being as they are” is one more thing to refer to, an element in
the world. But Travis wants it to be the world, so that the generality it
is brought under, “things being such that Sid smokes,” is outside the
world. We so to say hold the world in left hand, and the thought in the
other, and relate them from this point of view. 
But now there is the same “sideways on” problem that, as I argued
before, is inherent to the Fregean paradigm. The thought is taken to be
a concept of a way for the world to be (as for Frege it was frst a subject,
of which truth can be predicated, and later a name, which can refer to
the True). To assert the thought is to say that the world is that way. But
then the thought is not the sort of thing that can be said. I can only say
that things being as they are is a case of things being such that it is
raining; I cannot say that it is raining. Of course, there is something
which Travis would call “saying that it is raining”, but what this really
means is: saying that things being as they are is a case of things being
such that it is raining. From the sideways-on perspective from which
the paraphrase is given, “things being such that it is raining”, which is
supposed to be what the thought is, is only an element of a thought,
and so not itself the kind of thing that can be said or thought. What can
be said or thought is that things being as they are is a case of things
being such that it is raining. But wait a minute, that is the same thought
again (in Frege: wait a minute, “is true” adds nothing to the thought) –
and the problem repeats itself. I cannot think that things being as they
are is a case of things being such that it is raining: I can only think that
things being as they are is a case of things being such that things being
as they are is a case of things being such that it is raining. But … and so
on.
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So when we think through the ambition to place the world beyond the
conceptual, we end up oscillating between a sense of confnement
within the conceptual, and a desperate attempt to escape from this
confnement—either by relating thought and world from sideways-on,
or by pointing at the world outside of a propositional context. It is the
ambition that is at fault. It is true that the world consists of things
which we can only think about, not themselves expressible in words.
But thought answers to how things are. When we speak about things,
we do not speak about how things are. When we speak about things, we
say how things are. In that sense the world is not removed from what
we can express in words. This is the truth behind the Tractarian slogan,
“The world is everything that is the case; the totality of facts, not of
things.” The world is not all that we can think about, but all that we can
truly think. This is the conception which I will discuss in the next
chapter.
Conclusions
According to Travis, to represent some element of the world as being
some way for elements of the world to be (to represent Sid as smoking)
is really to represent the world (things being as they are) as being a way
for the world to be (things being such that Sid is smoking). (§2) 
What is this move supposed to do? It is an attempt to make explicit
what is added to a thought by asserting it. It thus faces the same prob-
lems which Frege's similar attempts faced. A forceless thought cannot
be thought, and so is not a thought. (§3.1)
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But Travis goes farther than Frege in separating a thought and its con-
ceptual structure. This turns the thought (even more than it already was
for Frege) into a thing-in-itself. A structureless thought cannot be
thought, and so is not a thought. (§3.2)
A further motivation Travis has to construe what is given as non-con-
ceptual is that falsehood is an achievement. This is in itself an insight, if
we can separate it from the conception of the world as lying beyond the
conceptual sphere. (§4)
Travis applies the same Cartesian structure to his account of percep-
tion. Our senses aford awareness of our surroundings; only in response
do we take a stance on how things are. What is given in the frst
moment is “things being as they are”. But when we think this through,
nothing can be given in the frst moment, because it is not yet aware-
ness. It is just not the moment of being given the reason for a
judgement. And so we cannot draw the conclusion that this reason is
non-conceptual. Travis construes what is given in such a way that it
cannot be given. (§5)
If we accept that conception, we fnd ourselves oscillating between a
sense of confnement within the conceptual, and a condemned attempt
to escape from this confnement — either by pointing beyond it
towards what is given, or by trying to relate thought and world from
sideways-on. So we must reject the conception. (§6)
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IV Saddled with content
§1 Introduction
I n Mind and World, John McDowell defends a conception of reality as
“made up of the sort of thing one can think,” and of perceptual experi-
ence as being presented with such things. (1994: 27–8) Although this
may sound idealistic, it is not supposed to be metaphysically conten-
tious. All it is meant to consist of is a truism or two, expressed in what
McDowell calls ‘reminders'.58 Reminding ourselves of these truisms is
meant to discourage a conception of reality as lying beyond the con-
ceptual sphere, a conception sometimes referred to as ‘scheme-content
dualism' or ‘the Myth of the Given'. Since McDowell's view is defned
in opposition to such dualism, I will refer to it as monism; it includes
what Jennifer Hornsby has defended under the name ‘the identity the-
ory of truth' (Hornsby 1997).
It may seem - it has seemed to critics - that monism fies in the face of
what also must be truistic: that reality is made up of the sort of thing
one thinks about (such things as sparrows, not thoughts about spar-
rows), and that it is such things which are present in experience. My
immediate aim is to show that despite this appearance to the contrary,
there is a truistic way of understanding monism, one that serves
McDowell's purposes, but also that the Fregean framework within
58 A nod to Wittgenstein's practice of assembling reminders: “Something that
one knows when nobody asks one, but no longer knows when one is asked to
explain it, is something that has to be called to mind. (And it is obviously
something which, for some reason, it is difcult to call to mind.)” (PI §89)
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which he defends the view prevents us from understanding it in that
way. My deeper aim is to display and partially motivate the kind of
philosophical style and outlook within which monism can come into
its own, one in which we take up the standpoint of self-consciousness,
and articulate, from that standpoint, what we already implicitly knew
in virtue of being human. I hope that pronouncement will cease to be
obscure by the end of this chapter.
I will proceed as follows. In §2 I introduce the two reminders, and the
view they are meant to oppose. In §3 I introduce my preferred way of
understanding those reminders, and contrast this with the way
McDowell understands them in Mind and World. In §4 I illustrate how
McDowell's understanding encourages the sort of dualism which he
wants to avoid. This makes for a kind of antinomy between monism
and dualism. We can escape the antinomy, I argue in §5, if we stop
referring to a thought, and instead take up the standpoint it consti-
tutes. This requires correcting for Frege's separation of force and
content, and his anti-psychologism more generally.
§2 Two reminders
I will distinguish between a reminder on truth and a reminder on
experience. Minimally, the reminder on truth says that thinking
reaches all the way to what it answers to: we can think that things are a
certain way, and when we think truly, things are in fact that way.
“Dressed up in high-fown language,” McDowell expresses it as fol-
lows:
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[T]here is no ontological gap between the sort of thing one can mean, or gen-
erally the sort of thing one can think, and the sort of thing that can be the
case. When one thinks truly, what one thinks is what is the case. So since the
world is everything that is the case …, there is no gap between thought, as
such, and the world. (McDowell 1994: 27)
Jennifer Hornsby has incisively defended this view under its tradi-
tional name ‘the identity theory of truth’. The identity theory of truth
says that true thoughts, which Hornsby refers to as true ‘thinkables’,
are the same as facts, and the world is the totality of facts (Hornsby
1997). Neither for Hornsby nor for McDowell is it supposed to be a the-
ory in any weighty sense. As McDowell puts it, “All the point comes to
is that one can think, for instance, that spring has begun, and that very
same thing, that spring has begun, can be the case.” (McDowell 1994: 27)
But the point comes to a little more than that, since it also contains an
endorsement of the opening lines of the Tractatus, a conception of the
world as everything that is the case. Those lines continue, “The world is
the totality of facts, not of things.” (TLP 1.1, my emphasis) So one might
think that this conception allows for a distance between the world,
thus understood, and the world conceived as a totality of things59,
primarily the sort of things that we fnd around us, and are present to
us in perceptual experience. If we cannot drive a wedge between true
thinkables and facts, one might feel there must then be a distance
59 As P.F. Strawson wrote, although in criticism of correspondence theories of
truth, “… if we read ‘world' (a sadly corrupted word) as ‘heavens and earth,'
talk of facts, situations and states of afairs, as ‘included in' or ‘parts of' the
world is, obviously, metaphorical. The world is the totality of things, not of
facts.” (Strawson 1953: 139n)
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between facts and the more or less concrete particular objects which
make up our surroundings. I take it that McDowell's account of experi-
ence is supposed to deny that these two conceptions of ‘the world’ can
come apart.60 The world, conceived as everything that is the case,
includes the sensible world.61 What assures this I will refer to as
McDowell's reminder on experience. Minimally, it says that in experi-
ence it can be manifest to us that something is the case. McDowell
expresses it as follows (26):
Although reality is independent of our thinking, it is not to be pictured as
outside an outer boundary that encloses the conceptual sphere. That things
are thus and so is the conceptual content of an experience, but if the subject of
the experience is not misled, that very same thing, that things are thus and
so, is also a perceptible fact, an aspect of the perceptible world.
It seems to me that this second reminder is crucial to understanding
the force and ambition of ‘the identity theory of truth’, but since it does
60 Nor do they come apart in the Tractatus: “To perceive a complex object is to
see that its constituents hang together thus and so.” (5.5423) This continues
with a discussion of the Necker cube. When we see it frst one way, then an-
other, “we really see two diferent facts.” See Sullivan 2005 for an elaboration
of both the afnity and the diference with McDowell's view.
61 McDowell does recognise a broader conception of ‘world', but concentrates
his eforts on dissolving puzzlement about the relation between thinking and
the sensible world: “[S]ince our cognitive predicament is that we confront the
world by way of sensible intuition (to put it in Kantian terms), our refection
on the very idea of thought's directedness at how things are must begin with
answerability to the empirical world.” (McDowell 1994/6: xii)
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not belong to the identity theory strictly speaking, it will be convenient
to have a name for the two reminders combined. I will refer to the
encompassing view as monism; it is shaped by an opposition to the
more familiar scheme-content dualism.62 (McDowell 1994: 4) Speaking
broadly and metaphorically, one could think of monism as a kind of
empirical realism about conceptual form: what our words make mani-
fest, the conceptual forms we express, can also be grasped in
experience, and can thus be found enmattered in the world around us.
Reminding ourselves of these supposed truisms is meant to dispel a
sense of distance between thinking and reality, and in that way dis-
courage engaging in constructing any more substantial theory of the
relation between thinking and reality. There is a felt need for a more
substantial theory when reality is pictured as lying “outside an outer
boundary that encloses the conceptual sphere.” It seems that for
McDowell this is the same as denying the truisms. If the world, and our
apprehension of it in experience, were not conceptually structured, in
the sense in which the truisms say that they are, the ultimate justifca-
tions for our judgements would not be of the form that things are thus
and so. It would not be possible to make an experience, or what in it we
experience, available for discursive deliberation in the way that a
thought can be made available for discursive deliberation. Whatever
can be expressed in words, what has the form that things are thus and so,
could only be a response to experience. But this, McDowell thinks,
62 My use of ‘monism’ here is the same as in the frst chapter. Monism is the
combination of McDowell's two reminders, understood in the minimal sense
in which they are genuinely truistic. In this chapter I distinguish this from
the more substantial understanding which McDowell's Fregean commit-
ments lead him to.
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would make it impossible to see such a response as rationally motiv-
ated at all. For the response to be rationally motivated, it should at least
be possible, even if we normally don't, to step back and discursively
deliberate over whether this experience warrants this response. But
that would require putting the relevant aspect of the experience itself
into words― exactly what, on a conception that denies the truisms, one
cannot do. At best one could try to point at “something that is simply
received in experience” (McDowell 1994: 6), and McDowell clearly feels
such a pointing would be an empty gesture.
Where McDowell's theme is justifcation, there Hornsby's theme is a
theory of truth. A conception of the world as lying beyond the concep-
tual sphere is then what is embodied in a correspondence theory of
truth. In contrast to the identity theory of truth, a correspondence the-
ory conceives the truth of a thought as consisting in a relation of
correspondence between the thought and something worldly which
one can only refer to, and this Hornsby takes to be incoherent. Of
course, thinking answers to how things are, worldly things which one
can generally only refer to, but one can say how things are—that is just
the truism which the identity theory reminds us of. By contrast, the
correspondence theorist conceives ‘how things are’63 in such a way that
it cannot be said. “From the point of view introduced by the identity
theory, it will be distinctive of correspondence theorists to seek items
located outside the realm of thinkables, and outside the realm of ordin-
63 Given the dualism of a correspondence theory, a correspondence theorist will
be inclined to fnd phrases such as ‘how things are’ ambiguous: there is what
we say when we say how things are, and there is what makes it true or false to
say so. On this second understanding of ‘how things are’, it is not, for the cor-
respondence theorist, something that can be expressed in words.
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ary objects of reference, but related, some of them, to whole think-
ables.” (Hornsby 1997: 7) Hornsby goes on to show that this idea takes
many guises. The worldly correspondent may be a state of afairs, a
situation, a particular case, a percept (Russell), the cosmic distribution
of particles (Quine), or even a fact, as long as it is conceived as that
which makes a thought true, without itself being thinkable. Such a the-
ory pictures a thought as distanced from the world, so that for it to be
true is for it to stand in a relation to what is ‘out there’ when it is true.
Hornsby writes, “the identity theory is worth considering to the extent
that correspondence theories are worth avoiding.” (Hornsby 1997: 6)
And McDowell believes that if we accept that reality lies beyond the
conceptual sphere, we are in a hopeless predicament, and no theory
will help us out of it. “Of course thought can be distanced from the
world by being false, but there is no distance implicit in the very idea of
thought.” (McDowell 1994: 27) But even if there is no distance implicit
in the very idea of thought, there may be a distance implicit in a philo-
sopher's conception of thought. I will argue that the Fregean
framework within which McDowell (and Hornsby, but the focus will be
on McDowell) defends monism - in particular the separation of think-
able content from assertoric force, and the consequent reifcation of
thinkable content - blocks a truistic understanding of his reminders.
Now if we cannot understand the reminders as truisms, we would be
tempted to think that there is, after all, a greater distance between
thinking and reality than monism allows for, and then this better not
be a hopeless predicament. We would be thus tempted, but I think
McDowell is right in wanting to avoid dualism, and even in taking such
a conception to be obviously incoherent, fying in the face of what
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really are truisms, properly understood. By means of a change of per-
spective, I will suggest, we can regain a truistic understanding of the
reminders, a defensible version of monism. 
§3 Perceptible facts
I n Mind and World, McDowell brings our attention to one central
motivation for dualism: a restriction that the concept of nature or caus-
ality has undergone in modern thinking. Generally speaking, the
restriction is to the efect that anything in nature has to be understood
in the way natural phenomena are understood in the natural sciences.
In the case of sensory experience the restriction comes to this, that any
contribution the subject makes to her experience must stand in con-
trast to receptivity. It cannot be simply part of receiving what is there
before her eyes; it must be a response to receiving what is there: a mat-
ter of imposing a form, construction, or interpretation onto what is
given. We can reject the underlying assumption, and allow for a
receptive contribution by the perceiving subject. To receive something
is not merely to be hit by it, as a ball is hit by a baseball bat; one has to
be in some way ready for what is received, as a catcher is ready for the
ball fying into his mitt. For example, in hearing the unity of a chord or
melody, I am making a receptive contribution to my experience—I
draw on personal capacities (my ears, without my understanding, are
not sensitive to such unity), but the unity I fnd is not something I con-
strue or add to what I receive; it is there to be found in the sounds
impinging on my eardrums. Without this capacity, I cannot even so
much as hear the music as music, composed of notes and chords and
rhythms; it would be mere noise to me. Moreover, it seems to me that
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there is some justifcation in McDowell's claim that the capacity I thus
draw on is a conceptual capacity; after all, to hear this unity is to be in a
position to refer to it demonstratively (that chord, that melody), thus
making it available for discursive deliberation.64 By thinking of experi-
ence as a collaboration between mind and world, instead of a
confrontation, we can avoid one route towards dualism. (McDowell
thinks the contribution the subject makes must be passive (10), and I
will later argue against this conviction: even exercising conceptual capa-
cities can be “a matter of receptivity in operation”.)
But a conception of experience as a confrontation is only one pressure
towards dualism; I want to draw attention to another. The dualist can
himself be seen as motivated by something which seems merely tru-
istic. When McDowell afrms his truisms, which picture the world as
the totality of true thoughts, the dualist will worry where this leaves
the more or less concrete particular objects which make up our sur-
roundings, such things as clouds, people, lakes, snowfakes, sparrows,
and so on. Such things are spatio-temporally located, undergo and
efect changes, and can be present in perceptual experience; thoughts,
by contrast, are generally taken to be abstract objects, grasped by the
mind instead of the senses. Even if this second part of the contrast is
64 There is some danger in calling it a conceptual capacity. It may suggest that
we have an understanding of what the capacity is from its use in discursive
activity, prior to invoking perceptual experience. It may then seem that the
monist is projecting something from discursive activity onto perceptual ex-
perience. But we don't have to equate conceptual and discursive, and we don't
have to think of the exercise of a conceptual capacity in discursive activity as
prior in the order of understanding to its exercise in experience. They can be
two sides of the same capacity, only understandable in terms of one another.
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contentious, the frst part is merely truistic: what is present in experi-
ence are the sort of things we fnd around us, the sort of things we
think about. If McDowell wants to discourage a dualism between
thought and world, he will have to accommodate this truism. He may
of course choose to reserve the word ‘world’ for the totality of facts, but
things have to be given some central place in the picture.
So it may seem, as critics have thought65, that identifying the world
with the totality of facts presents McDowell with a dilemma: either
facts are somehow made up out of things that we fnd around us, in
which case they seem to be distanced from thoughts, or facts are true
thoughts, in which case they seem to be distanced from the things that
we fnd around us. In Fregean terms they would, on the frst horn of
the dilemma, belong to the realm of reference (what we think about);
on the second horn, they would belong to the realm of sense (what we
think). But this is just an expression of the dualism McDowell aims to
discourage, and he would reject the dilemma. He does conceive facts,
and thoughts generally, as belonging to the realm of sense, but he does
not take this to distance them from the realm of reference. Facts, on
McDowell's conception, are neither made up out of concrete objects,
nor are they distanced from them; they are aspects of the things we fnd
around us: “aspect[s] of the perceptible world.” (26)
65 Julian Dodd presents this dilemma (Dodd 1995), but does not see the choice
McDowell has already made to place facts in the realm of sense, nor does he
see an escape from the dilemma. Peter Sullivan likewise thinks that the mod-
ern pronents of the identity theory face a problem given that they conceive
facts as true Fregean senses; he argues that the author of the Tractatus, unlike
McDowell and Hornsby, escapes the dilemma (Sullivan 2005).
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Maybe we can understand McDowell's talk of aspects, and generally
his reminders, in the following way. In experience things, the sort of
things we fnd around us, impress themselves on our senses, and thus
become present to us. But a thing is not divorced from how it is. We
can't have the thing before our eyes without also having its condition
before our eyes. So in a sense, ‘how it is', to the extent that this is mani-
fest from our point of view, also impresses itself on our senses, and is
present to us. For something to be present to us just is for us to be per-
ceptually aware of how it manifestly is. For example, in observing a
sparrow on my table, the sparrow and the table impress themselves on
my senses, and in virtue of my being open to how they manifestly are
(drawing on my capacity for grasping spatio-temporal arrangements),
I enjoy perceptual awareness of where the sparrow is: on my table. 
Understood in this way, McDowell's reminder on experience should be
uncontentious. What would experience be if it did not already involve
such achievements as seeing where things are? It would be, in a famil-
iar phrase, a blooming, buzzing confusion. It does happen, as an
exception to the norm, that my senses are registering impingements
without me being aware of it, as when a buzzing noise is distracting me
without my realising (I may only notice the noise once it stops). And
even when I attend to something, I may fail to see how it is in some
important respect: observing what I take to be a cloud against a clear
blue sky, I am unable to see where it is; then I see that it is smoke rising
from a factory chimney, and things fall into place. But experience can-
not generally or normally be like that. If experience were generally like
the frst case, mere sensibility, uninformed by the understanding, I
would not see how things are—I would not be self-consciously aware
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of my surroundings. And if my surroundings were generally like the
second case, without enough familiar anchors to orient myself, I would
fail to see how things are—I would not be at home in the world. In both
cases, I would fail to have a functioning capacity of perception. As it is,
being human and more or less at home in the world, I do have a func-
tioning capacity of perception. In a normal, good case of experience I
simply see how things are. It is to such a case that McDowell's
reminder applies.66
McDowell's reminder on truth can be understood in a similarly
unproblematic way. When I think truly, my thinking reaches all the
way to the fact: I think of the sparrow that it is on the table, and on the
table is in fact where the sparrow is. With that I reach the world—at
least if, “The world is everything that is the case,” may be understood
without reifying facts, as a way of saying that the world is all things,
being all the ways they are. Thinking stops nowhere short of the world:
when one thinks truly, what one thinks of is the very way one thinks it
is.67 That again cannot be contentious.
But can we understand McDowell in this way? The form of expression
which he chooses (“that very same thing, that things are thus and so”) sug-
gests that we cannot. In the understanding of his reminders just
sketched, I made sense of what it is for that things are thus and so to be an
aspect of things by taking up the standpoint of having an experience,
66 See also Sullivan (2011: 184): “At home in the world, I can simply say what I
see.”
67 That formula is limited to predicative thoughts. But if we can manage to fnd
it unmysterious that predicative thought reaches all the way to the world,
there won't be a deep problem about diferently shaped thoughts.
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and then refecting, from that standpoint, on what it is for an object to
be self-consciously present to me. In philosophy I then merely bring to
refective thought what I already know, unrefectively, in seeing how
things are. Similarly, in my paraphrase of McDowell's reminder on
truth, I take up the standpoint of thinking that the sparrow is on the
table, and use this thought (not refer to it) in order to say when it would
be true. In both cases what I say philosophically is an articulation of
what I already know in experiencing/thinking what I do, or generally,
in representing things as I do. In representing things as being some
way I already know how my representation stands to what it answers
to; I do not need to step back from my representation, refer to it, and
from such a perspective relate it to the world.
I am weaving together two themes, my central themes in this chapter.
One is the self-consciousness of representation. This is also the central
theme in McDowell's work, and in the tradition of German idealism
from which he draws. It is notoriously difcult to say clearly what it
comes to, but all I really need, for present purposes, is the schematic
characterisation that in representing some thing as being some way,
and in virtue of doing so, I know what it is that I'm doing; and since
what I'm doing is representing the world as being some way, I know
how my thought, the thought that things are that way, stands to the
world. Just this, I believe, motivates and justifes McDowell's methodo-
logy of issuing reminders (what some refer to as his ‘Wittgensteinian
quietism’). Because in using a thought I already know what it is, I do
not have to go beyond what I already know when, in philosophy, I
want to say what thought is—I merely have to remind myself of what I
already know, bring it to philosophical refection. (Such quietism, then,
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is not the nihilistic view that representation has no essence, but the
view that the essence cannot be hidden.) Contrast this with sufering
from a disease. Even when in sufering from a disease I know what it is
that I am sufering from, I do not know this merely in virtue of sufer-
ing from it. So in saying what it is that I am sufering from, I have to
call in a doctor or medical scientist, or if I happen to be one, treat
myself as another. Here reminders won't do; what is needed is empir-
ical observation and discovery.
The other theme is the transparency of representation. There would be
a gap between representation and reality if representations generally
were opaque, getting in between the representing subject and reality.
This can happen as an exception to the norm. I say of a cat that it is on
the mat. In fact the cat, having recently mastered esoteric meditation,
is hovering a few inches above the yoga mat. In such a case my words,
and the thought expressed, stand in between me and a transparent
viewpoint on reality. The thought becomes itself the object of refec-
tion when someone says in response, “It is true (in a sense) and false (in
a sense).” (Such cases play an important role in the correspondence
theory defended by J.L. Austin, and under his infuence, in the view of
Charles Travis.) But this can only be an exception to the norm. Nor-
mally, representation is transparent: in representing things as being
some way, not the thought I express but its subject matter is on my
mind. When I think that the sparrow is on the table, I do not think of
my thought, of that the sparrow is on the table; I think of the sparrow that
it is on the table. Something similar is true for perceptual experience.
When I see that the sparrow is on the table, I do not see (the thought)
that the sparrow is on the table; I see the sparrow, and normally to see this
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is to see where it is: on the table. I would be in the grip of a vicious
regress if generally, in order to represent things as being some way, I
had to step back from my representation, and again represent it as
standing in some relation to the world—as if to represent something as
being some way were like drawing a picture for the mind, which the
mind then again can interpret in various ways (but to interpret it is to
draw another picture, etc.). Such a regress could arise in various ways.
But at least one version is stopped before it can get started once we
realise that representation is self-conscious: because in representing
things as being some way I already know how I thus stand to the world,
I do not need to step back and refect on the representation, on that
things are this way, in order to relate it to the world. My thought is, so
far, not on my mind; it is part of my mind. In thinking I make up my
mind; my mind is made up of what I think.68
Contrast this with McDowell's formulations. Both in his reminder on
truth, and in his reminder on experience, McDowell uses ‘that things
are thus and so’ as a referring expression. What it refers to is supposed
to be ‘the sort of thing’ which one can think, which is also the sort of
68 The theme of transparency is central in the work of Peter Sullivan, to which I
am much indebted: “In this, neither the sentence nor the thought obtrudes it-
self as the object of consideration, or obstructs one's view of things. Quite the
reverse. The sentence understood, the thought, constitutes one's view of
things.” (Sullivan 2004: 733)
Sullivan tends to emphasise not so much the self-consciousness of represent-
ation, but the need for a sentence to display the essence of a thought. I think
this is another side of the same coin. It may be a many-sided coin: as I indic -
ate, a form of words, the thought expressed, can be opaque when it fails to
capture the intended circumstances aptly enough.
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thing that can be presented to one in experience, and a totality of
which makes up the world. In this way McDowell steps back from the
standpoint taken up in thinking a thought; instead he refers to the
thought, and from this perspective relates it to reality. This fnds
expression in the slogan of the identity theory: the world is the totality
of true thinkables.69 Its rejection of a correspondence theory does not
come in the form of a rejection of the very idea that we can conceive
truth as a relation between that things are thus and so and reality, but
rather in the form of a rejection of the sort of relation involved:
whereas the correspondence theorist thinks truth lies in a relation
between a thought and something outside of it, something not itself
thinkable, there the identity theorist takes the relation to be one of
identity between a thought and a fact.70
69 McDowell's work on modesty for a theory of meaning suggests a diferent
conception; in fact, the conception which I will recommend. On the right-
hand side of a T-sentence of a Davidsonian theory of meaning, the sentence,
which is mentioned on the left-hand side, is used to say when it would be
true. This contrasts with the ‘very same thing' talk in Mind and World. My
contention, then, is that there is a tension between the identity theory of
truth, as it is expressed in Mind and World, and the central insight behind
modesty for a theory of meaning.
70 To put it this way may seem to underestimate the wide disagreement in aims
and conception of the two theories. The identity theory, unlike a correspond-
ence theory, is not supposed to be a defnition of truth; it is supposed to be a
truistic reminder meant to discourage the attempt to ofer any more substan-
tial conception. But what I am arguing is that it is just in light of this com -
mendable ambition, the ambition to be modest, that the departure from the
correspondence theory looks too shallow.
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The failure to take up the standpoint of self-consciousness becomes
more pronounced when we turn to McDowell's understanding of his
reminder on experience. Minimally, the reminder says that it can be
perceptually manifest to one that things are thus and so. One can liter-
ally see that things are thus and so (fnd a conceptual form enmattered
in the here and now). This would be perfectly consistent with the
equally truistic idea that in experience one sees things, the sort of things
that we fnd around us, if for some thing to be self-consciously present
to the perceiving subject just is for her to see how it is; more specifc-
ally, that it is thus and so. But that is not how McDowell develops his
reminder. He holds that in experience one is under an appearance to
the efect that things are thus and so; in response, one can take this
appearance at face value, as would be the default, or reject it as an illu-
sion. In other words, in experience one is presented with ‘a thinkable
content’, that things are thus and so; in response one can afrm or deny
this content. Using ‘that things are thus and so’ as a referring expres-
sion, McDowell parses ‘seeing that things are thus and so’ as seeing
what that expression refers to, and so he conceives that things are thus
and so as the object of awareness. “What we see is: that such-and-such
is the case.” (29) Not that he would deny that in experience objects are
present to us. But what this means, according to his view, is that we are
presented with thinkables which we can accept or reject.
It is far from an idiosyncrasy of style that McDowell expresses his
reminders in the way that he does. It is the way in which, within the
Fregean framework of Mind and World, his central, Kantian thought
fnds expression, that a robust realism requires a combination of spon-
taneity and receptivity. Let me start with calling the framework to
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mind. Frege observed that one can grasp a thought without acknow-
ledging it as true, for instance when asking a question, or when the
thought is used in the antecedent of a conditional. He concluded that
we must distinguish between a thought, in itself forceless, and the
force (assertive, inquisitive, etc.) with which it is used. In the case of
assertion, Frege notes, “both are so closely joined in an indicative sen-
tence that it is easy to overlook their separability,” (1918: 294) and this
is certainly true. The force/content distinction comes to this, a distinc-
tion between what I mean to say in asserting what I do, and what I
mean: the thing that I mean. What I mean in saying that the sparrow is
on the table is that the sparrow is on the table (I mean it with force), but
what I mean, on Frege's conception, is the thinkable content sup-
posedly given by ‘that the sparrow is on the table’. The act of assertion
is analysed as consisting in the act of attaching a force to a thinkable
content; the thinkable content now becomes something to refer to, an
object of some sort. It is essential to Frege's anti-psychologism that this
should be so: it allows him to conceive logic as being about the things
that one can think, uncontaminated by the activity of thinking, which
he takes to be a merely psychological issue.
I do not believe that McDowell would want to draw quite that contrast.
But where the force/content distinction is Frege's way of keeping apart
logic and psychology, there, diferently but relatedly, it is McDowell's
way of preventing the moderate form of idealism that he wants to
defend from slighting the independence of reality. McDowell wants to
accommodate the pressures behind dualism by acknowledging that the
activity of thinking is constrained by something outside of it—by the
sensible world, or what comes to the same, our perceptual awareness
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of it. But what the dualist forgets is that in order for this to be a genuine
constraint, one that allows us to conceive thinking as rationally
answerable, the constraint cannot be from outside the form of thought.
Thinking cannot answer to something that is alien to it. This Kantian
thought then within the Fregean framework fnds expression in the
form of the force/content distinction. Although the constraint must be
from outside thinking, it should be from within thinkable content: “[I]f
we are to give due acknowledgement to the independence of reality,
what we need is a constraint from outside thinking and judging, our exer-
cises of spontaneity. The constraint does not need to be from outside
thinkable contents.” (28) And although experience is not active - it is not
judging that things are such and such, but rather being presented with
something - what we are presented with is nonetheless already con-
ceptually shaped. In order to be presented with a thinkable content,
receive it, we must draw on our conceptual capacities. It would be inapt
to speak of exercising conceptual capacities; “that would suit an activ-
ity, whereas experience is passive” (10):
In experience one fnds oneself saddled with content. One's conceptual capa-
cities have already been brought into play, before one has any choice in the
matter. The content is not something one has put together oneself, as when
one decides what to say about something. In fact it is precisely because exper-
ience is passive, a case of receptivity in operation, that the conception I am
recommending can satisfy the craving for a limit to freedom which underlies
the Myth of the Given.
In experience we are saddled with content. In response, in active
judgement, we can either accept or reject this content: “How one's
experience represents things to be is not under one's control, but it is
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up to one whether one accepts the appearance or rejects it.” (11)
McDowell talks of what is ‘under one's control’ in order to align the
contrast between the receptivity of experience and the spontaneity of
judgement with the contrast between passivity and activity, which he
needs for parsing empirical judgement in a moment of passively ‘being
presented with content' and a moment of active judgement in
response. Experience is supposed to be passive because it is not under
our control, and relatedly, we do not bear responsibility for our experi-
ence as we bear responsibility for our beliefs. But the two contrasts do
not align. Receptivity indeed contrasts with creativity. For instance, in
keeping up our end in a conversation we have a great freedom: there is
not, as there generally is in the case of seeing how things are, a way of
getting it right.71 But receptivity does not contrast with activity, in the
somewhat special sense in which knowledge and belief are forms of
activity. It is true that we cannot choose what to experience, but
neither can we choose what to believe; nonetheless, we do not speak of
‘being believed to’. (To say, “I am of the opinion,” is to distance oneself
from one's opinion.) Nor is it true that we bear no responsibility for
experience. One may be criticised, in much the same way as one may
be criticised for a mistaken belief, for failing to exercise one's capacities
properly in experience, as a musician would be, or a music critic, when
failing to hear the unity of a chord or melody. Once we rid ourselves,
with McDowell's help, of the restricted conception of causality I men-
tioned before, there is no need anymore to speak of experience in the
71 I say generally, because there are cases, such as Jastrow's duck/rabbit picture,
where one can see something in various ways. Such cases occur in ‘real life’
too, but it seems to me important that they do not occur all the time.
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passive voice (‘being under an appearance’); we can just speak of exper-
ience as we ordinarily do, in the active voice, with the perceiving
subject in the grammatical subject position: “I see how things are.”
Not only do we not need to speak as McDowell does, we better not:
McDowell's adherence to the Fregean structure makes an unproblem-
atic understanding of his own reminders unavailable to him, and given
the central role that it plays in Mind and World, to the reader. The
force/content distinction, in this form, amounts to a separation of that
things are thus and so from the ‘I think’ or the ‘I see,’ and a problem arises
on both sides. On the side of the thought, refecting on it, referring to it,
it seems an implausible candidate to be what the world is made of,
what impresses itself on our senses, and is given or present in percep-
tual experience. In referring to a thought, and construing it as the
object of perceptual awareness, McDowell takes up the perspective
from which the conception he wants to discourage looks unavoidable. I
will elaborate on this objection in the next section.
A related problem arises on the side of the ‘I see.’ On McDowell's pic-
ture, in experience we are still at a distance from the thinkable content
which is presented to us, not taking up the standpoint it constitutes. It
appears to us that things are thus and so, but to be thus appeared to is
not yet to see that things are thus and so – it only becomes that when
we take the appearance at face value. In this way McDowell posits a
kind of deep structure of experience, underneath what is manifest to us
in experiencing what we do. Normally, in seeing that a sparrow is on
my table, I do not hold this content at arm's length. I would not even
know how to begin to doubt it. I simply see, as part of the sparrow's
being present to me, where it is: on the table. It does happen sometimes
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that an experience becomes opaque. It may look to me as if the sparrow
is on the table, but also as if the sparrow is just to the side of the table,
hanging still in the air. In such a case I can rid myself of the illusion by
looking closer, or looking from a diferent angle, and it is only because
I then spontaneously see how things are (I do not again have to decide
whether to take these appearances at face value) that I can reject the
misleading appearance. It could not generally be the case that I had to
decide whether or not to take appearances at face value. If this were
generally the case, there would not be enough to go on to make the
decision. If exception became normal case, and every appearance as
such would still be at a distance from me, only becoming my judge-
ment by my taking it at face value, I'd be so alienated from my
surroundings that I would not even have a working capacity of percep-
tion. Of course, McDowell does not think that in experience I actively
have to decide, for every appearance, whether or not to take it at face
value, but this is nonetheless the deep structure that he posits.72 This
72 On McDowell's picture, at least as later explicated, I do not normally con-
sciously decide to take an appearance at face value. This is normally some-
thing I have already done as soon as I enjoy an experience. “ ‘Unless there are
grounds for suspicion, such as odd lighting conditions, having it look to one
as if things are a certain way — ostensibly seeing things to be that way — be -
comes accepting that things are that way by a sort of default, involving no ex-
ercise of the freedom that fgures in a Kantian conception of judgement.’
(1998, p. 439) 
But to the puzzlement in the main passage it does not matter very much
whether accepting appearances at face value is done consciously or somehow
automatically achieved. The same question that arises there for deciding to
take an appearance at face value, now arises for automatically having done so.
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structure exactly fts someone who is in a position that a radical sceptic
feels he is in; and so, far from making it intelligible that the world is
within the mind's reach, this picture brings such scepticism to life.
It may seem that McDowell also has another motivation; it may seem
he draws apart ‘being appeared to’ and ‘taking the appearance at face
value’ in order to accommodate the possibility of illusion. But McDow-
ell also writes that “it does not matter very much that one may be
misled.” (9) Worries about illusory experience tend to motivate a shal-
low scepticism about the possibility of knowledge, whereas McDowell
wants to allay a deeper anxiety about how discursive activity can be
even so much as contentful, engaging meaningfully with the world.
Laying to rest the shallower form of scepticism is then supposed to
become a routine by-product. It requires merely resisting the tempta-
tion to model a good case of perceptual experience on what the good
and the bad, illusory case have in common – that is, it requires what
has come to be known as disjunctivism. But when McDowell comes to
fll in the distance between the passivity of experience and the spon-
taneity of thought, all he has to ofer is the possibility of rejecting an
appearance as an illusion. Without this possibility, there just is no dis-
tance between seeing and knowing. The possibility of ‘being misled’
ends up playing a central role in drawing the contrast McDowell feels
is needed to allay the deeper form of scepticism, even though that form
of scepticism is not supposed to be motivated by illusions at all.
Moreover, on McDowell's view, every experience, good or bad, is one
of being presented with an appearance, but this is just what the good
How can I automatically accept appearances at face value except against a
background of simply seeing how things are?
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and the bad case have in common. There is a tension, then, between
McDowell's disjunctivism and the role that the presentation/response
structure plays in his way of spelling out his reminder on experience. It
would be better in accord with disjunctivism to take experience to be
simply seeing how things are (except when it is not). So far this is
merely an ad hominem objection; but I do think we should be resolute
disjunctivists, and I will return to this in the last section.
§4 Antinomy
The perspective which McDowell takes up in defending monism is a
perspective from which dualism looks inescapable. From such a per-
spective we cannot understand how a true thought can be a fact, if a
fact is also to be the sort of thing that can impress itself on our senses,
and be manifestly there before our eyes. I will mention three objections
which monism faces when ‘seeing that things are thus and so’ is parsed
as seeing (the thinkable content) that things are thus and so, and which
are avoided, I believe, on the conception which I want to recommend. 
(1) The frst objection is something like an appeal to intuition. A
thought cannot literally be touched, as I think anyone will acknow-
ledge. Can it be seen? I look around, and I see leaves lying on the
ground, the refection of the sun in the windows, branches softly sway-
ing, the aforementioned sparrow still on my table, but no matter how
hard I look, nowhere do I fnd (the fact) that the sparrow is on the table, or
any of the other things that I can judge to be so. That things are thus and
so is not a thing among the things in my surroundings. The persuasive-
ness of this consideration lies in its naïveté. It just seems obvious that
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thoughts cannot literally be seen. The philosopher who says otherwise
must have a substantial metaphysical thesis, and so the burden of
proof lies on his side. Though McDowell would not accept the burden
of proof – it is common-sensical that we can see that things are thus
and so – his attack on the Myth of the Given is supposed to dislodge
this conviction. Reminding ourselves that in experience one draws on
conceptual capacities, we can return to a kind of pre-philosophical
innocence: in experience it can be manifest to us that things are thus
and so. But the current problem is that McDowell's attack focusses on
the restricted conception of causality, and not on the more naïve pres-
sure behind the conviction, which gets its thrust from taking that things
are thus and so to be the object of awareness. Looking at that things are
thus and so, it looks abstract, and so awareness of it cannot be perceptual
awareness. Think also of Frege's exclamation, “How diferent is the
process of handing someone a hammer from that of communicating a
thought!” (Frege 1918: 311)
(2) That, as I said, is a more an appeal to intuition than an argument.
One way to argue for this is through refection on the possibility of
false thought. Say that a thought, that things are thus and so, is the sort of
thing that can be there before our eyes, the sort of thing that can be ‘in
the world’ in that sense. Then if the thought is false, there would be no
such thing in the world. But if a thought is the sort of thing that can be
before our eyes, this now just seems another way of saying that there
would be no such thing. For instance, if we take the thought that the
leaves are on the ground to just be what is in the world when it is true, the
leaves' being on the ground (one may call this a state of afairs), then there
is no such thing if the thought is false. But the thought must have
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being, since it must be thinkable, whether it is true or false. So we can-
not equate the thought with the leaves' being on the ground, or more
generally with the sort of thing that can be before our eyes, impress
itself on our senses, and be present to us in perceptual experience.73 If
that things are thus and so is an object of some sorts, it is an abstract
object, and awareness of it cannot be perceptual awareness.
(3) Another way to argue for this is by drawing a contrast between the
changeable world and the atemporality of truth. For it to be true that
something is the case is not merely for it to be true at the moment; it is
for it to always have been, and always to continue to be, a true thing for
one to think. It is of course not just that its truth value cannot change.
The thought itself cannot change, at least not in its essentials, if it is to
be the same truth or falsehood for all eternity. Frege was motivated in
73 The argument turns on this, by thinking of a fact as something that can be
there before our eyes (impress itself on our senses, be present to us in experi-
ence, be “an aspect of the perceptible world”), we cannot help but think of its
obtaining as a form of existence. Even if it is inapt to say it exists, whatever
other term we use (obtaining, subsisting, being in the world) is parasitic on
our understanding of what existence is. But that understanding requires us to
say that if it does not exist (obtains, etc.), it fails to be, and so fails to be any -
thing (in particular, thinkable).
This is part of what motivated Russell and Moore to reject the identity the-
ory, after having frst embraced it. Hornsby comments, “I believe that Moore
felt forced to retract his frst thoughts about truth because of his failure to see
that facthood has to be reckoned an inessential property of any contingent
truth.” (Hornsby 1999: 244) But it seems to me just the identity theory's con-
strual of a fact as something ‘there in the world' that blocks an understanding
of facthood as an inessential property.
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this way to place thoughts outside the changeable realm (Frege 1918:
309):
The actual world (die Welt des Wirklichen) is a world in which this acts (wirkt) on
that, changing it, and in turn undergoing reactions (Gegenwirkungen) which
change it. All this is a process in time. We will hardly call actual (wirklich) that
which is timeless and unchangeable.”74 
Undergoing and efecting changes, as the passage makes clear, is one
way to describe causal interaction. So if a thought is not the sort of
thing to undergo or efect changes, it is not the sort of thing to impress
itself on our senses, or be present to us in perceptual experience (Frege
1918: 292):
A thought is something immaterial (Unsinnlich), and all sensibly perceptible
things are excluded from the realm of things for which truth can even so
much as come into question… But don't we see that the sun has risen? And
don't we thereby see that this is true? That the sun has risen is not an object
which emits rays that reach my eyes, it is not a visible thing like the sun itself.
I would not want to recommend Frege's view. My point is merely that
it is hard to resist this view once we parse ‘seeing that the sun has
risen’ as seeing (the thinkable content) that the sun has risen. If a thought
is an object, it must be an abstract object, and awareness of it cannot be
74 Not that Frege thinks a thought is entirely without causal efcacy. A thought
can act indirectly; it does so when human beings apprehend thoughts and act
on them. But this does not afect a thought in its essentials: “There is lacking




So by taking up the referential perspective on a thought, McDowell
blocks an understanding of his own reminders as truisms. I would like
to hear the reminder on experience, that in experience it can be mani-
fest to one that something is the case, as saying that in seeing what we
do, we enjoy a perceptual grasp of how things manifestly are — seeing,
for example, how things are causally and spatio-temporally arranged,
how they are shaped, and in the case of animals, what they are doing.
That is certainly a familiar phenomenon. But the shape of McDowell's
account, and the form of expression which he chooses, forces me to
understand this remark as saying that in experience we are presented
with ‘a thinkable content’: that things are thus and so. McDowell thinks
such things can be present in experience. But refecting on the sort of
thing thinkable content would be, it seems not the sort of thing to
undergo or efect changes, or have a spatio-temporal location, and so
not the sort of thing to impress itself on our senses or be present in
experience. Though I suspect McDowell does not want to go in for this
type of refection, it is encouraged by the standpoint he takes up in
spelling out his reminders.
When McDowell's reminders fail to look truistic, the conception they
were meant to discourage looks correspondingly common-sensical. Of
course the world must lie beyond the conceptual sphere. The conceptual
sphere is made up of the sort of thing that one can think, and this sort
of thing must be abstract, grasped by the mind instead of the senses. It
is not the sort of thing that we fnd around us. When I think that the
leaves are on the ground, for what I think to be true is for the leaves to
be on the ground, but what is then ‘out there’ is not the thought that
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the leaves are on the ground, but rather (as we are now inclined to say)
the situation/state of afairs/particular case of the leaves' being on the
ground, conceived as distinct from the thought; that is, conceived as
not itself thinkable. In experience we can at most be acquainted with
such an object. This acquaintance (connaître) is of a special sort, not yet
involving any knowledge (savoir). Experience itself cannot be know-
ledge, since the object of knowledge is something given by a 'that'
clause, and such a thing, on the current conception, lies outside the
sensible realm. Experience is a bare meeting, confrontation, with the
world, an opportunity for knowledge and understanding, but not itself
yet that. This triggers the dualistic pointing, which McDowell criti-
cises, at something beyond the conceptual sphere. The pointing is
directed at what is met with in experience, without presupposing any-
thing that would require more than such a bare meeting to know.
If the understanding of McDowell's reminders which I have suggested
is genuinely truistic, then this dualism fies in the face of a truism. We
would then have an antinomy between monism and dualism. Refect-
ing on what sort of thing that things are thus and so might be, we are led
to some form of a correspondence theory, or what comes to the same, a
conception of reality as lying outside the conceptual sphere. But this,
as McDowell clearly sees, is a hopeless predicament. And so we are led
to a rejection of the correspondence theory, a rejection which now
takes the form of the identity theory of truth. But as long as it still
seems that a thought is something else than the things that we fnd
around us, this leaves one with the sense that things in their concrete
particularity have been omitted from the picture.75 It is an antinomy,
75 Sullivan for instance writes that McDowell, wanting (in my terms) to reject
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and not a paradox, because there is an underlying assumption. Both
sides think of a thought as something to refer to, an object of some
sorts, using ‘that things are thus and so’ as a referring expression.
§5 An alternative
But surely a thought is essentially something to think, and only sec-
ondarily something to refer to. Taking this seriously, we can escape the
antinomy by a change of perspective: stop refecting on a thought,
instead take up the standpoint it constitutes. This allows for accom-
modating what is truistic in the motivation of dualism. The world
indeed consists of the sort of things one can think about. But this is not
in tension with monism, since things are not divorced from how they
are. The world is all things, being all the ways they are. In a typical
judgement, we think of some thing that it is some way. Our thinking
reaches all the way to the world because when we think truly, what we
think of is the very way we think it is. This says what McDowell wants
to say, but without referring to thoughts or facts, and so without
encouraging dualism. Instead we can use a thought to say when it
would be true: for it to be true to think that the sparrow is on the table
is for the sparrow to be, in fact, on the table. In a slogan, truth lies in
being so.76 Instead of thinking of truth as a relation between a whole
dualism, but lacking the Tractatus's way of locating objects inside the facts,
responds “in a cruder and historically more common way: by cutting of the
ofending limb. But what then remains is a picture in which the ordinary fea-
tures of externality have no anchor at all. It is one that positively invites the
Johnsonian, stone-kicking charge of idealism.” (Sullivan 2005: 60)
76 This is one half of Aristotle's famous defnition of the true and the false in
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thought and something else, as the correspondence theory does, or
even, as the identity theory does, as a relation between a whole thought
and that same thought-as-fact, we can think of truth as a unity
between the thing thought of, and the way it is thought to be, the unity
thought in thinking the copula.77
Frege had a deep reason for construing thinkable content as an inert
Mataphysics Gamma (the other half I will get to soon): “To say of what is that
it is not, or of what is not that it is, is false, while to say of what is that it is,
and of what is not that it is not, is true. But neither what is nor what is not are
said to be.” (Met. Gamma 7: 1011b 26–7)
It is important that this defnition, unlike the equivalence schema “It is true
that p if and only if p”, is asymmetric. It is true (false) that such and such is so
and so because such and such is (not) so and so, but not the other way around:
“It is not because of our having the true thought that you are pale, that you are
pale; rather it is because of your being pale that we who say so have a true
thought.” (Met., Theta 10: 1051b 6–9) “It is because of the thing’s being, or not
being, thus-and-so that the predication is said to be true or false...” (Cat. 5: 4b
8–10)
The asymmetry of “Truth lies in being so” distinguishes it from defationism.
The defationist holds that what truth is is exhausted by the formula, “It is
true that p if and only if p”. But that formula is perfectly symmetric. By con-
trast, on my view the truth of the thought that things are such and such is ex-
plained by things being such and such. 
One could think of asymmetry in a defnition of truth as a core commitment
of the correspondence theory. Being able to capture this assymmetry between
thought and reality, then, is also a way in which I can show my departure
from the identity theory of truth—“‘Is true' means the same as ‘is a fact'” is
symmetric; “Truth lies in being so” is asymmetric.
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object: his anti-psychologistic wish to keep thinkable content uncon-
taminated by the activity of thinking. It seems to me that in order to
arrive at a framework within which monism can come into its own, we
must correct for Frege's anti-psychologism generally. Let me briefy
indicate, since it would take a book-length work to do more, the sort of
contrast with Frege's approach that I have in mind. For Frege, logic
77 Still, from a certain perspective the departure from the identity theory of
truth may look shallow. That suits my purposes, since I want my recom-
mendation to be genuinely a way of understanding McDowell's reminders.
Those reminders are directed at a conception of reality as lying outside the
conceptual sphere, or, as Hornsby puts it, outside the realm of thinkables, and
outside the realm of ordinary objects of reference, “but related, some of them, to
whole thinkables” (Hornsby 1997: 7). The point of the emphasised phrase is to
allow for the kind of conception I want to recommend. It would be platitudin-
ous, Hornsby agrees, to say that “true sentences say how things are”, as long
as ‘things' here refers to ordinary objects of reference. “[T]he true sentence
‘that book is red', for example, says something about how things are by saying
how one of the things (sc. that book) is (sc. red).” (Hornsby 1997: 7) 
The same conception of truth is implicit in the modest approach to Davidso-
nian theories of meaning, which both McDowell and Hornsby defend. On the
right-hand side of the T-sentences of such a theory the sentence mentioned
on the left-hand side is used (not referred to) in order to say when it would be
true. That is just the right way to think of the relation between a sentence in
its meaningful employment and the reality it answers to. The aforementioned
asymmetry (see fn 37) then comes to expression in the need to fnd T-sen-
tences which are explanatory, ones that are not merely true, but can be used
in a theory of meaning. In a true theory that can be used as a theory of mean -
ing, there is an explanatory relation between the left-hand side and the right-
hand side of every T-sentence. So we fnd T-sentences such as “It is true to
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cannot be about the activity of thinking; if it were, it would be merely
about the way human beings happen to think, not the way they should
think in order to reach the aim of thought: truth. Frege is of course
right to exclude from the realm of logic the various contingencies and
pathologies that aflict human reasoning; but for Frege, even normal
thinking has to be handed over to empirical psychology. In a posthum-
ously published remark, he writes:
The logician does not have to answer the question: how does thinking nor-
mally take place in human beings? What course does it naturally follow in a
human mind? What is natural to one person may well be unnatural to anoth-
er.” (Frege, PW: 7) 
It is as if Frege can only think of activity in statistical terms, or in any
say, ‘Snow is white,' if snow is white.” It is just in such cases that “if” can be
replaced by because: it is true (false) to say that snow is white because snow is
(not) white. And that is my preferred formula.
But neither modesty for a theory of meaning, nor the rejection of correspond-
ence theories by itself, is the identity theory of truth. That theory embodies a
certain conception of truth that is supposed to help resist the temptation to-
wards a correspondence theory. And the conception it embodies is in tension
with those good ideas which are also to be found in the work of McDowell and
Hornsby. In the moment when we ‘remind' ourselves that the world is the to-
tality of true thinkables, we are not conceiving truth in the way that we do
when we think of the truth of “That book is red” as amounting to that book's
being red (or better: it is true to say, “That book is red,” because that book is
red). Because in that frst moment we are referring to a thinkable, and relat-
ing it to the world from that perspective, whereas in the second moment we
are using it.
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case, only in the terms of a science such as psychology, which in its
self-conception refrains from normative pretensions. Frege misses a
conception of ‘normal’ or ‘natural’ which carries normative force, the
sort of conception we fnd in neo-Aristotelian accounts such as Eliza-
beth Anscombe's Intention or Michael Thompson's Life and Action. On
such an approach, norms of reason ultimately derive from what it is to
be the sort of animals that we are. This allows for a kind of naturalism
which is not empiricist, and so avoids being a legitimate target for
Frege's anti-psychologism, without falling into the other, dualistic
extreme. In the study of thought we study the characteristic activity of
a certain animal, but unlike empirical scientists, we study it, so to say,
from the inside—articulating knowledge we have in virtue, not of
empirical observation, but of being what we are. A conception along
these lines is suggested by Wittgenstein's remark, “Giving orders, ask-
ing questions, telling stories, having a chat, are as much a part of our
natural history as walking, eating, drinking, playing.” (PI 25)
To study activity from the inside (not, of course, looking inside) is to say,
as I illustrated before, that we bring to philosophical refection what it
is that we know in having a certain capacity; for instance, what it is
that we know in knowing how to reason, or in knowing how to percep-
tually apprehend our surroundings. Before Aristotle discovered the
study of logic people already knew how to think; in the study of logic
we come to say what it is that we know in knowing that; we come to
abstract away the forms of our thoughts in virtue of which they hang
together in the ways that we already knew they did. Knowing how to
reason is knowing how to reason correctly; it is knowledge of norms in
this strong sense. Departures from the norm are understood as such, as
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departures from the norm which is intrinsic to the kind of activity it is.
One cannot, for example, explain the idea of a logical fallacy except
against the background of an understanding of logical inference.
When this approach is applied to the philosophy of perceptual experi-
ence, it takes the form of what has come to be known as disjunctivism.
An experience is essentially an attempt to perceive how things are. We
understand cases of illusions, and other ways of failing to perceptually
grasp how things are, as departures from the norm that is intrinsic to
the kind of thing experience is. It can only be called an illusion against
such a background (there are no illusions within dreams). Now we have
to be careful about the kind of failure that an illusion is. It is not like
saying something false, as seems to be implied by McDowell's account.
One cannot grasp what it is for a thought to be true without grasping
what it is for that thought to be false (one cannot grasp the thought that
the station is open without grasping the thought that the station is closed),
but illusions are not like that; they do not provide an internal contrast
to the good case. They are more like saying something which is not
even so much as true or false. As in the case of opaque thoughts (recall
the example of the esoteric cat), certain experiences can become
opaque, so that they themselves become the object of refection. This
happens when the way things look and the way they are departs from
the patterns we are used to. Say that it looks to me as if people are
ascending a rectangular staircase, but it also looks to me as if they keep
returning to the same point, as in W.C. Escher's drawing. It both looks
to me as if they are ascending, and it looks to me as if they are not
ascending. Reality cannot be like that, and so I am led to refect on the
experience itself. I can, as it were, hold the content of my experience at
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arm's length, and ask myself which appearance I should accept.
Against a background of seeing how things are (and my other know-
ledge and worldview), and only against such a background, it may be
possible for me to make the decision. This is assured by the fact that
things normally are the way they look. The predictable patterns of our
lives allow for the normal case to be a spontaneous grasping of how
things are (it is a happy monotony that allows us to be at home in the
world).
All this, it seems to me, is very much in concord with McDowell's
philosophical outlook. But in Mind and World he is held back by a Fre-
gean heritage, as a result of which he only imperfectly follows this
approach. The structure of the bad case, in which one assesses whether
an appearance should be taken at face value or rejected as an illusion, is
projected onto the good case. That is just a consequence of the
force/content distinction. Given the conception of a thought as force-
less, the closest that one could come to ‘taking up the standpoint of a
thought' is taking up the standpoint of merely entertaining a thought;
transposed to experience, this is the moment of being presented with
an appearance to the efect that things are thus and so, without yet, as
far as thus being presented to goes, taking it that things are that way.
But this cannot be the normal case. We would not have enough to go on
to make a decision whether to take an appearance at face value if the
need to make a decision was not, as in reality it happily is, an excep-
tional circumstance. The situation in which that would be the normal
case is one where we would fnd ourselves in surroundings so alien
that nothing provides an anchor for us to orient ourselves; surround-
ings which would not be structured according to the fundamental
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categories of our thinking. But if McDowell is right that experience is
conceptually structured, then it follows that in such surroundings, our
capacity for perception would not be that. More generally, it is to be
expected that if our cognitive capacities belong to our natural history,
as per Wittgenstein's idea, they are only capacities in our habitat.
Rejecting the structure of being presented with an appearance (think-
able content), and accepting or rejecting it in response (attaching a
force), we can regain a truistic understanding of the reminder on
experience. In order to accommodate McDowell's idea that it can liter-
ally be seen that things are thus and so, we do not have to construe that
things are thus and so as an object of awareness; we can construe it as a
specifcation of how one sees the object of awareness to be, and so also
as a specifcation of how it is. I can say generically that I see where the
sparrow is, but I can also say more specifcally that I see that it is on the
table. Just as the sparrow is not divorced from how it is, say, its being
on the table, so its presence to me is not divorced from my seeing how
it is, including where it is: on the table. For the sparrow to be present to
m e is for me to see how it is. Although occasionally I can reject an
aspect of my experience as an illusion, there is normally no distance
between the presence of things to me and my seeing how they are
(which is not to deny, of course, that something can be present to me
without my seeing how it is in some respects).
Now the problems that arose before dissolve. (1) The naïve objection
was the expression of a misguided way of looking for facts, frst think-
ing of them as things on a par with the sort of thing we fnd around us
(the result of parsing ‘seeing that things are thus and so' as seeing what
‘that things are thus and so' refers to), and then fnding that they are
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not among the things around us. But facts are not things on a par with
the sort of things we fnd around us. Instead, we can think of facts as
aspects, specifcations, determinations, of how things are; in the case of
perceptually manifest facts, the way the sort of things which we fnd
around us manifestly are. If I see where the sparrow is (on the table), I
thereby take in a fact: the fact that the sparrow is on the table. And see-
ing where things are is certainly a familiar phenomenon.
(2) On my preferred alternative, the problem of false thought doesn't
arise. The only conception of falsehood that the identity theory has
room for is negative: “a thinkable is false if and only if it is not a fact.”
(Hornsby 1999: 243) This in efect means that internal negation, a nega-
tion of a predicate within a thought, has to be reduced to external
negation, a negation of the whole thought. For it to be false that the sta-
tion is open, according to the identity theory, is the same as for it to be
not the case, not a fact, that the station is open. Hornsby fails to say
more because she fails to use the thought to say when it would be false.
She, like McDowell, treats a thought as a simple unity (that things are
thus and so can be replaced by that p), and relates it as a whole to reality.
It was just this that made for the problem about the being of false
thoughts. It may seem that on my alternative, that problem would
return in the form of the problem of non-being. If truth lies in being so,
one might think falsehood lies in not being so, and this should trigger a
deep puzzlement about absolute non-being. But if we stop looking at a
thought, instead taking up the standpoint it constitutes, we can defne
falsehood as being not so: for it to be false that the station is open is for
it to be not open; that is, closed. (This cannot be said if we use that p,
instead of schematically spelling out the thought so that we have its
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structure at our disposal.) This gives a positive understanding of false-
hood. Instead of contrasting a thought with the whole of logical space,
it is contrasted with a local alternative. There is nothing intrinsically
puzzling about such local non-being. The station's being closed is just
as much a case of a station's being some way as the station's being open
(not that they are symmetric: one understands the station's being
closed as a deprivation). Such facts as the station's being closed and my
shoe-laces' being untied are negative facts which are nonetheless “in
the world”: there is not some positive fact which makes them true.78
Things are diferent for such facts as the sky's being not red. There is,
in a sense, no “the sky's being not red” in the world: what is in the
world is the sky's being blue, and it is because of this that one can say
truly that the sky is not red. But either way, there is not yet a puzzle
about how it is possible for one to think something that is not the case.
The puzzle is avoided by not equating a proposition with what is there
when it is true.
(3) Unlike a Fregean thought, being so does make up the causal, change-
able world. The sparrow's being on the table is locked in time: it begins
when the sparrow lands on the table, and ends when it fies away. In
thinking, one gains some independence from the fux, since one can
think that the sparrow is on the table even when it is not (currently),
and even when the sparrow or the table is not yet, or no longer, in
existence. If the sparrow is now on the table, it always was and always
will be true to think that it now is. (The independence is limited: there
78 This theme is explored in depth in the work of Jean-Philippe Narboux (e.g.,
Narboux 2009, 2011), to whom I am indebted for seeing the importance of re-
fusing to reduce internal negation to external negation.
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would have been no such thought if evolution had failed to create spar-
rows, or if this particular one had never come into being.) But this
atemporality of truth does not make the sparrow's being on the table
timeless. That is one way in which it is helpful to endorse a kind of
minimal dualism: it allows for making sense of the way in which
reason afords a certain independence from what is changeable. As
thinking animals, we are not locked in time the way other animals are.
We can allow for this independence by distinguishing, as the identity
theory of truth does not, between what is true or false - an act of judge-
ment, or its content, a proposition -, and what its truth or falsity lies in:
some thing's being some way.
My alternative avoids the problems with Fregean monism by distin-
guishing between a claim and a circumstance. But neither are
thinkaboutables; they are, in that sense, not things which in judgement
we relate to each other. In Tractarian terms, they are facts, not objects.
To say that the relation between them is internal is to say that it is not a
relation. This comes to expression in the formula: it is true (false) to say
that the man is pale because the man is, in fact, (not) pale. Because this
conception is not relational, the regress problems which dualism faces
are also avoided. To think a thought is not to think that the thought
stands in some relation to reality. It is to think the unity of its constitu-
ents, and thereby the unity of what its constituents speak of. Truth is a
kind of unity of thinking and being, but this not a sameness of think-
able and fact. It is rather the unity of the proposition which is
expressed in the verb or copula, and in which assertoric force comes to
expression in a judgement or assertion. Not “One can think, for
instance, that spring has begun, and that very same thing, that spring
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has begun, can be the case,” but, “One can think that spring has begun,
and the very thing one then thinks of, spring, can be the very way one
thinks it is, having begun.” 
I wrote before that monism can be characterised in this way: what our
words make manifest, the conceptual forms we express, we can also
grasp in our experience, and thus fnd enmattered in the world around
us. It is important that this is only normally so, and we can get a grasp
on what it means for this to be normally so by looking at departures
from the norm. Words poorly chosen may fail, on an occasion, to make
the intended thought manifest; a thought may fail to be either true or
false; and an experience in unfamiliar surroundings may become inco-
herent. In such cases our representations become themselves the
object of refection, obtruding themselves between us and a transpar-
ent viewpoint on the world. Such departures from the norm are in
many ways more interesting (as the work of Travis attests), and cer-
tainly more varied, than the norm itself. There is very little to say
about the norm—hence the emphasis on truisms. But we understand
failures of transparency as such, as failing to live up to a standard that
is internal to the sort of thing it is. This allows me to almost agree with
McDowell's core idea, “Our thinking can be distanced from the world
by being false, but there is no distance implicit in the very idea of
thought.” Our representations can be distanced from the world by
being false or opaque (e.g., inapt), but there is no distance implicit in
the very idea of representation.
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Conclusions
McDowell afrms two truisms which, in themselves, really are truistic,
and which are nonetheless helpful in order to discourage dualism: (1)
We can think that things are a certain way, and when we think truly,
things are in fact that way. (2) In experience it can be manifest that
things are a certain way.
But McDowell develops these reminders within a Fregean framework.
This comes to expression in two ways. (1') The use of 'that things are
thus and so' as a referring expression, so that the frst reminder
becomes: the very same thing that one can think can also be the case.
(2') The two-part structure of experience, so that the second reminder
becomes: in experience one is presented with an appearance to the
efect that things are thus and so, which, in response, one can either
accept at face value or reject as an illusion.
But understood like that, the reminders cease to be truistic. In fact they
are highly problematic. (1') Although McDowell calls “that things are
thus and so” a thinkable, in presenting his view he refers to it, and so
treats it as a thinkaboutable. But if a thinkable is a thing, it is the wrong
sort of thing to make a world out of. (2') We do not normally hold
appearances at arm's length and decide whether to accept them or not.
That McDowell knows, but the problem goes deeper: this could not
even be the normal case. The logical structure McDowell posits could
never be the surface structure.
We can regain the truistic form of the reminders when we reject the
Fregean framework (as is done in more detail in chapter II). They then
become (1'') I can think of something that it is some way, and when I
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think truly, the very thing I think of is the very way I think it is. (2'') To
see things is to see that things are thus and so. But to see that things are
thus and so is not to be presented with a thinkable content, but to see of
something that it is some way. (E.g., to see a bird, and in doing so, to see
where it is: on the table.) 
This amounts to a kind of minimal dualism: claim and circumstance are
distinguished, but they are not diferent thinkaboutables which in
thinking we relate to each other. A claim is true because a circumstance
obtains, but when we spell this out, the sense of a relation dissolves: it is




Aristotle, (Met.) (Cat.) (De Anima) in The Complete Works of Aristotle: The
Revised Oxford Translation, ed. Jonathan Barnes (Princeton: Princeton Uni-
versity Press, 1984).
J.L. Austin, (1950) “Truth,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supple-
mentary Volumes 24, 111-128.
Elizabeth Anscombe, (1957) Intention (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University
Press).
— (1965) “The intentionality of sensation,” in Ronald J. Butler (ed.),
Analytic Philosophy (Blackwell), 158-80.
Michael Beaney (ed.) (1997), The Frege Reader (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing.)
Jonathan Beere, (2010) Doing and Being (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
David Bell, (1987) “The Art of Judgement,” Mind 96, 221–244.
— (1996) “The formation of concepts and the structure of thoughts,” Philo-
sophy and Phenomenological Research 56: 3, 583-596.
Matthew Boyle, (2011) ‘Making up your mind and the activity of reason’,
Philosopher's Imprint 11.
— (2012) “Essentially rational animals,” in Rethinking epistemology, ed.
Guenther Abel and James Conant (Berlin, Germany: Walter de Grutyer).
— (forthcoming) “Additive Theories of Rationality: A Critique,”
European Journal of Philosophy.
Bill Brewer, (2011) Perception and Its Objects (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
Jim Conant, (2014) “Two Varieties of Scepticism,” in Varieties of Skepticism:
Essays after Kant, Wittgenstein, and Cavell (Walter de Gruyter: Berlin).
Donald Davidson (1973), ‘On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme’, Proceed-
196
ings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association, 47: 5–20;
reprinted in Davidson 2001.
— (1979) “Moods and Performances” in Davidson 2001: 109-122.
— (2001) Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
2nd edition).
René Descartes, (1641) Meditations on First Philosophy, tr. John Cottingham
(Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 1641/1996).
Julian Dodd, (1995) ‘McDowell and identity theories of truth,’ Analysis 55, 160
– 165.
Michael Dummett, (1973) Frege: Philosophy of Language (Cambridge, Mass.: Har-
vard University Press).
— (1991) “More about Thoughts,” in Frege and Other Philosophers
(Oxford: Clarendon Press), 289-314.
Gottlob Frege, (1879) Begriffsschrift, eine der arithmetischen nachgebildete Form-
alsprache des reinen Denkens (Halle: L. Nebert.). A selection is translated as
“Begrifsschrift: Selections (Preface and Part I)” in Beaney 1997, pp. 47-78.
— (1891) “Funktion und Begrif,” in Beaney 1997. 
— (1892) “Über Sinn und Bedeutung,” in Beaney 1997.
— (1918) ‘The Thought: a logical inquiry’, Mind 65, No. 259 (1956), 289-311.
— (1984) Collected Papers on Mathematics, Logic, and Philosophy, ed. B.
McGuiness (Basil Blackwell, Oxford).
— (PW)  Posthumous Writings (Oxford: Blackwell, 1979).
P.T. Geach, (1965) ‘Assertion’, The Philosophical Review 74, pp. 449-465.
Jennifer Hornsby, (1997) ‘Truth: the identity theory,’ Proceedings of the Aris-
totelian Society 97 (1), 1-24.
— (1999) ‘A Response to Dodd and to Candlish,’ Proceedings of the Aris-
totelian Society 99 (1999), 241-245.
197
Mark Eli Kalderon, (2011) 'Before the Law’, Philosophical Issues 21:1, 219–244.
C.I. Lewis, (1929) Mind and the World Order: Outlines of a Theory of Knowledge
(New York: Dover Publications).
Beatrice Longuenesse, (1998) Kant and the Capacity to Judge (Princeton: Prin-
ceton University Press).
John McDowell, (1984)  “De Re Senses,” The Philosophical Quarterly 34: 136
(Special Issue: Frege), pp. 283-294.
— (1994/6)  Mind and World, Cambridge, Ma.: Harvard University Press.
— (1998), “Having the World in View: Sellars, Kant, and Intentionality”,
Journal of Philosophy, vol. XCV, pp. 431-91. 
— (2002), “Responses”, in Smith, N. H. (ed.), Reading McDowell. On Mind
and World (London: Routledge), pp. 269-305. 
— (2005) “Evans's Frege,” in José Luis Bermúdez (ed.), Thought, Reference,
and Experience: Themes From the Philosophy of Gareth Evans (Oxford: Oxford Uni-
versity Press).
— (2008) “Avoiding the myth of the given,” in John McDowell: Experience,
Norm, and Nature, ed. Jakob Lindgaard (Blackwell, Oxford).
— (2011) Perception as a Capacity for Knowledge (Milwaukee: Marquette Uni-
versity Press).
Richard Moran, (2001) Authority and Estrangement: An Essay on Self-Knowledge
(Princeton: Princeton University Press.)
Jean-Philippe Narboux, (2011)  ‘There’s many a Slip between Cup and Lip' in
The Philosophy of J. L. Austin, ed. Martin Gustafsson and Richard Sørli
(Oxford: Oxford University Press), pp. 204-40.
Hilary Putnam, (1991) Representation and Reality (Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Uni-
versity Press).
Thomas Rickets, (1996) ‘Logic and Truth in Frege,’ in Proceedings of the Aris-
198
totelian Society Supplement 70, pp. 121–140.
Wilfrid Sellars, (1956) Empiricism and the philosophy of mind (Cambridge,
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1997).
P.F. Strawson, (1950) ‘Truth’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society SV XXIV,
Reprinted in his Logico-Linguistic Papers (London: Methuen, 1971). 
— (1974) “Imagination and Perception,” reprinted in his Freedom and
Resentment and Other Essays, London, Methuen, 1974, pp. 45–65.
Peter Sullivan, (2001) ‘A Version of the Picture Theory,' in Wittgenstein:
Tractatus – Klassiker Auslegen (Vossenkuhl W. (ed.). Berlin: Akademie Ver-
lag) .
— (2004) ‘Frege’s logic'. In D. Gabbay and J. Woods (Eds). Handbook of the
history of logic volume 3, pp. 671-762.
— (2005) ‘Identity Theories of Truth and the Tractatus', Philosophical
Investigations 28:1.
— (2011) ‘Synthesizing without concepts' in Beyond the Tractatus Wars,
ed. R. Read and M. A. Lavery, London: Routledge. 
Peter Sullivan and Colin Johnston, (forthcoming) ‘Judgements, facts and pro-
positions: theories of truth in Russell, Wittgenstein and Ramsey',
forthcoming inThe Oxford Handbook of Truth, ed. Michael Glanzberg (Oxford:
Oxford University Press).
Michael Thompson, (2008) Life and Action (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Uni-
versity Press).
Charles Travis, (2006) Thought's Footing (Oxford: Oxford University Press). 
— (2008) Occasion-sensitivity (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
— (2011) Objectivity and the Parochial (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
— (2013) Perception: Essays after Frege (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
— (2015) ‘Sufering intentionally?' in Wittgenstein and Perception, ed.
199
Michael Campbell and Michael O'Sullivan (London: Routledge).
— (forthcoming a) “The Move, The Divide, The Myth, and its Dogma”.
— (forthcoming b) “Sense and Sensitivity”.
— (forthcoming c) “Deliverances (Indirection)”.
Ludwig Wittgenstein, (TLP) Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (London: Kegan Paul,
1922).
— (PI) Philosophical Investigations (Oxford: Blackwell:1979).
200
